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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Elizabeth Anne Caldwell 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Philosophy 
 
September 2012 
 
Title: Embodiment and Agency: The Concept of Growth in John Dewey’s Philosophy of 
Education 
 
 
This project takes up recent literature exploring intersections between 
embodiment theory and education research.  I bring these literatures together around an 
interpretation of the concept of growth from John Dewey’s work on education, as I argue 
that this widely debated idea represents a particularly rich concept with respect to this 
intersection of theory.  I interpret his concept of growth as a concept regarding human 
agency, which I claim is a thoroughly embodied and felt phenomenon (as opposed to a 
purely rational capacity).  In this interpretation, I follow Dewey in claiming that growth is 
a valuable educational goal, arguing that when read as embodied agency, the concept of 
growth can be a helpful focus for encouraging the cultivation of students’ felt experiences 
of agency. 
The project begins by taking up Dewey and his work in the philosophy of 
education, emphasizing his definition of education as the reconstruction of experience 
and the ideal of growth as it relates to this reconstruction.  I outline Dewey’s conceptions 
of experience as well as his ideas regarding the self, the body-mind, and the relationship 
between habit and self-constitution.  While I claim that Dewey’s work offers a rich 
framework in which to think about growth, agency, and education, I then look to two 
 v 
 
alternate philosophical perspectives in supplementing his conception of the embodied 
self.  First, I take up the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in describing how his 
phenomenological perspective articulates a method for careful, first-person testimony 
regarding embodied experience, as this supplements Dewey’s view by focusing 
thematically on how embodied agency is felt and experienced.  Second, I take up the 
work of Michel Foucault in describing how his postmodern perspective articulates a 
method for deconstructing the social conditions that create contemporary, disciplinary 
body-subjects, as well as how his later work emphasizes care of the self, projects of self-
transformation, and practices of freedom.  These thinkers, I argue, can further Dewey’s 
emphasis on growth by providing resources regarding transformation as the unending 
process of self-creation, exploration, and the expansion of possibilities, which buttress 
Dewey’s idea of growth when interpreted as embodied agency.   
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CHAPTER I 
GROWTH, AGENCY, AND EMBODIMENT IN JOHN DEWEY’S  
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 
 
 This project examines a particular connection between embodiment and 
education, focusing on a key idea from John Dewey’s philosophy: the concept of growth 
as an educational aim.  Specifically, I interpret Dewey’s concept of growth, which is 
central to much of his philosophy but is particularly vital to his work on education, as an 
idea regarding human agency.  More specifically, I emphasize that agency is not simply a 
rational faculty or cognitive ability, but is an embodied phenomenon relating to the ways 
in which individuals feel themselves to be active, capable agents in the midst of changing 
situations.  That is, I am interpreting growth as the development and enrichment of ever-
increasing potentials for exercising one’s agency, which involves her ability to form 
intentions and carry out projects, but in addition, addresses her capacities for living her 
life with deliberate engagements in which she finds meaning, purpose, and a sense of 
possibility.  This sense of possibility, I maintain throughout the project, is a felt, 
embodied phenomenon, an element of one’s embodied participation in an environment, 
which draws on and works in conjunction with an awareness of her potentials.  It is this 
sense of possibility that I find critical to a rich sense of embodied agency, and thus, this is 
a part of how I interpret growth as an educational ideal.  As such, my project begins with 
Dewey’s work on education and growth, continues through his accounts of the self and 
the body-mind, and augments these accounts with two others, those of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty and Michel Foucault.  I put these thinkers in dialogue to show how each 
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perspective on embodiment has something unique to offer a reading of embodied agency, 
with a view to how the process of education might cultivate students’ agency through 
embodied learning practices.  In short, I am marrying Dewey’s conception of educational 
growth with accounts of the body that both highlight and contextualize human agency as 
embodied.  My goal in employing these thinkers is to show the relevance of Dewey’s 
idea when it comes to discussions of education and embodiment, arguing that this 
grouping of philosophers can provide rich resources for thinking about educational 
practice as the cultivation of embodied agency.   
 Dewey’s views on education hold a central place with respect to his philosophy 
more broadly understood, as he believes education to be the sphere where philosophical 
commitments are truly tested and where their effects are most pointedly felt.  His view of 
education’s centrality can be seen in his definition of education as a reconstruction of 
experience, such that future experience might be enriched by the increase in connections 
and depth of meaning in present and future experience.  While a broad and far reaching 
definition, I find this to be a compelling description of how education transforms 
experience, and thus, it forms the starting point for the current investigation.  However, 
because we live our lives as embodied human beings, and thus educate ourselves and 
others as such, my inquiry moves to how experience is reconstructed insofar as our 
bodies are the conduits or vehicles of such experience, the pivots of such constructions 
and reconstructions.  
 Moreover, a large part of Dewey’s focus on education is not about teaching 
students particular subjects, or on what kind of material educators should be 
incorporating into their classrooms.  While much of his emphasis is on methodology 
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more specifically than content,1 his work maintains a consistent emphasis on educating 
the whole person, educating students by way of harnessing the interests and impulses 
they express on their own and channeling these energies into organized, productive 
pursuits.  He advocates using the method of inquiry in educational strategies, aiming to 
develop processes and subjects of learning that not only pique students’ interest and 
allow them to engage in investigation in a “natural” way, but he also aims for educational 
methods that will strengthen their abilities for intelligent inquiry and action and for 
sensitive, thoughtful engagements with the world.  In short, Dewey’s educational vision 
does not simply seek to teach students about the world, but to generate environments in 
which students learn how to live well in the world, interacting with it and with others 
harmoniously, and cultivating habits of thoughtful, reflective, deliberate activity so that 
their lives might be characterized by direction, purpose, and meaning.  To capture this 
sense of purpose and meaning, Dewey often describes fruitful educational pursuits as 
those which foster growth, and the aim of growth is to cultivate more growth and more 
meaningful growth.  While over time, this definition has proven to be rather 
controversial, I believe it can offer helpful resources for thinking about the processes and 
the benefits of education, and as such, it is the idea from Dewey’s work that inspires 
much of the following project. 
 While interpretations of growth have varied since the time of Dewey’s writing, I 
will argue here that the concept of growth can be interpreted as a concept regarding 
                                                
1 His work addresses subject matter and content to some degree, but the larger thrust of 
his emphasis on education lies with a particular approach to teaching and learning.  He 
leaves many specifics about material intentionally up to local educators and 
administrators, so that they might orient curricula and generate particular educational 
structures according to the needs of their communities. 
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human agency.  I will characterize growth as an ideal related to the experienced, felt 
potential to actualize possibilities in one’s life, in addition to being an ideal of 
intelligence in surveying and acting within situations and generating connections between 
experiences.  In other words, I read growth as a concept signaling an increase in 
intelligence, perceptive capacities, and facility at making connections, but also signalling 
an increase in individuals’ felt capacities for forming intentions, executing purposes, and 
operating with a sense of one’s own potential.  In other words, I understand growth to 
highlight the enhancement not only of intelligent action, but also of one’s awareness and 
sense of purpose in being an intelligent and capable actor in the world.  This takes me to 
the question of embodiment, in that increasing one’s agency, or her felt capacities for 
deliberate action, is a markedly embodied phenomenon; it is a capacity that must be 
experienced in and through one’s entire being, felt in one’s sense of self in a holistic 
fashion, in order for its efficacy to be realized.2  I will argue that a felt sense of agency is 
important for articulating one’s intentions and executing one’s purposes in the world, and 
thus, it is an important part of one’s educative prospects, especially when thinking about 
growth as an educational aim.  Moreover, I believe that the agency to formulate and 
execute one’s intentions necessitates a sense of trust and confidence in one’s entire being, 
                                                
2 While I am not engaging her work at length in this project, I acknowledge that my use 
of “capacities” and “capabilities” resonates with Martha Nussbaum’s development of 
these ideas in her capabilities approach to a theory of justice.  My use of these ideas bears 
some relation to hers, in that according to her approach, capabilities are networks of 
substantial, actual freedoms or sets of actual, living opportunities for individuals to make 
choices and execute actions effecting their lives.  Moreover, she views education as one 
of these fundamental capabilities that all individuals deserve access to, as part of the 
capability of developing freedoms of imagination, thinking, and practical reason.  
However, Nussbaum’s conception of the human self differs somewhat from the one I will 
develop, insofar as her discussion moves from, and is directed towards, the tradition of 
political liberalism.  See Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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in her capacities of mind and body.3  In short, I am reading Dewey’s concept of growth as 
an ideal of agency and I am reading agency as a thoroughly embodied phenomenon.  I 
will conclude that embodied agency is a plausible way to interpret Dewey’s idea of 
growth and thus, will think about what this conception of growth means for educational 
practice. 
 There are several motivating factors for making this claim and for emphasizing 
what it might entail for education.  One factor regards the question of agency as an 
embodied phenomenon, and another, more pressing one, includes the current conditions 
shaping the lives (and agencies) of students.4  First, while agency might generally be 
considered the capacity of an individual or group to act in the world, or to consciously 
develop intentions and carry them out in activity, my reading of this idea will emphasize 
the felt experience of such a capacity, a brand of confidence or trust in one’s sense of self 
and one’s abilities.  I am emphasizing this kind of confidence or trust in one’s embodied 
self as a thoroughly felt, experiential quality, a component of encountering and engaging 
with situations that may not be consciously recognized or able to be rationally articulated.  
However, as a way of encountering situations, I stress that one’s agency emerges largely 
                                                
3 While using the language of “mind and body” as if they were separate things seems to 
lose something of the existential reality of human experience, I will use them distinctly at 
points to highlight the various shades of embodied experience, as well as describing ways 
mind and body have been historically interpreted as separate and separable entities.  Like 
Dewey, who roundly rejects dualism of all varieties, I also believe that any separation of 
the two is a matter of linguistic convention for discussing these phenomena of human life 
in different ways.  I do not believe they are fundamentally separate “things,” though the 
language used to describe them might at times appear as such. 
 
4 I focus primarily on students in the United States working within the public school 
system.  While I do not always state explicitly, I tend to think primarily about the 
embodied conditions of middle and high school students (though I believe many of my 
claims would apply to elementary-aged students as well). 
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through her felt, embodied sense of being an active, capable participant in her world.  
This interpretation runs counter to some of the ways in which canonical philosophical 
traditions have characterized agency, casting it as a purely rational capacity and linking it 
with decision-making, identity, and autonomy.  In her introduction to the volume 
Embodiment and Agency, Letitia Meynell describes how agency has been typically 
characterized as  “distinguished from mere bodily activity and ... intimately tied to the 
mind,” and how it has historically emphasized “rationality and free will.”5  She claims 
that in the European tradition, the agent was basically identified with the mind, and thus, 
the mind became the focus for further philosophical inquiries into knowledge and ethics.6  
While the focus of my energies will not be specifically on overturning this limited 
conception of agency and expounding on its flaws (acknowledging also that some 
important work along this line has been conducted), I will be emphasizing a reading of 
agency that underscores its experiential and embodied character.  In doing so, I will be 
echoing some of the thinkers whose work is collected in this volume, who examine 
agency through a range of lenses, challenging the conception of the autonomous, rational 
individual by emphasizing the impacts of the embodied character of experience.7 
                                                
5 Letitia Meynell, Introduction to Embodiment and Agency, eds. Sue Campbell, Letitia 
Meynell, and Susan Sherwin. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2009), 2. 
 
6 Ibid. 
 
7 The essays in this volume take up factors such as emotion, relationality, narrativity, 
memory, race, gender, and the effects of globalization into their accounts of embodied 
agency.  While my approach does not focus specifically on these factors, I wish to 
acknowledge the important work done in articulating how these facets of existence can 
play a role in influencing one’s embodied experience of agency. 
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 While not necessarily always using the same focus on agency, recent research on 
the phenomenon of stereotype threat touches on a similar aspect of how one’s actions and 
performances can be influenced by factors outside of their control, particularly by factors 
that tend to operate outside the sphere of rational capacity and more on the level of felt, 
experiential qualities.  Briefly, stereotype threat documents the phenomenon that being a 
part of a particular social group about whom stereotypes exist can negatively influence 
one’s performance.  In other words, if a stereotype exists for a certain group, a member of 
that group is susceptible to performing below her potential (or her performance in a 
different context) if the threat of fulfilling the stereotype is present.  Initially researched 
and documented by Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson in the 1990s, their findings 
demonstrate that the presence of a stereotype can markedly hinder the performance of 
someone threatened by fulfilling that stereotype, and moreover, they find that the impact 
is heightened in situations where individuals are in some way “primed” to experience the 
stereotype before or while performing a task.8  Since their initial studies with African-
                                                
8 Claude M. Steele and Joshua Aronson, “Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual 
Performance of African-Americans,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69, 
no. 5 (1995): 797-811.  This initial work was with African-American and White college 
students (at a prestigious university, where all students were fairly high achievers to 
begin with), assessing students’ performance with respect to the stereotype that African-
Americans have lesser intellectual capacities than Whites.  Their experiments included 
difficult tests emphasizing verbal ability and problem solving, taken by students divided 
into several groups, each with the same number of White and African-American students.  
One group was told that the test was a measure of intellectual ability: this was the 
diagnostic group, the group primed for stereotype threat.  Another group was told that the 
test was simply a laboratory experiment, not measuring their intellectual abilities 
(nondiagnostic).  A third group was told that the test was a challenge and they should try 
their best (nondiagnostic, control).  The results – of varying experiments with this model, 
controlling different variables in different experiments – consistently showed that the 
African-American students in the diagnostic group, the ones who were told the test was a 
measure of intellectual ability, underperformed compared to the other groups.  Their 
results tended to be lower than the White students in the diagnostic group as well as all 
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American and White college students, more than 200 studies have been performed 
regarding various aspects of this phenomenon, generally confirming the result of their 
findings: that stereotype threat can significantly impact not only students’ achievement, 
but also their perceptions of their abilities, and their expectations for achievement in the 
future.9  
 There are several hypotheses for how stereotype threat works, but the general 
consensus is that individuals experience pressure not to conform to an existing stereotype 
as an added cognitive burden while working on a given task, and this pressure can bring 
distraction and divided attention.  Some hypotheses state that this added burden inhibits 
individuals’ use of working memory, can trigger uncertainties regarding one’s abilities, 
can heighten sensitivity to mistakes, can foster feelings of dissociation within one’s 
identity by attempts to distance oneself from the stereotyped group, and can generally 
increase distraction and anxiety, all of which can inhibit performance.10  What this 
phenomenon goes to show is that the exercise of one’s agency is far from a unilateral, 
uncomplicated, purely rational process.  It is a particular demonstration that the felt 
characters of one’s experience – often unconscious ones – can be significant in how one 
                                                                                                                                            
the students in the nondiagnostic and control groups.  Through variations in these and 
other experiments, Steele and Aronson concluded that the threat of conforming to a 
negative stereotype about one’s group can significantly impact one’s performance. 
 
9 Debra Viadero, “Experiments Aim to Ease Effects of ‘Stereotype Threat,” Education 
Week 27, no. 9 (October 24, 2007), 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2007/10/24/09gap.h27.html.  Some variations on 
these studies have shown that the stereotype that girls are not as good at math as boys 
impact girls’ performance on math tests, as well as stereotypes regarding the intellectual 
capacities of Latinos and other minority groups (including African-Americans, Asian-
Americans, and elderly populations).  
 
10 Toni Schmader, “Stereotype Threat Deconstructed,” Current Directions in 
Psychological Science 19, no. 1 (2010): 14-18. 
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experiences her own possibilities and potentials in that situation.  In other words, the 
presence of stereotype threat demonstrates that one’s agency might be effected in ways 
not relating to her intellectual ability, but through the presence of pervasive attitudes and 
atmospheres with which she interacts.  If agency is understood as an embodied 
phenomenon and not simply a rational faculty, as a facet of situations in their complete 
and felt totalities, the presence of stereotype threat can explain how one’s felt, embodied 
agency can be incongruent with one’s “believed” or “cognitive” agency, or how there 
might be disconnects between how one acts given oppressive circumstances and how one 
might act in their absence. 
 In this work, I will cast the embodied character of agency as a felt quality within 
human action, as a sort of trust that is not simply a rational capacity of decision-making 
or the intellectual exercise of one’s reason, but also involves a felt, experienced sense that 
one is able to form intentions, carry out purposes, and develop a sense of her own 
presence as an actor in the midst of changing circumstances.  I will claim that this feeling 
of faith in one’s capacities is significant for developing one’s agency, in that, lacking this 
experiential sense of trust poses difficulties in developing a strong sense of oneself as an 
efficacious actor in the world, as an individual both responsible for her actions and 
capable of creating her own life within certain constraints.  The phenomenon of 
stereotype threat might be seen as one instance of this kind of inhibition, where students 
so threatened can experience their academic potential and future opportunities as 
circumscribed, and unwarrantedly so.  Through the course of this project, I will argue that 
this kind of felt, experienced trust in oneself might be characterized as an embodied 
“belief” or felt sense that she is able to act intelligently and effectively in her world, and 
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that her possibilities for continued growth are real and actualizable (which entails the 
recognition from others that such possibilities are real and actualizable as well).  By 
characterizing this element of agency as an embodied belief or sense, I am viewing 
agency as a felt, experiential phenomenon, one that is rooted in the embodied nature of 
human life and the pervasive qualities of feeling that emerge as part of lived experience.  
In highlighting the felt sense of experience, I am borrowing from Mark Johnson’s 
analysis, presented most recently in The Meaning of the Body, of the embodied sense of 
experience that helps form the roots of our thinking and development of meaning.11  His 
emphasis on the pervasive, qualitative sense of experience helps to characterize the 
significance of feeling when it comes to engaging in situations and the possibilities we 
discover therein.  My approach similarly aims to stress the embodied character of agency, 
our sense of ourselves as capable and efficacious actors, and how it might be enriched 
through education.  I believe educative growth might be well served by acknowledging 
the body’s vulnerabilities and resiliencies, its obstacles and successes, its frailties and its 
wonders; and importantly, not least of such wonders is our capacity for near-continual 
change, renewal, and transformation, or in other words, growth. 
 The second, and perhaps more pressing motivation behind this project, concerns 
many of the conditions present in current educational systems and structures.  Not only 
are residues of dualistic thought prevalent in much traditional educational practice (one 
can imagine a classroom where students sit quietly, relatively passively, at tidily 
organized rows of desks, while the teacher actively fills their brains with information, in 
                                                
11 Mark Johnson, The Meaning of the Body (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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the style of Paulo Freire’s banking model of education12), but other contemporary factors 
are at play in schools as well.  Predominant among these are increases in standardized 
testing as the measure of educational success, with subsequent pushes to decrease school 
time on subjects not related to testing results.  This is compounded by drastic funding 
cuts for education, as federal, state, and local budgets get squeezed tighter and tighter in 
the current (early 21st century) economic climate.  The result of these factors is often the 
dramatic reduction (or complete elimination) of classes and programs that are considered 
extracurricular, and a large share of this burden falls on arts and music classes as well as 
sports and physical education programs.13  As such, students across the country today are 
much less likely to participate in these classes and programs on a regular basis; moreover, 
as programs are cut, the costs often fall to participating students and their families, 
prohibiting some from (regular) participation.  
 This situation is made worse by the conditions surrounding food and nutrition for 
many students.  Increases in the availability of highly processed foods and beverages, 
paired with a lack of fresh, locally available food and produce (especially in some urban 
areas), means that the food choices largely available (and marketed) to students leaves 
fewer options for many students to develop healthy, balanced eating habits.14  Paired with 
                                                
12 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum Publishing, 1990). 
 
13 Judith Davidson discusses this phenomenon, particularly with respect to arts education, 
as the increasing degree to which arts, music, and dance educators teach on borrowed 
time, in borrowed spaces, and with borrowed students/borrowed bodies.  See “Embodied 
Knowledge: Possibilities and Constraints in Arts Education and Curriculum,” in Knowing 
Bodies, Moving Minds: Towards Embodied Teaching and Learning, ed. Liora Bresler 
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), 197-212. 
 
14 CDC, “The Obesity Epidemic and United States Students,” accessed August 19, 2012, 
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/yrbs/pdf/us_obesity_combo.pdf. 
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decreases in physical education and overall levels of physical activity, this leads to the 
dramatic increases in childhood obesity rates seen across the U.S.15 Moreover, 
contributing to this trend are students tending to spend more free time engaged with 
visual technology (computers and the Internet, video games, cell phones, televisions, 
etc.), further decreasing time that students spend engaged in physical activity, both in and 
out of school.  The confluence of all these forces means that the conditions shaping 
students’ embodiments have come to face many new and potentially harmful, 
disempowering influences.  This also means that attending to the embodied experiences 
of students, particularly as to the ways they experience themselves as active agents with 
open possibilities, is a significant issue facing education today. 
 I should note the many thinkers who have explored connections between 
embodiment and education whose work has influenced this project (in addition to the 
principal figures already mentioned).  Most notably, Marjorie O’Loughlin’s work on 
education and embodiment takes up many interrelated issues of education, curricula, and 
pedagogical practice in connection with embodiment, emotion, empathy, aesthetics, and 
sociality.16  She also employs the work of Dewey and Merleau-Ponty (among others) in 
her treatments, advocating a view of the body that emphasizes its character as active, 
                                                
15 Childhood and adolescent obesity rates have more than tripled over the last three 
decades, with research from 2008 showing that more than one-third of American children 
and adolescents are overweight or obese (CDC, “Adolescent and School Health,” 
accessed August 14, 2012, http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/obesity/facts.htm). 
 
16 Marjorie O’Loughlin, “Paying Attention to Bodies in Education: Theoretical Resources 
and Practical Suggestions,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 30, no. 3 (1998): 275-
298; “Overcoming the Problems of ‘Difference’ in Education: Empathy as 
‘Intercorporeality,’” Studies in Philosophy and Education 17 (1998): 283-294; 
“Recovering the Body for Aesthetics Education: A Brief Philosophical Exploration,” 
Forum of Education: A Journal of Theory, Research, Policy, and Practice 50, no. 2 
(2000): 11-18. 
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productive, and communicative.  Her work aims to merge the discourses of education and 
philosophical accounts of embodiment, stressing that theories articulating the body as 
central to subjectivity, emotional consciousness, and sociality are vital to understanding 
the processes of learning and meaning-making.  Her 2006 book, Embodiment and 
Education: Exploring Creatural Existence, explores several of these themes in depth: the 
ocularcentric ordering of the world and of knowledge; the embodied and “implaced” 
character of all “creatural” existence, including the meaning-making character of human 
life; the productive and reproductive character of working bodies; the emotional and 
social character of existence and their roles in education; and the embodied nature of 
citizenship and civic participation.17  O’Loughlin relates each of these discussions to 
questions of education, also examining ways in which the embodied characters of these 
experiences are often neglected or denigrated, resulting in a detriment to our collective 
understanding of life and our enactment of embodied relations within it.  While her 
account of the “creatural,” her term for the unique type of animality human beings 
demonstrate, includes a brief account of creatural agency as embodied,18 a treatment of 
embodied agency more broadly speaking remains somewhat in the background of her 
analysis.  However, her original work has been quite helpful for me in thinking about 
how attention to the body can enhance one’s connections to their environment and to 
others, linking educational practices to the embodied praxis of everyday life.    
 Similarly, Sherry Shapiro’s Pedagogy and the Politics of the Body represents 
another book-length treatment of this connection.  Her work provides accounts of her 
                                                
17 Marjorie O’Loughlin, Embodiment and Education: Exploring Creatural Existence 
(Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2006). 
 
18 Ibid., 83-4. 
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experiments in teaching dance, including some suggestions for incorporating more 
attention to the body in the traditional classroom and curriculum.  In engaging critical 
pedagogy in her teaching, she aims to provide a space where students’ voices and bodies 
are highlighted as agential components of personal transformation and liberatory 
expression.19  As such, her work raises questions regarding the embodied nature of 
agency and the deliberate projects of self-transformation one can undergo via bodily 
practice, particularly through dance.  In a similar vein, Peter McLaren’s discussion of the 
postmodern body addresses the interwoven characters of desire, subjectivity, and modes 
of production within capitalist and media-driven culture.  He stresses the need for critical 
pedagogy to develop a language that acknowledges the body/subject as both “inscribed 
upon” and agentially empowered.20 
 The volume Knowing Bodies, Moving Minds offers a collection in which thinkers 
from various disciplines, including many from teachers in non-traditional venues, offer 
their insights regarding the connection between education and embodiment.  The 
collection takes up a wide range of questions regarding this connection: the essays within 
it tackle questions ranging from the “disappearance” of the body in education through 
emphases on rationality, control, and surveillance; reports on experiments with dance 
classes in Juvenile Hall; and the woeful conditions that many arts and music classes are 
forced to operate in, working with limited time, space, and support, often relegated to a 
                                                
19 Sherry Shapiro, Pedagogy and the Politics of the Body: A Critical Praxis (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1999). 
 
20 Peter McLaren, “Schooling the Postmodern Body: Critical Pedagogy and the Politics 
of Enfleshment,” in Postmodernism, Feminism, and Cultural Politics, ed. Henry Giroux 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 144-173. 
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marginal (if even present) position in curricula.21  Barbara Satina and Francine Hultgren 
emphasize the embodied character of education for women and girls specifically, 
advocating for educational exercises that foster students’ “bodily competence” in 
empowering themselves and overcoming residues of mind/body dualism in education.22  
Diana Gustafson’s discussion of teaching and learning incorporates her experiences with 
medicine, sociology, and the practice of qi gong in exploring the body as an 
epistemological site, its role in the construction of self, and its potential as a political 
signifier.23  Margaret Macintyre Latta and Gayle Buck’s essay pairs case studies of 
middle-school science classes with insights from a particular children’s game, looking at 
how the embodied trust present in the game might be linked to the development of 
familiarity and discovery of possibilities through awareness of one’s own body amidst 
others in educational pursuits.24  Richard Shusterman applies his theory of somaesthetics 
to humanities education, arguing that the cultivation of bodily awareness would aid 
                                                
21 Michael Peters, “Education and the Philosophy of the Body: Bodies of Knowledge and  
Knowledges of the Body,” in Knowing Bodies, Moving Minds, 13-28; Joseph Tobin, 
“The Disappearance of the Body in Early Childhood Education,” in Knowing Bodies, 
Moving Minds, 111-126; Janice Ross, “The Instructable Body: Student Bodies from 
Classrooms to Prisons,” in Knowing Bodies, Moving Minds, 169-182; Judith Davidson, 
“Embodied Knowledge: Possibilities and Constraints in Arts Education and Curriculum,” 
in Knowing Bodies, Moving Minds, 197-212. 
 
22 Barbara Satina & Francine Hultgren, “The Absent Body of Girls Made Visible:  
Embodiment as the Focus in Education,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 20 (2001): 
521-534. 
 
23 Diana L. Gustafson, “Embodied Learning: The Body as an Epistemological Site,” in  
Meeting the Challenge: Innovative Feminist Pedagogies in Action, eds. Maralee 
Mayberry and Ellen Cronan Rose (New York: Routledge, 1999), 249-274. 
 
24 Margaret Macintyre Latta & Gayle Buck, “Enfleshing Embodiment: ‘Falling into 
Trust’ with the Body’s Role in Teaching and Learning,” Educational Philosophy and 
Theory 40, no. 2 (2008): 315-329. 
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students in developing closer attention to processes of perception and thought.25  While 
embodied agency and Deweyan growth are only sometimes at the forefront of these 
discussions (and especially not together), these treatments demonstrate that the 
conversation surrounding the role of the body in education has become more robust in 
recent years. 
 While most the research discussed thus far stems from philosophers, particularly 
embodiment philosophers with interests in education, there are discourses surrounding 
the body within educational theory as well.  One of these literatures takes up the 
relationship between physical education, physical fitness and health, and learning and 
academic performance.  For example, a 2010 review of research, compiled and presented 
by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in conjunction with the CDC and 
other national health organizations, addresses these connections through evaluating the 
results of an array of independent research projects, conducted by educational theorists 
and health experts.26  Their findings take into account a variety of types and sources of 
physical activity, and across the board, these studies suggest that regular physical activity 
                                                
25 Richard Shusterman, “Thinking through the Body, Educating for the Humanities: A 
Plea for Somaesthetics,” Journal of Aesthetic Education 40 (2006): 1-21.  
 
26 CDC, “The Association Between School-Based Physical Activity, Including Physical 
Education, and Academic Performance,” (Atlanta: U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2010).  The study provides a survey of studies performed in recent 
years on this relationship, addressing a variety of physical engagements (PE classes, 
physical activity in class, and recess) and assesses the effects these activities have on 
various elements of academic performance.  They look at academic achievement (based 
on grades and standardized test scores), academic behaviors (attitudes and behaviors 
toward academic work, as self-reported by students and observed by teachers), and 
indicators of cognitive skills and attitudes (such as concentration, memory, self-esteem, 
and verbal skills).  The study found that each type of physical activity studied had overall 
positive effects on these target factors; while some effects were deemed neutral, there 
were hardly any effects that were considered negative.   
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has either a positive or neutral relationship to students’ academic performance, and that 
physical activity in schools, on the whole, has very few (if any) negative effects.  Most 
notable in these findings is that increased time dedicated to physical activity in school 
does not appear to have a negative effect on academic achievement (grades and test 
scores), despite having less time devoted each day to preparing for material on 
standardized tests.27  Also, the overwhelming majority of studies showed positive impacts 
on academic behaviors and cognitive attitudes, including factors such as self-esteem and 
social cooperation.  The study also concludes that participating in extra-curricular sports 
programs is related to decreases in drop-out rates and increases in reported self-esteem 
and social connectedness. 
  However, despite these findings, the National Education Association (NEA) 
reports that students today rarely partake in recommended amounts of physical activity 
on a regular basis.  Recommendations from the NEA suggest at least 150 minutes of 
physical activity for elementary students per week (an average of 30 minutes per school 
day), and 225 minutes a week for middle and high school students per week (an average 
of 45 minutes per school day).28  The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
puts this number higher: they recommend at least 60 minutes of physical activity per 
                                                
27 Another comprehensive study, conducted by Canadian researchers and assessing a 
large collection of research, came to very similar conclusions: that increased time 
engaged in physical activity has an overall positive effect on academic performance, 
despite having less formal instruction time.  See François Trudeau and Roy J. Shephard, 
“Physical Education, School Physical Activity, School Sports and Academic 
Performance,” International Journal of Behavioral Nutrition and Physical Activity 5, no. 
10 (2008): 10-20. 
 
28 National Education Association, “Student Health – Physical Education,” accessed 
August 13, 2012,  www.educationvotes.nea.org/wp.../StudentHealth-
PhysEdOnepager.pdf. 
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day.29  The NEA reports also that only one state accords with this recommendation, and 
only five states require physical education in grades K-12.  Most states (47) have their 
own standards for physical education, but only 33 of these states require local districts to 
comply with those standards.  A CDC survey found that only 29% of high school 
students surveyed had gotten 60 minutes of activity per day in the week prior to the 
survey; 14% reported that they had not gotten this much activity in any day in the week 
prior.  Only about half (52%) of students reported that they had attended physical 
education classes in any average week, and the number of students attending physical 
education classes daily drops to 31%.30  These findings suggest that huge numbers of 
students are missing out on vital parts of a comprehensive education, particularly, 
elements emphasizing their embodied lives, which are key for many to helping them 
grow into healthy, flourishing, empowered agents.  
 In short, the main thrust of this research serves to support conclusions similar to 
ones I argue for – an increased level of energy and attention devoted to embodied 
practices – though their conclusions are drawn from a different vantage point.  Not only 
does this research document the decrease in bodily activity in recent schooling trends, it 
documents also the positive impacts that reversing this trend can provide.  However, the 
conclusions reached are largely due to justifications related to academic performance, 
fitness levels and overall health, whereas mine are based on a particular reading of an 
educational goal: growth as embodied agency.  Of course, factors such as nutritional 
                                                
29 CDC, “The Association Between School-Based Physical Activity, Including Physical 
Education, and Academic Performance.” 
 
30 CDC, “Physical Activity Facts – Adolescent and School Health,” accessed August 13, 
2012, http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/physicalactivity/facts.htm. 
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health and physical fitness are important parts of an overall picture of embodied agency, 
but my focus is on the felt experience of such agency.31  As such, these recommendations 
address an important part of this issue, but increasing physical activity alone is not likely 
to be the sole or single most effective avenue for addressing students’ embodied 
experiences of agency.  
 In addition to this literature, there is a discourse in education theory surrounding 
the variety of learning styles students demonstrate, including a bodily-kinesthetic 
learning style, stemming from Howard Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences.  The 
theory states that individuals tend to operate through a particular profile of these 
intelligences; Gardner identifies Logical-Mathematical, Musical, Linguistic, Spatial, 
Intrapersonal, Interpersonal, and Bodily-Kinesthetic intelligences as relatively 
independent modes of intellectual competence.32  The theory states that individuals show 
different profiles favoring and combining these intelligences in particular ways.  With 
respect to bodily-kinesthetic learners, Gardner claims that the cores of bodily intelligence 
are “control of one’s bodily motions and capacity to handle objects skillfully,” using 
examples such as dancers and mimes as individuals demonstrating this type of 
intelligence in powerful ways.33  Moreover, according to Galeet BenZion, a education 
                                                
31 Moreover, some thinkers, particularly from dance education, claim that as physical 
education tends to emphasize physical fitness as its primary goal, other aspects of 
embodied knowledge and ways of “educating the body” tend to get sidelined (Susan W. 
Stinson, “My Body/Myself: Lessons from Dance Education,” in Knowing Bodies, 
Moving Minds, 127-152). 
 
32 Howard Gardner, Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences (New York: 
Basic Books, 1983).  His later work adds Naturalistic and Spiritual intelligences to this 
list.  
 
33 Ibid., 206. 
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theorist studying kinesthetic learning, these learners feature “a cognitive potential 
realized by activities that allows one to use the body to express a thought or a goal 
directed action;”34 and tend to favor “learning triggered by sensations that are generated 
by the body through motion, emotion, thoughts and ideas, and that is expressed through 
movement of the human body.”35  As such, the theory continues that identifying students’ 
learning styles and teaching using methods that highlight these capacities and skills – 
known to some as the “meshing hypothesis”36 – is the most effective way to maximize 
learning.  In practice, this entails that educators distinguish which students tend to fall 
into the various learning styles, and design lessons specifically for the styles their 
students demonstrate.   
 Educators and researchers have found evidence that gearing lessons towards 
students’ particular learning styles has marked positive results.  This seems to be 
particularly salient with kinesthetic learning, given that students identified as kinesthetic 
learners may be prone to struggling with elements of the traditional curriculum and 
traditional styles of teaching.  Indeed, Gardner states that the typical modern, secular 
school puts a premium on logical-mathematical, linguistic, and to some extent, 
intrapersonal intelligences, while spatial, interpersonal, and kinesthetic intelligences 
                                                
34 Galeet BenZion Westreich, “An Analysis of Kinesthetic Learners’ Responses: 
Teaching Mathematics Through Dance” (PhD diss., American University, 1999), 10.  
 
35 Ibid.  BenZion is paraphrasing the work of Margaret H’Doubler here, a dance educator 
and theorist. 
 
36 Harold Pasher, Mark McDaniel, Doug Rohrer, and Robert Bjork, “Learning Styles: 
Concepts and Evidence,” Psychological Science in the Public Interest 9, no. 3 (2009): 
105-119. 
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receive far less emphasis.37  Students identified as kinesthetic learners may tend to have a 
hard time sitting still and concentrating for extended periods of time, and may have 
higher rates of behavioral issues for this reason.  For example, a recent study conducted 
with fourth grade students identified as kinesthetic learners focused on a variety of dance 
and movement-related activities linked with mathematics learning objectives.38  At the 
close of the study, the researchers found that not only the students’ math scores 
improved, they also showed improvements with respect to social interactions, verbal 
abilities, and problem-solving skills.39  Interestingly, many parents of the students 
involved in the study commented on their students’ improvements in coping behaviors, 
self-control, self-confidence, and communication skills.40  As such, some of this research 
suggests that the differences faced by kinesthetic learners in traditional schools may be 
meliorated through an increase in kinesthetic-oriented learning practices, recommending 
that teachers incorporate more full-body engagement exercises into the standard 
classroom. 
 However, there are also growing debates about the validity of learning styles 
approaches and the effectiveness they have in the classroom.  Recent research has shown 
that students from different learning styles do not show significant differences responding 
                                                
37 Gardner, Frames of Mind, 353. 
 
38 BenZion’s work documents this study.  Kinesthetic-focused math activities include 
things such as asking students to create a certain shape with their bodies, working alone 
or with a partner; asking them to move according to a certain shape or type of image; or 
asking them to express what 4 x 2 is through bodily comportment or movement.  Often 
such exercises are followed by asking students to describe their thought and movement 
processes, or to write down the results of their bodily experiment. 
 
39 BenZion, “Kinesthetic Learner’s Responses,” 138. 
 
40 Ibid., 106-7. 
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to the teaching style intended to “mesh” with their particular learning style.41  This 
perspective claims that the scientific and statistical evidence demonstrating that students 
learn best when instructed in their own learning style, paired with evidence 
demonstrating that they also learn less effectively when instructed in different learning 
styles, is simply lacking.  Such researchers conclude that the increased cost, time, 
training, and energy invested in such approaches are misguided and fail to produce 
consistent results.  
 Despite the controversy surrounding this issue, my research is likely to make 
some similar recommendations as those geared towards kinesthetic learners: that an 
increase in learning activities that engage the body are likely to produce positive effects.  
However, given the constraints that many educators and administrators are already under, 
I believe it may be beneficial for all students – including, but not limited to those 
identified as kinesthetic learners – to engage more regularly in body- and movement-
oriented learning practices.  While not an ideal solution, it may propose a partial measure 
for better addressing the needs of kinesthetic learners (or simply, more active, restless 
students) while simultaneously teaching all students about their own embodiments, their 
manners of movement and understanding, and some of their possibilities within a given 
environment. 
 While not always emphasizing kinesthetic learning styles, recent 
experimentations with embodied practices in schools have yielded interesting results.  
Several schools and college classrooms have begun incorporating meditation and/or yoga 
                                                
41 Pasher et al., “Learning Styles.”  This report is an analysis of a collection of 
independent research on learning styles methods and their effectiveness. 
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practice into their student’s coursework, and one report shows reduced levels of stress for 
elementary students in impoverished areas of Baltimore.42  Moreover, as some schools 
take on project-based approaches to learning, many of these curricula emphasize the 
integration of embodied activity with class material that illuminates various facets of the 
topic at issue.  For example, a San Francisco high school recently constructed an urban 
garden on their campus while learning about agriculture, ecological interdependence, 
cultural histories related to food and farming, and the philosophical implications of food 
production, community well-being, and agricultural sustainability.43  Such studies and 
pedagogical experiments show that many educators and educational communities are 
beginning to take seriously the ways in which a more holistic approach to learning might 
benefit students in a huge variety of ways, and many are doing so by highlighting the role 
of the body in educational practice. 
 Other possibilities that educators might consider may involve working more 
embodied, active practices into the regular curriculum and classroom.  In addition to 
maintaining or increasing the availability and variety of arts, music, dance, drama, and 
physical education programs available to students, teachers might experiment with 
                                                
42 Kelly Brewington, “Yoga, Meditation Program Helps City Youths Cope with Stress,” 
The Baltimore Sun (Feb. 23, 2011), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-02-
23/health/bs-hs-yoga-city-youth-20110223_1_yoga-chronic-stress-researchers.  See also 
Mary Billard, “In Schools, Yoga Without the Spiritual,” New York Times (Oct. 7, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/nyregion/in-yoga-classes-at-schools-teachers-avoid-
the-spiritual.html; Ken Burak, “Help! My Philosophy Teacher Made Me Touch My 
Toes!” in Yoga: Philosophy for Everyone, ed. Liz Stillwaggon Swan (Malden, MA: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2012), 61-72; and Erin McCarthy, Ethics Embodied: Rethinking Selfhood 
through Continental, Japanese, and Feminist Philosophies (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2010), 96-104. 
 
43 Downtown High School, “EATS Project,” accessed June 10, 2012. 
http://downtownhighschool.org/Downtown_High_School/Course_Offerings.html.  This 
project is one focus among several project-based curricula.  
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incorporating movement and dance into traditional classes (such as math, language arts 
and writing, and foreign language courses).  Exploring ways to add drama-related 
activities to classes, such as those in literature, foreign languages, and geography, might 
provide new perspectives on other cultures, as well as one’s own.44  Laboratory 
experiments, already common in some middle and high schools, could be expanded and 
taken up as the basis of course projects, and this model might be rethought in relation to 
its applications in writing and language classes.  Variations on classroom layout could be 
explored, involving spaces designed for greater movement or including particular stimuli 
for activities.  As already noted, project-based approaches to learning could adopt a more 
central place in the “standard” curriculum, offering students a greater variety of 
engagements and the potential for more socially directed and personally meaningful 
inquiries.  Variations on physical and health education might include options beyond just 
emphasizing physical fitness and nutrition, but might engage a stronger emphasis on 
educating the body and exploring one’s embodied sense of self.  Such engagements might 
include practices such as yoga and meditation, a variety of dance styles, martial arts, self-
defense classes, and perhaps even anatomy and physiology courses.  Some of the more 
“traditional” home economics topics, such as cooking, sewing, woodworking, and 
gardening could be paired with courses exploring their various corollaries in science, 
history, and social positioning (particularly given the spread of globalization and the 
commercialization of culture).  Perhaps a range of outdoor education programs could be 
adopted, teaching students skills related to camping, hiking, navigating, climbing, and 
wilderness knowledge.  Last, while this issue extends beyond the purview of this project, 
                                                
44 Adding elements of movement and drama are suggestions frequently raised by 
O’Loughlin. 
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classes engaging students honestly about sexuality, particularly in its connections with 
physicality, identity, reproductive knowledge, safety, selfhood, and their individual rights 
would be invaluable to many students (who receive, depending largely on their location, 
abstinence-only or abstinence-focused education about sexuality).  In short, this list aims 
to suggest some practices that modify the traditional model of education, where students 
sit relatively passively at desks for long periods of time, moving through corridors as 
signaled by a bell or alarm, and often feel little investment, sense of self, or sense of 
purposiveness in their activities.  I argue that engaging their embodied selves more – in 
the classroom, in physical education courses, and in modifications of the standard 
classroom and curriculum – might offer substantial benefits to their developing senses of 
self and their experiences of embodied agency.45 
 My interest with respect to the experiments described above and the list of 
suggestions just given is on how such practices might help students develop more and 
                                                
45 I make several caveats with respect to this “traditional” model and the range of 
suggestions given here.  First, I do think there is a value to students learning how to retain 
focus and attention on a given subject, task, or idea for certain periods of time.  Indeed, 
this is a key discipline that enables students to take up some of these subjects, tasks, or 
ideas on their own in the future, and indeed, provides them with skills they need to go 
forward.  However, given the current structures of most schools, teachers do not often 
have resources to expand much beyond this model, and this model is not the most 
effective approach for many students, subjects, or teachers, nor to be the predominant 
physical mode of being for the bulk of the school day.  Thus, I realize that my 
suggestions entail changes and modifications that are not likely to be feasible for many 
educators, schools, or districts, simply by virtue of current policies, standards, and 
expectations.  This is compounded by the fact that many of the suggestions listed would 
require huge investments of time, energy, research, and financial support, requiring 
changes with respect to training, structure, staff, schedules, funding practices, and so 
forth.  Given that current policies and financial circumstances hardly allow for the most 
basic resources for many schools, I am well aware that many of these ideas are something 
of a pipe dream.  However, all of this goes to serve a greater call, for which many are 
already spending their lives fighting, that education become a top priority for public 
funding and social investment. 
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more effective resources for continuing to direct their own educations, to continue 
transforming their lives and their world.  I would imagine that many such practices would 
encourage them to experience themselves as agents, and more specifically, as embodied 
agents with the potential to continue growing, continue expanding the possible 
experiences their lives might encounter.  This is my interpretation of what Dewey means, 
at heart, when he emphasizes that the aim of education is growth, and the aim of growth 
is more growth: the embodied experience of agency, experienced as possibility. 
 This reading of Dewey’s work, supplemented by Merleau-Ponty and Foucault, is 
what I hope to contribute to this growing body of literature on education and 
embodiment.  My approach provides a defense of Dewey’s idea of growth, articulating 
this concept as an idea regarding human agency and the cultivation of its expression, and 
claiming that this idea has unique benefits when it comes to the aims of education.  
Specifically, because growth aims toward more growth (a point critiqued by many for its 
vagueness, which I will discuss later) it offers a global perspective on what education is 
meant to achieve, felt pointedly once formal education has concluded.  It captures the aim 
of living well and living fully, of realizing the potentials of intelligent, engaged human 
life and its potential to keep growing, to continue discovering, learning, and expanding 
one’s possibilities throughout the course of one’s life.  I hope to capture this expansive 
sense of growth by likening it with a sense of agency, emphasizing agency as a felt, 
embodied quality of experience and not simply a rational or cognitive faculty.  In doing 
so, I am marrying Dewey’s conception about education with accounts of the body that 
both highlight and contextualize human agency as embodied.  As such, I aim to expand 
the interpretation of Dewey’s idea of growth by incorporating a dialogue of different 
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perspectives on embodiment, showing the centrality, flexibility, and vulnerability of the 
body as a site of agency, and thus a site of growth in Dewey’s sense.  Through this focus, 
I hope to contribute to the literature addressing the intersection of embodiment and 
education, advocating for a multifaceted perspective on the body that can articulate some 
of the complexities of embodied experience, maintaining emphasis throughout on how 
these perspectives can participate in a discussion on embodied agency as a vital part of 
educational growth. 
 
Chapter Outline 
 Because I am focusing on an interpretation of Dewey’s concept of growth through 
a lens of agency and I am reading agency with an emphasis on embodiment, it will be 
necessary, in starting the project, to take up the ways in which Dewey conceptualizes 
ideas related to this reading, to examine how he himself might formulate embodied 
agency in relation to growth.  As such, chapter two will take up many of these ideas from 
Dewey’s work, focusing primarily on his texts on education and most specifically on 
Democracy and Education and Experience and Education.  This chapter will take up his 
conceptualizations of education, experience, and growth, focusing on his definition of 
education as “that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the 
meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent 
experience.”46  From there, this chapter will outline Dewey’s conception of experience as 
a blend of doing and undergoing, highlighting how one manifestation of growth is the 
                                                
46 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, vol. 9: 1916, The Middle Works of John 
Dewey, 1889-1924 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1978), 82. 
 28 
increase in connection between actions taken and results expected as a consequence of 
those actions, thus lending towards a greater facility in directing subsequent experience. 
 In shifting the discussion to growth, chapter two will outline some of the debates 
over Dewey’s use of this term, leading to my characterization of growth as an aim related 
to agency.  In this discussion, I will also take up the question of self-knowledge, how it 
might be generated within a Deweyan education, and how it might play a role in fostering 
agency.  In outlining these concepts and their connections to one another, chapter two 
will begin to articulate what a Deweyan sense of embodied agency might entail in terms 
of educational growth.   
 Chapter three will move into some of Dewey’s other works, drawing material 
from Human Nature and Conduct, Experience and Nature, and Art as Experience in 
order to give more flesh to his conception of the human being, the body, the self, and the 
phenomenon of habit, all of which help to articulate what his idea of reconstruction 
entails and how such phenomena are related to a sense of embodied agency.  Briefly, this 
discussion outlines Dewey’s naturalistic conception of the human being as an organism in 
an environment, addressing also his conception of the body-mind as an organic unit of 
human life.  His view of the self emerges out of the workings of this organic body-mind 
in its contact with a natural and social world, centered on the habits it practices (learned 
both by “nature” and through social culture) and the ways in which those habits interact.  
In addition to accounts of habit, self, and the body, this chapter takes up Dewey’s 
conceptions of will, intelligence, freedom, and his characterization of having an 
experience, in order to gather ideas relating to agency (as Dewey rarely uses this term).  
His use of these ideas, however, especially that of intelligence, is helpful for developing 
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an account of agency along Deweyan lines, as well as articulating more precisely those 
qualities of experience that education strives to achieve.  In concluding this chapter, I will 
argue that a Deweyan account of agency includes an embodied sense of intelligence and 
the culminating experience of purposive action, but that his account might be taken 
further by the addition of other philosophical perspectives.  I make this claim because 
despite the rich resources Dewey offers, I believe they are limited in several respects.   
 Briefly, I believe Dewey’s account of the naturalistic body-mind-self, while an 
important touchstone for his account of education and for this project as a whole, offers a 
limited perspective about what it feels like, in the first person and in the flesh, to be an 
embodied agent.  While his views provide a helpful account of the human being as an 
organic and habit-oriented self, I believe more could be articulated about the experiential 
and direct contact we have with the material and meaningful world.  This impetus takes 
my focus, in chapter four, to a phenomenological perspective, here presented through 
some of the insights of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  However, because embodiment, like 
many phenomena discussed by philosophers, is the focus of many different traditions and 
perspectives, I believe there is more we ought to consider in looking at a conception of 
embodied agency.  At this point, I will have outlined Dewey’s naturalistic view and 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological view, and yet one more seems to me to offer 
something wanting in these two: a postmodern perspective that examines the ways in 
which the body acts as a site for cultural meanings and social powers.  As such, this 
impetus takes my focus, in chapter five, to some of the insights offered by Michel 
Foucault in his emphasis on the body-subject as largely constructed through social and 
historical phenomena.  In this light, this discussion will also include some pointed ways 
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in which the body might be interpreted as a site for social empowerment and a vehicle for 
transforming its own place in the world. 
 To say a little more about these two additional perspectives, in turning to 
Merleau-Ponty in chapter four, I will focus on his descriptive account of the body as the 
center and “pivot” of human consciousness and perception.47  As such, his account 
provides a kind of close, first-person testimony of how the body generates meanings 
(though many of them not entirely conscious), and how the integration of such meanings 
in the body carries us around the world.  In short, Merleau-Ponty describes ways in which 
the “I” of consciousness is largely not constituted by a mind interpreting stimuli and 
orchestrating thoughts, but of a body interacting with its world in ways most often taken 
for granted.  Because his account is rather broad in its scope, I will focus particularly on 
his discussions of habit, expression, and transcendence in relating his work to Dewey’s.  
His views of the body as expressive in itself and as transcending itself are helpful, I 
believe, in that they root the expressive potentials of existence firmly in the body, while 
also articulating how the potentials of human subjectivity consistently exceed and go 
beyond their own boundaries, thus giving voice to their transcendence.  I will argue that 
incorporating insights from this philosophical perspective are helpful for articulating 
more thoroughly how agency is experienced at the level of embodied existence and 
activity. 
 From this perspective, I will take up the work of Foucault, offering a vantage 
point which one might loosely characterize as its “opposite.”  Since we now have a richer 
sense of what some elements of embodied experience and agency are like “from the 
                                                
47 My emphasis will be primarily on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. 
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inside,” or from a first person description, it will be helpful to turn to an account of how 
embodied experience is influenced “from the outside.”  As such, chapter five will take up 
the work of Michel Foucault and his constructivist perspective of the body.48  Similar to 
Merleau-Ponty, Foucault argues that many of the body’s meanings operate below the 
level of consciousness, but the target of his inquiry is how bodily practices have come to 
take on certain social meanings and interpretations, and how bodies become disciplined 
into practicing and thus living out those meanings and interpretations.  Much of 
Foucault’s work tackles the question of how we come to understand and relate to 
ourselves as subjects, and, in this investigation, he also explores how we come to relate to 
ourselves as embodied subjects, viewing our bodies and thus, ourselves, in different ways 
depending on the circumstances in which we “use” or “encounter” them.  He argues that 
discipline is one of the primary ways we come to experience ourselves as a particular 
identity; for example, one experiences herself as a student by virtue of how she takes up 
and executes certain academic disciplines (which apply to the body’s operations as well 
as to intellectual tasks).  Such a perspective will be helpful to articulate some of the ways 
in which our bodies are influenced by the social and cultural forces around us, as well as 
how we relate to ourselves via those forces.  This perspective applies to social contexts of 
contemporary Western life, broadly speaking, but especially to the contexts of schools, 
and, while I will take up this context to some degree, my main emphasis in incorporating 
Foucault’s work is to highlight how deeply these social meanings impact our experiences 
                                                
48 I will be incorporating some material from what many refer to as his earlier or 
“genealogical” work, drawing from Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, 
vol. I.  I will, however, also be taking up material from what is often referred to as his 
later, “ethical” work, drawing from interviews and essays in Ethics: Subjectivity and 
Truth and The History of Sexuality, vol. 3. 
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of our embodied selves.  Not only do Foucault’s investigations have entailments for our 
relationships to our bodies, they implicate our very conceptions of self, community, 
authority, purpose, and action, and thus, agency. 
  This chapter will also include some of Foucault’s later work, focusing on the 
transformative potentials present in the disciplined practices of care for the self, in order 
to see how these elements of embodied practice (some of which Foucault explores from 
texts of antiquity) might benefit a conception of embodied agency.  Foucault examines 
these self-forming practices as manners of relating to oneself.  However, in Foucault’s 
terms, the relevance of such practices extends beyond the self, in that, through developing 
a practice of caring for oneself, one also educates oneself about critical matters, in terms 
of developing ethical relationships to herself, her community, and her world.  Moreover, 
such practices help the individual to cultivate an openness towards and readiness for self-
transformation, which I will claim can be seen as a supplement to thinking about 
Deweyan growth.  Foucault’s emphasis on self-transformation takes on a kind of ethical 
imperative: one cares for oneself, but also maintains a vital contact with the world, 
through engaging in self-transformations that continually allow one’s sense of self to be 
renewed.  In short, I argue that this material can be helpful for expanding Dewey’s sense 
of growth in terms of agency, because self-transformation lends itself to developing 
embodied habits of self-knowledge and practices of self-cultivation that aim toward the 
expansion of possibility.  In taking on new experiences, new challenges, and new 
relationships with oneself and one’s community, one might experience new ways to be an 
embodied subject, and thus, an embodied agent. 
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 Chapter six will bring the dispersed insights from these chapters together into a 
reading of embodied agency helpful for my interpretation of Deweyan growth.  Returning 
to Dewey’s perspective on education as the reconstruction of experience and his focus on 
growth as movement towards more growth, as well as the deepening of one’s capacities 
for enriching, meaningful experiences, I will now bring these other philosophical 
perspectives to bear on how such growth can be thought of as the development and 
expansion of embodied agency.  With the help from Merleau-Ponty, we can see how 
agency is one of the many ways the body is active, is generative of a sense of self through 
its communion with the world.  With the help of Foucault, we can see how the body is 
molded and shaped in various ways, through the operation of discipline as well as 
through practices of self-care.  Moreover, these concepts prepare the way for a reading of 
self-transformation, which, when combined with Dewey’s sense of growth as the 
expansion of possibility, can be seen as the development of agency in one’s felt sense of 
capacity, possibility, and purpose.  This sense of growth as agency is, I maintain, a 
plausible and rich interpretation of what a Deweyan education aims for in reconstructing 
experience.  
 However, I am well aware that in my selection of these particular traditions and 
thinkers, there is much discourse on the body and on education that is being left out of 
this treatment.  In inquiring about embodiment and education, one can find resources in 
pragmatism, phenomenology, feminism, psychoanalysis, postmodernism, cognitive 
neuroscience, aesthetics, critical race theory, disability studies, gender theory, queer 
theory, critical pedagogy, feminist pedagogy, and other traditions and approaches which 
take up ideas and themes related to this project; and this is just within philosophy and 
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educational theory.  Research on art, music, dance, yoga, and other kinds of bodywork 
are also likely to have their own insights to add.  It is not my intention here to imply that 
any of these approaches are lacking in what they might offer this study.  However, due to 
constraints of time and space, I limit my selection to the treatments already discussed, 
and I leave many of these important works to future research.49   
 While I take a great deal from the work of O’Loughlin, Shapiro, the other thinkers 
mentioned above, and many not yet introduced, I hope to further the discourse on 
embodiment and education by elaborating on the central idea of growth from Dewey’s 
work, emphasizing its value as an educational ideal.  I believe its value might best be 
appreciated when thought in terms of the living, felt, embodied agency that education 
might cultivate, and that this emphasis can add to the larger discussion in terms of 
highlighting the development of agency as a felt, experienced part of life.  While many of 
the treatments mentioned above incorporate Dewey as one among several philosophers 
(and philosophers of education) that takes the body seriously, few read his idea of growth 
as an idea explicitly linked with agency.  Moreover, my emphasis on embodied agency 
presents a unique perspective in developing the ways we can see this idea emerging from 
                                                
49 I also wish to include a particular stipulation regarding disability and the development 
of agency as an embodied phenomenon.  In claiming that agency is embodied, I wish to 
extend current investigations of thought and consciousness as embodied to this facet of 
human experience and its relevance to the process of learning; however, I do not wish to 
imply that persons who are differently abled have intrinsic limitations to their agency.  
While I believe that individuals with disabilities may experience their physical selves and 
their qualities of movement as unique and possibly as different from those without 
disabilities, I do not believe that such differences necessarily entail a lack of embodied 
agency.  Rather, the agency that all persons have is, I maintain, rooted in embodied 
experience.  As such, while individuals with disabilities may experience different 
constraints on their physical engagement with the world, these offer different sets of 
contours for the emergence of particular possibilities, and thus, the developments of 
particular expressions of agency.  However, developing this issue in more depth 
represents a particular interest of mine for future research.  
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Dewey’s work and applying it to current educational circumstances.  In bringing together 
a variety of philosophical approaches to embodiment, I hope to present an image of 
embodied agency that can enrich and enliven this key insight from Dewey’s perspective 
in contributing to the discourse on education and embodiment.  
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CHAPTER II 
DEWEYAN EDUCATION AND GROWTH: SELF-KNOWLEDGE,  
AGENCY, AND EMBODIMENT 
 
Deweyan Education and the Concept of Growth   
 Despite John Dewey’s immense corpus, one can argue that his ideas and 
commitments regarding education lie at the heart of his philosophy.  Dewey himself even 
remarks that Democracy and Education serves as one of the most comprehensive 
expositions of his philosophy, as well as his favorite published work,50 and it is clear that 
democratic social processes and the concern with creative inquiry that pervades Dewey’s 
writings find comfortable homes in this book.  As such, this text will be one of the 
primary ones of this study, along with several of Dewey’s other writings on education, 
especially Experience and Education.  As his interest in education extends from the 
practices and methods carried out in American schools to the tenets grounding collective 
moral life, the breadth of concerns addressed in his writings on education is vast.  As 
such, the focus of my energies will revolve around several central concepts, the first 
articulations of which will emerge in this chapter.  First, with respect to Dewey’s 
educational philosophy, the concept of growth will form a touchstone for the variety of 
approaches I engage in this project.  I choose to focus on this term due to its centrality in 
Dewey’s educational approach, as well as its application with respect to educational and 
                                                
50 David T. Hansen, “Introduction: Reading Democracy and Education,” in John Dewey 
and Our Educational Prospect: A Critical Engagement with Dewey’s Democracy and 
Education (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), 2.  (The remark about it being, at a certain point 
in his life, the single work most fully propounding his philosophy is cited in vol. 5, LW, 
156.) 
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ethical aims of living well.  Second, self-knowledge and agency in the process of growth 
– educational and ethical – are key concepts that my research on Dewey’s educational 
philosophy will emphasize.  Briefly, I will argue that self-knowledge is a requisite 
element within an education practically oriented towards growth, especially insofar as 
such growth signifies an increase in the possibilities of concrete agency and self-
actualization of students.  Third, the theme of embodiment will come to play a large part 
in my selection of materials, both from Dewey and from other thinkers.  I will claim that 
an education oriented towards agential growth and the cultivation of self-knowledge can 
benefit greatly from emphasizing attention to the body in educational practice.  This 
chapter will begin to outline how these pieces fit together in my perspective, inspired by 
Dewey’s educational philosophy.  Taken together, these elements of Dewey’s view 
suggest the importance of a felt, experiential, embodied agency, not the abstract agency 
or decision-making faculty of a purely rational knower.  Moreover, emphasizing this felt 
agency as a central part of growth means that it may be read as a significant educational 
aim.  
 But to begin crafting this puzzle, I should begin with saying a little more about 
Dewey’s philosophy of education.  As in his view of philosophy more broadly, Dewey’s 
conception of education departs from what some see as its primary or its traditional 
purpose; his approach takes heed of what some of those traditions seek but also provides 
his own challenges and ambitions for what education might accomplish.   In this vein, he 
works against what he calls the “ordinary notion of education,” which is centered around 
the transmission of historically sanctioned cultural signs and patterns of knowledge, or 
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what he calls, “the acquisition of literacy.”51  Instead, Dewey emphasizes that what 
education provides is something far beyond this kind of receptive acquisition; for him, 
education is the capacity and impulse to organize experience such that more and more 
educative experiences are possible.  Dewey lays out his own technical definition of 
education: “It is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the 
meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent 
experience.”52  Thus, education is the engagement with the particular contents of life such 
that they may be continually informing the meaning and increasing the connections with 
others, with the effect of fostering the integrative capacity of using such knowledge to 
inform and shape future experiences.  Moreover, such reconstructions of meaning take 
place through experience so that present experience undergoes transformation, also 
enabling future transformations of experience.  In short, educational experience ought to 
serve to broaden and deepen the impact of every other experience one undergoes. 
 In this way, Dewey famously identifies education with the process of growth and 
with life itself, claiming that “education is not a means to living, but is identical with the 
operation of living a life which is fruitful and inherently significant,” entailing that the 
ultimate goal or value to which education can aspire is “the process of living itself.”53  As 
such, what education is meant to do is to continuously increase our abilities and 
responsive intuitions as human beings, not just as students, teachers, philosophers, 
scientists, or what have you; it is rather to equip everyone with the fundamental tools of 
                                                
51 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 12. 
 
52 Ibid., 82. 
 
53 Ibid., 248. 
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living in the world.  To separate the learning done in school from the learning done in the 
rest of life is to hamper the viability of both, on Dewey’s terms.  It is due to this focus 
that Dewey correlates education with morality in the close of Democracy and Education, 
claiming, “Interest in learning from all the contacts of life is the essential moral 
interest.”54  It is with eyes, ears, and imaginations open and eager to engage that we best 
learn, and it is in this manner that we best live, especially insofar as we hope to embody 
socially democratic ideals.55 
 Thus, as with many elements of Dewey’s philosophy – the conception of the 
individual human being as an organism in an environment, the emphasis on social 
democracy and pursuing collective goals, the significance of the aesthetic in experience – 
their ultimate goals and values hang on the idea of growth.  His philosophy of education 
clearly follows suit.  He claims that, like the process of living itself, education is 
synonymous with growth.  Because life has no aim beyond itself, its continued existence 
                                                
54 Ibid., 370. 
 
55 In “Democratic Education: A Deweyan Reminder,” Randall S. Hewitt draws on 
Dewey’s work to combat current trends in public education that link corporate and 
consumer life with educational environments and practices. He claims that Dewey’s work 
can revitalize the investment needed for students to take on the task of community and 
political life of which they are already a part and will later be participating in on a 
broader scale (“Democratic Education: A Deweyan Reminder,” E&C/Education and 
Culture 22, no. 2 (2006), 43-60).  On a similar note, Leonard J. Waks’ “Rereading 
Democracy and Education Today” fruitfully employs themes from Dewey’s work to 
address issues of globalization and multiculturalism in contemporary American schools.  
While he may find issues of multi-ethnic communities more present in Democracy and 
Education than others, Waks provides helpful explanations of how the differences in 
perspective and background between groups of students may be engaged in the classroom 
as projects cultivating the ideals and practices of democratic schooling.  Such Deweyan 
themes, Waks argues, can be regarded as helpful tools in preparing today’s youth for the 
growing challenges posed by globalization (“Rereading Democracy and Education 
Today: John Dewey on Globalization, Multiculturalism, and Democratic Education,” 
E&C/Education and Culture 23, no. 1 (2007), 27-37). 
 40 
and enrichment is the ever-emerging end-in-view guiding its actions; he writes in 
Experience and Education, “Education as growth or maturity should be an ever-present 
process.”56  As such, Dewey claims that education is the continual process of enriching 
the possibilities of its own practice; in other words, the end of education is more 
education, the goal of creating connections in experience is discovering and developing 
the capacity for more connections in future experience, and the means by which these 
possibilities emerge is through the continual growth – the continual education – of the 
individual.  In Democracy and Education, Dewey writes: 
 Since in reality there is nothing to which growth is subordinate save more growth, 
 there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education.  It is a 
 commonplace to say that education should not cease when one leaves school.  The 
 point of this commonplace is that the purpose of school education is to insure the 
 continuance of education by organizing the powers that insure growth.  The 
 inclination to learn from life itself and to make the conditions of life such that all 
 will learn in the process of living is the finest product of schooling.57 
 
It is precisely this “finest product of schooling” that my project is particularly interested 
in: that is, the ways in which education (and the philosophies grounding them) develops 
the capacity for intelligent, deliberate, transformative, agential practice, particularly in the 
lives of individuals after their period of formal schooling has ended, and which schooling 
has, ideally, helped to cultivate.   
 With the terms “agency” and “agential practice,” I refer to the felt qualities of 
capability and potential in making decisions and formulating purposes with respect to 
one’s life (and the life of her community), as well as having the concrete means of 
                                                
56 John Dewey, Experience and Education, vol. 13: 1938-1939, The Later Works of John 
Dewey, 1925-1953 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1985), 30. 
 
57 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 56. 
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actualizing those decisions and purposes in one’s reality.  In this sense, I wish for this 
conception of agency to take into consideration the ways in which agency exceeds (or is 
not accurately captured by) a strictly rational definition, insofar as embodied 
characteristics of life play a role in the ways agency is experienced and the ways agency 
is received in the social sphere.  For example, in contrasting a view of agency based in 
the rational, autonomous individual, Kym Maclaren offers an interpersonal view of 
agency that highlights the role of emotions.  She casts emotions as tensions within our 
existential situations that shape our interpretations of reality, thus shaping the character of 
our actions and decisions.  As such, she conceives of agency as an embodied response to 
this entire network of conditions, stressing that what agency does is “to make existential 
sense of the world and to find our place in reality.”58  While emotion is just one aspect of 
the embodied reality of experience, I am trying to think about agency along similar lines, 
as representing a kind of practical intelligence, a mode of responding to situations and 
developing intentions within them.  However, I hope to characterize such agency as 
experienced through the embodied possibilities of one’s being, which includes the felt 
sense of those possibilities, the ways that the agent experiences them as possibilities.  It 
follows then, that when the felt sense of those possibilities is lacking, one’s agency might 
not be experienced as richly as it might be.  That is, if one does not feel or experience 
herself to be an agent, believing but also having a felt sense of herself as a capable and 
efficacious actor, then her ability to execute purposes is likely to be diminished.  For 
example, one can envision a scenario in which an individual could recognize certain 
possibilities for action, but qualitatively experience those possibilities as divorced from or 
                                                
58 Kym Maclaren, “Emotional Metamorpohses: The Role of Others in Becoming a 
Subject” in Embodiment and Agency, 38, author’s emphasis. 
 42 
not related to her own action.  As an illustration, one can imagine a timid young student.  
In a classroom full of people around whom she feels uncomfortable, she may be reticent 
to answer questions posed by a teacher, despite her knowledge of the answers.  Perhaps 
her hesitance stems from a desire not to show off or appear pretentious, perhaps from a 
fear of others teasing or denigrating her in some way, or perhaps simply because she 
becomes nervous speaking in front of others.  In any case, the fact that she recognizes 
possibilities of action – responding to a question to which she knows the answer – may 
not square with her felt possibilities of action; in this case, raising her hand and answering 
questions.59  Because these responses may not always align with one another, I want to 
emphasize here the ways in which such felt, experienced qualities of agency are 
significant for one acting on and being able to expand her agency.  They are constitutive 
elements of what it means for her to have agency, for her to be able to act according to it. 
 I wish to stress here, however, that many factors enter into one’s experience of 
embodied agency.  Many elements of one’s embodied being might be experienced as 
obstacles or hindrances to her potentials, while others might be experienced as unique 
opportunities.  And moreover, what one experiences as a unique gift or a hindrance may 
not be regarded or treated so by others.  What I hope to articulate is the way in which 
one’s felt sense of her own agency is a key part of how that agency is experienced, and 
the way agency is experienced is likely to play a significant role in the possibilities one 
acts upon, in addition to those possibilities one even conceives of as present for herself.  
                                                
59 This example could be read through the lens of stereotype threat: a young girl may feel 
her agency torn between acting on her knowledge and the fear of fulfilling a negative 
stereotype. 
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As such, if an individual does not feel herself to be an agent, her own perception of her 
possibilities and potentials is likely to be limited from the outset.  
 While I will go on to argue that developing this kind of practical agency requires 
attention to embodiment in outlining the aims of education, I will first outline more 
details of Dewey’s own articulation of what these aims are.  Specifically, in thinking 
about education as both preparation for and the enactment of an intelligent life engaged in 
the world, the concept of growth lies at the heart of Dewey’s educational philosophy.  
Indeed, Dewey writes, “Education is ... a fostering, a nurturing, a cultivating, process.  
All of these words mean that it implies attention to the conditions of growth.”60 
 
Growth: Experience, Meaning, and Expansion 
 In contrasting his view with several others on education, including theories that 
identify education as the unfolding of latent powers, or as the imposition of external 
forces in preparing the young for the future, Dewey conceives of education as the process 
of growth as reconstruction:   
 the ideal of growth results in the conception that education is a constant 
reorganizing or reconstructing of experience.  It has all the time an immediate 
end, and so far as activity is educative, it reaches that end – the direct 
transformation of the quality of experience.61   
 
Here we see that reconstruction or reorganization of experience is not simply a building-
up or collecting of experience; rather, education can enact a fundamental shift in the 
character of experience itself.  If executed well, activities in schooling have the effect of 
connecting to other experiences in one’s life and have the potential to foster more and 
                                                
60 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 14. 
 
61 Ibid., 82. 
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deeper connections as the student continues to grow.  All experience is educative, Dewey 
claims, but the point of (formal) education is to make experience educative in the most 
fruitful way: creating connections with other aspects of life, such that meaning of as 
many experiences as possible is deepened.  This is an important element in Dewey’s ideal 
of growth: because experience refers to and draws on itself and its past, the aim is for the 
present experience to best enable the richness and depth of experiences in the future.  
Moreover, part of what Dewey emphasizes in casting education as reconstruction is the 
fact that the capacities of future experience are transformed by exploring and engaging 
the possibilities within present experience; that is, the transformations enacted in 
education take place through present experience while also creating a preparation for 
further experience.  Indeed, this continuity between present and future experience is key 
to the significance of felt agency as educative growth: the recognition of this continuity 
holds the possibility for transforming the intellectual comprehension of a situation into 
felt possibilities for action within it.  All experience is educative, Dewey claims, in that 
all experiences have the potential to effect later experiences, for better or worse; they can 
lead towards growth as well as stunt such growth. 
 In claiming that all experience is educative, Dewey qualifies this idea by 
emphasizing its negative capacities, saying that “Any experience is mis-educative that 
has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience.”62  Thus, the 
kinds of experiences aimed for in schools are those promoting growth, and the ultimate 
aim is to provide for growth that leads towards more – and more meaningful – growth.  
While the often-given retort to this description calls out its vagueness and the lack of 
                                                
62 Dewey, Experience and Education, 11. 
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specific direction in which growth should emerge, part of what this kind of growth entails 
is the felt sense that the present can impact the future; that future possibilities can emerge 
from present transformations.  While the critique of vagueness is one I will discuss in 
more detail later, for the moment, I want to include Dewey’s own clarification of growth 
as generating more growth.   
 Critics beginning in Dewey’s day asked, “growth toward what?” calling attention 
to the utter lack of instruction this gives educators, but also to the fact that because all 
experience is educative, growth (in some fashion) will happen no matter what; students 
might grow in developing a profitable, but unsavory skill set, becoming for example, 
highly adept burglars or gangsters or corrupt politicians.  Such objections prompt 
Dewey’s response that growth, in any particular direction, should be assessed in terms of 
the present and future experiences it sets students up for, or for “the attitudes and habits” 
opened up along the course of a particular line of growth.63   
 That a man may grow in efficiency as a burglar, as a gangster, or as a corrupt 
 politician, cannot be doubted.  But from the standpoint of growth as education and 
 education as growth the question is whether growth in this direction promotes or 
 retards growth in general.  Does this form of growth create conditions for further 
 growth, or does it set up conditions that shut off the person who has grown in this 
 particular direction from the occasions, stimuli, and opportunities for continuing 
 growth in new directions?  What is the effect of growth in a special direction upon 
 the attitudes and habits which alone open up avenues for development in other 
 lines?  I shall leave you to answer these questions, saying simply that when and 
 only when development in a particular line conduces to continuing growth does it 
 answer to the criterion of education as growing.  For the conception is one that 
 must find universal and not specialized limited application.64 
 
Thus, while a student might grow in a particular, specialized field with great aplomb, the 
question of growth is only answered satisfactorily if the field or line of growth in 
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64 Ibid., author’s emphasis. 
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question is amenable to continued growth in a number of different – and it is assumed, 
socially desirable – directions.  So educational theorists are not meant to make the exact 
choices of where and how students will grow, as Dewey wants to leave this up to 
individual educators and administrators, giving them freedom to craft their own goals 
with respect to their community, the needs of their students, and other local situations.  
The job for educators is to help direct students along their own paths of growth, and such 
paths are best laid out when they offer a healthy set of possibilities for continued, and 
continually enlarging avenues of growth.  Thus, growing into a smooth burglar or skilled 
swindler, in Dewey’s vision, is likely to end up closing off possibilities for growth in 
one’s future.  Despite the possibility for developing a specialized skill set and opening up 
certain types of experiences (perhaps those involving adventure, thrill, monetary gain, 
etc.), the limiting forces of such a path of growth overwhelm the potential goods gained 
from it (confronting the law, losing trust of others, going to jail, etc.).  Similarly, failing 
to offer students experiences that truly engage and interest them – experiences they find 
meaningful – is also likely to hamper the type of growth that Dewey envisions.  If the 
experiences of schooling result in students feeling chronically bored, disconnected, or 
frustrated, then their participation and action within school activities is likely to be 
coerced, mechanical, or simply the result of rote training and “getting by”; in other 
words, the actual agency that education is intended to open up and enlarge is diminished 
instead of enhanced.  Growing into a highly sensitive inquirer or a rigorous critical 
thinker are really the types of growth that Dewey has in mind, and these skills and 
dispositions require that courses of growth be open and expansive, but also that students 
be genuinely interested and actively find meaning in their engagements.  Inquiry and 
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critical thinking are paradigmatic examples of growth in understanding, because these are 
skills that can be applied in a wide range of directions and can have the result of an 
increasing number and quality of connections between experiences; growth toward more 
growth.  
 But specification of what growth really means still requires more clarification.  To 
do so, I will first outline Dewey’s conception of experience, discuss his characterization 
of experience as doing-undergoing and discuss his principles of continuity and 
interaction, since understanding his conception of experience is important for 
understanding his conception of growth.  Second, I will articulate my own reading of 
some characteristics significant for growth, that is, it can be viewed to involve increasing 
the degree of transparency in understanding the situations of one’s life, self, and 
environment.  More importantly, however, the ideal of growth is also about increasing the 
degree of agency one has within her environment, which involves an understanding of 
how she works within it, how it effects her, how she effects it, and how she might 
maximize possibilities of flourishing within given situations.  It is this emphasis that will 
later take my focus to the role of embodiment in education.  
 
Dewey on Experience: Doing-Undergoing, Continuity and Interaction 
 In most of his texts, including those on education, Dewey articulates some version 
of his conception of experience.65  In Democracy and Education, he highlights the active-
passive character of experience; in Experience and Education, he highlights the 
                                                
65 Along with numerous essays, some of Dewey’s texts where the concept of experience 
is a major theme include Experience and Nature, Art as Experience, and Experience and 
Education. 
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principles of continuity and interaction as forming a basic means of assessing the 
educative value of an experience.  I will briefly outline here some features of Dewey’s 
concept of experience and its significance for his philosophy of education. 
 In Democracy and Education, Dewey explicates his conception of experience by 
focusing on its character as both active and passive.  It is active in that it involves trying, 
doing, acting, or making some kind of change, which Dewey connects with 
“experiment.”  On the other hand, it is passive in that it involves undergoing, receiving, 
or being-done-to, often as the consequences of an activity.  He describes, “We do 
something to the thing and then it does something to us in return: such is the peculiar 
combination.  The connection of these two phases of experience measures the fruitfulness 
or value of the experience.”66  The link between these two phases of experience is so 
important because for Dewey, it is the strength of this link that characterizes something 
as learned.  He claims that to “learn from experience” is to establish a relationship 
between what is done and what occurs as a result of what is done.  In this connection, 
“doing becomes a trying; an experiment with the world to find out what it is like; the 
undergoing becomes instruction – discovery of the connection of things.”67  In 
summarizing the import of these characteristics of experience for education, Dewey 
writes, “Two important conclusions for education follow.  (1) Experience is primarily an 
active-passive affair; it is not primarily cognitive.  But (2) the measure of the value of an 
experience lies in the perception of relationships or continuities to which it leads up.”68  
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As such, Dewey claims that in not being primarily cognitive, experience is characterized 
more by the interplay of doing and being-done-to, or the interaction of actors and the 
responses from others and environments, than by purely rational or intellectual 
operations.  Also, in highlighting the significance of perception of relationships and 
continuities, we see that of primary importance in making experiences valuable is the 
extent to which they offer discernable, meaningful connections.  This is paramount in his 
philosophy of education, for experiential engagement and the development of increasing 
connections and depth of relationships are what enables and facilitates learning, 
development, and growth, in any kind of subject, sphere, or activity.   
 Interestingly, this discussion, in the chapter titled “Experience and Thinking,” 
then moves into an issue at the heart of this project: the connection between experience, 
growth, and embodiment, or the question of learning concerning the body as equally 
significant as the intellect.  Dewey comments on the manner in which schools have a 
tendency to focus on the cognitive and acquisitive aspects of learning, often with the 
result of seeing the body’s “interference” as an obstacle and a nuisance.  If the tasks of 
schooling frame instruction as imparting knowledge to students as spectators rather than 
participants or agents, it is possible for schools to assume “Something which is called 
mind or consciousness,” which “is severed from the physical organs of activity.”69  This 
dualistic frame of mind, while certainly changed from the time of Dewey’s writing, is 
arguably still in existence today in different forms and degrees.  (While beliefs about the 
mind and body as a fluid unit might be different today, many remnants of dualism are 
still seen in the basic structures of classrooms with students sitting passively, “absorbing” 
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a teacher’s lesson, and in curricular components that work with themes reflecting these 
ideas.)  In any case, Dewey criticizes this separation, claiming that it also instigates a 
divorce between the active and passive characters of experience, thus breaking the 
connection that is the very stuff of meaningful connection: “The intimate union of 
activity and undergoing its consequences which leads to a recognition of meaning is 
broken; instead we have two fragments: mere bodily action on one side, and meaning 
directly grasped by ‘spiritual’ activity on the other.”70  This fragmentation of experience 
can produce the opposite effect for students than that typically intended by educators: 
experience becomes disengaging, fractured, and compartmentalized, instead of engaged, 
interconnected, and continuous.  He goes on to devote a brief discussion to the 
significance of the body and its role in the process of learning and discovering meaning 
in experiences.  Some of this material will bear on the next chapter focusing more 
exclusively on these questions.  For now, I will summarize Dewey’s point that the 
separation of body from mind in the practices of education lead to a separation in the 
elements of experience that subsequently hinder the development of meaning within 
experience.  The result can be boisterous, uncontrolled eruptions of bodily activity at 
unproductive times and places, as well as the development of a mechanical, disengaged 
bodily disposition that fails to see the meaning of its own role/existence.  I will take up 
some of this material in more depth later, however.  
 Returning to the question of experience, in Experience and Education, Dewey 
emphasizes the ways that experience involves two elements that are important for 
educators to understand – continuity and interaction – such that the organization of 
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experiences they design can follow productively along lines of experience in its “natural” 
progression.  Throughout the book, Dewey underscores that all experience is educative.  
However, that experience can be educative, or for experience to have an impact in 
enriching the possibilities of itself (in the present and in the future), draws on the fact that 
experiences are not discrete, separate phenomena, nor are experiencers separated from 
them.  He writes, “the principle of continuity of experience means that every experience 
both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way 
the quality of those which come after.”71  It is this principle that also grounds the 
conception of growth – or rather, growing – as characterizing the process of education; 
continuity allows for educative growth to take place.  Because experience takes up 
something from what has come before and modifies in some way experiences yet to 
come, it is continuous.  And because of this continuity, the active and passive elements of 
experience can reveal connections that may have been previously unseen.  Thus, for 
Dewey, the continuity of experience is part of the reasoning for why all experience is, or 
has the potential to be educative. 
 That experience is continuous is a rather commonplace claim, Dewey reminds us, 
but it is significant to account for attending to the way in which experiences connect with 
other experiences and how the connections they foster not only enable future experiences, 
but also enable future circumstances.  He uses the examples of a child learning to speak 
or read, or an individual choosing to pursue a particular profession, say a doctor or a 
teacher.  He notes that in each case, a new power is opened up – the ability to speak or 
read – and with it, new circumstances also open up – new desires, new challenges, and 
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new conditions of subsequent learning.  Moreover, new external situations arise as well, 
and with them, new adjustments of habits and new attitudes corresponding to needs in the 
stimuli of these conditions.  A child who can read will respond differently to, say, being 
presented with a new book, or observing a parent read the newspaper, than a child who 
has not learned how to read.  A doctor will certainly notice different elements of a given 
situation than will a teacher, and will respond to them in different ways.  These are 
examples of how the continuity of experience is not just a principle stating the relatively 
obvious – that experiences are connected – but it underscores that the connection of 
experiences entails the need for attention to the way their continuity tends toward the 
development of certain attitudes, situations, and possibilities, and that these attitudes, 
situations, and possibilities are a large part of the “results” of education.  These are 
(among) the very subtle elements that the educator must attend to in orienting her 
relationships with students such that their experiences foster growth.   
 This brings us to the second element of experience: the principle of interaction.  
He offers these two principles together as a part of the criteria for determining the 
educative value of experiences.  The “external conditions” of any particular circumstance 
include everything from the materials with which individuals interact (in schools: things 
like books, toys, equipment, art supplies, buildings, etc.) to the teachers, classmates, 
assignments, activities, and so forth, or “the total social set-up of the situations in which a 
person is engaged.”72  These conditions are vital to organizing the “internal states” and 
conditions of students’ experiences.  Basically, the principle of interaction asserts that the 
inner life of the student is directly related to – in interaction with – all of the external 
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circumstances involved in a given experience.  Together, the inner and outer elements of 
experience form what Dewey calls a situation.  It is the principles of continuity and 
interaction – interacting with each other – that form a cursory basis for determining 
educative value.   
 Dewey elaborates on the meaning of “situation” in his later work.  In his Logic, he 
defines situation as a contextual whole of environing experience, which is sensed or felt 
as a qualitative whole.73  He characterizes the pervasiveness of a situation as qualitatively 
experienced or felt, as “the background and the control of every experience;”74 which is 
to say that every experience functions with a unique, individual situation as its felt 
backdrop.  This term becomes significant for developing Dewey’s definition of inquiry, 
which describes the transformation from an indeterminate situation into a determinate 
one, characterized by transforming the “constituent distinctions and relations” of the 
indeterminate situation “into a unified whole.”75  As such, while a complete treatment of 
this concept goes beyond the purview of the present discussion, it is significant for 
characterizing the felt, qualitative element of experience, particularly in the union of 
“inner” and “outer” as raised in Dewey’s discussion of educational experience.  
 In his educational works, Dewey emphasizes the principles of continuity and 
interaction for several reasons.  First, these principles acknowledge that any experience a 
student undergoes must provide some kind of helpful stimulus, that is, the objective 
conditions must interact with a students’ inner life in a provocative or engaging way, 
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connecting with and building upon resources the student already has in operation.  
Moreover, these principles call on educators to give great care and attention to the 
objective conditions of a situation and to attend carefully to the ways these conditions 
impact the students on an intellectual (and emotional, psychological, etc.) level.  Second, 
these principles ground the concept of experience that Dewey believes educators must 
understand if their efforts are to be most effective.  This is significant because a 
misunderstanding of experience is likely to generate experiences that do not foster growth 
in the most fruitful ways.  Specifically, a dominating concern with education as 
preparation for the future, without proper heed to the ways in which it is a reconstruction 
of the present, is more likely to foster the kinds of experiences, attitudes, and habituations 
that thwart further growth in the future.   
 Dewey notes that the concept of preparation in this regard can be a very 
“treacherous idea,” even though, in one sense, all experiences are and should be 
preparations for later experience, and ideally, for future experiences “of a deeper and 
more expansive quality.”76  However, when preparation for the future is prized over the 
experiences of the present, concern can easily be lost for the attitudes and habits, the 
dispositions and beliefs (often about the experience of learning itself) generated in the 
course of schooling.  When this concern is lost, the most important attitude to be gained 
from education – the “desire to go on learning”77 – can be enervated instead of 
intensified.  If students are not able to gain the most from present situations (finding both 
intellectual satisfaction or connection as well as curiosity to discover more), or find the 
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practices in which they are engaged to be useless, irrelevant, or worse, fostering feelings 
of defeat, the attitudes developing in the process are not likely to be ones fueling a 
passion for continued learning, at least in the form of deliberate study.  To this effect, 
Dewey describes the perils and the prospects of the ideal of preparation: 
 When preparation is made the controlling end, then the potentialities of the 
 present are sacrificed to a suppositious future.  When this happens, the actual 
 preparation for the future is missed or distorted.  The idea of using the present 
 simply to get ready for the future contradicts itself.  ...  We always live at the time 
 we live and not at some other time, and only by extracting at each present time the 
 full meaning of each present experience are we prepared for doing the same thing 
 in the future.  This is the only preparation which in the long run amounts to 
 anything.78 
 
What this means is that the quality of the engagement of students with their environment, 
in and for the present, is one of the biggest responsibilities that the educator must attend 
to.79  If concern is devoted more to future results than present experiences, the principle 
of continuity is violated in neglecting the fact that the student is failing to getting the 
most out of a current, living situation.  Thus, the role of the present moment, considered 
in connection with the past and the future, is diminished (and may even become 
negatively tinged and counterproductive), thus diminishing possibilities for the future.  
One might recall a claim often heard in middle and high schools: “when are we ever 
going to need to know this?” (when “this” might refer to trigonometry, the Russian 
Revolution, Australian geography, organic chemistry, Latin, or whatever item or subject 
is annoying a student at the time).  This complaint signals several things: first, that the 
activity or lesson at hand is decidedly not one whose immediate relevance is felt; if 
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questions are being asked about its usefulness in the future, it is clearly not doing much to 
augment the present.  Moreover, this claim also signals the attitude pervasive in so many 
educational situations: that what is being learned is not being learned for the present, but 
for the future.  This attitude is a relatively common one, and it is not an entirely negative 
one.  It is true, of course, that many things learned in schools may not be the most 
exciting things at the time, and yet, their importance is clearly felt when one gets older, 
just as unpleasant experiences are also sometimes the most significant for learning.  
However, I use this example to highlight how consistently education is thought of (or 
perceived by students) as preparation for a later time, and less so as an enrichment of the 
present. 
 Dewey stresses that both of these characteristics of experience – continuity and 
interaction – form a starting point for assessing the ways in which and the extent to which 
certain experiences offer more possibilities for growth than others.  With this basic 
outline of experience in place, I will turn to the issue of growth as one of the fundamental 
educational aims in Dewey’s perspective.   
 
Growth: Critiques and Problems; Defenses and Boons 
 As we have seen, growth for Dewey is a term that signals the enrichment of 
experience, the development along certain lines, and an increasing understanding of the 
situations that shape one’s experience.  However, it is an idea that has gained Dewey 
some notoriety, due to its often-noted ambiguity and conflicting possibilities of 
interpreting its meaning as an educational ideal.  In what follows, I will briefly outline 
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some of the critiques this idea has encountered since Dewey’s time, as well as some 
positive readings and some very fruitful possibilities that this idea presents. 
 The first of these issues concerns the generality of the concept of growth.  
Beginning during Dewey’s day, many thinkers and educators decried this idea as vacuous 
and unhelpful for informing or orienting an approach to the classroom and curriculum, let 
alone in the execution of day-to-day workings of a school.  I.L. Kandel, Richard 
Hofstadter, Eamonn Callan, and R.S. Peters are among these commentators, not only 
pointing out the vagueness of the idea, but leveling more serious critiques that come on 
the heels of this ambiguity. 
 One of Dewey’s contemporaries, Kandel claims that the vague concept of growth 
has led to poor interpretations of Dewey’s theory, emphasizing individual growth over 
the organization of content and the institution of subjects in school, resulting in “nihilism 
and anti-intellectualism.”80  His attack laments the many problems in education of the 
time that Dewey, he claims, fails to address, arguing that his work leads to a “cult of 
uncertainty” which fails to “accept any responsibility for a clear definition of values, for a 
clear statement of the purpose of education,” and that the consequences of this neglect are 
being felt most pointedly as the country is involved in war.81   
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 Hofstadter describes some benefits of the ideal of growth, such as its anti-
mechanistic focus, and its connotation that education is a process of enlarging and 
expanding one’s power and a refinement of understanding and complexity, while also 
noting some of its problems.  He addresses the seeming mis- or inadequate understanding 
of Dewey’s theories, often as a result of their ambiguity and open-endedness, leading to 
widespread mis- or ineffective application of his methods, especially those concerning 
teacher authority.82   
 Peters sharply criticizes Dewey’s idea of growth, claiming that its vagueness 
masks Dewey’s real intention, which, he claims was not growth in any direction, but 
growth in “practical critical thought,” which translates most directly into opening up 
possibilities for “more control of the environment.”83  Peters fears that this emphasis can 
lead to unsavory results, such as a lack of arts and literature in the curriculum, and 
fostering the belief that the rise of “technological man” would reinforce a view of nature 
                                                                                                                                            
many aspects of American life.  Kandel explains that huge numbers of Americans failed 
to qualify for military service due to poor education, listing issues including functional 
illiteracy, ineptitudes at basic math, knowledge of world geography and history, and 
American civic history and responsibilities.  
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as intended for human use and control.84 However, one can quickly respond that while 
what Peters gleans from Deweyan growth might be part of a full interpretation of growth, 
it is only a part.  Moreover, familiarity with Dewey’s manner of thinking (and more 
works from his corpus) demonstrates that Dewey would never condone reducing or 
eliminating the arts from education in favor of scientific method stealing the show, and 
Dewey’s concern with intelligence, while lauding scientific method, would not employ it 
as the sole or exclusive strategy for problem-solving or appreciating one’s world.   
 Callan also critiques the idea of growth for being too inclusive and hence, vague, 
as well as arguing, with Peters, that “growth” actually substitutes for another idea: that 
growth means democratic socialization and development in scientific intelligence.85  His 
larger concern, however, is that Dewey hangs too many things on assumptions, including 
one that assumes children are already “naturally” inclined toward processes of inquiry 
and democratic socialization.  Similarly, Dewey has been heavily critiqued for his work 
reflecting a relentless, near-naive sense of social optimism.  Thinkers such as Allan 
Bloom, Raymond Boisvert, and Cornel West, in addition to nearly all of those already 
discussed, lay some form of this charge on Dewey.  While Bloom claims his theories lead 
toward a bland relativism where openness is prized above any other intellectual 
qualities,86 Boisvert critiques his optimistic viewpoint for its lack of accounting for the 
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tragic elements of life, or as he calls it, “Necessity.”87  Likewise, West argues that 
Dewey’s view can at times border on narrow provincialism, and that his reconstructionist 
approach fails to offer enough resources for confrontational efforts in the struggle to 
change broad-scale power dynamics.88 
 Linked with the worry over Dewey’s incessant optimism arises the concern over 
“permissiveness” in the classroom.  Because Dewey’s methods shift the teachers’ role 
from one of clear authority and director of instruction into a position more focused on 
guidance of interest, the design of environments, and an anti-authoritarian model of 
learning, many critics call out the ways that such lack of authority not only puts teachers 
in a confusing position, but encourages “bedlam” among schoolchildren.  John Patrick 
Diggins describes this concern and the way it grew more and more vitriolic from 
Dewey’s time up until the fifties.89  It is important to note, however, that while some of 
this criticism resulted from poorly understood applications of Dewey’s ideas, Dewey 
himself criticized educators who took the progressive model of schooling to mean that 
students are given no structure, discipline, or direct guidance from teachers at all.90 
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 Along with the question of authority and the schools’ role in the broader social 
scheme, the very real question of ends arises as an issue in Dewey’s educational 
philosophy, especially as concerns the ideal of growth.  While Dewey claims that, like 
life, education has no end beyond itself and that the aim of learning is to continue being 
able and inspired to learn, the question of what students are actually moving toward is 
something of a different question on the ground.  While some may accept the broader 
claim that education is an end in itself as a justification and guide for learning, others 
claim that the typical ways of identifying concrete goals and marking certain 
achievements seem to dissolve.  Diggins raises the question of growth here in particular, 
describing its insufficiency in this respect hinging on the fact that the process of learning 
involves working to realize specific ends (such as executing projects, working toward 
certain achievements, meeting set benchmarks, etc.), and not just as the continuation of 
growth itself, for its own sake.  He writes, “The desire to achieve meaning, purpose, and 
value does not arise from the biological givens of growth.  A life that turns on nothing 
more than growth could be aimless and empty, lacking the tension and direction that 
comes only from the conscious choice of ends.”91  Like others critiquing Dewey’s 
theories for their lack of concrete direction, Diggins points out the difficulty of teaching 
toward an abstract ideal – which might, albeit, still be the long-view, overarching goal – 
but which does not lend itself immediately to showing how students identify and 
accomplish particular goals, reaching milestones (even of their own design), along the 
way. 
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 One might see this concern as a particular version or subset of the question, 
“growth towards what?”  This is a viable concern with Dewey’s emphasis on this idea, 
and to be frank, there may be no universal, straightforward answers to it.  Some responses 
might include: growth towards more growth, growth toward increasing possibilities, 
growth toward individual and social flourishing, growth toward the practice of freedom, 
and so on.  One problem with each of these answers is that the object toward which 
growth is tending can never be determined in advance, for part of the process of growing 
is determining its own path as it goes, which will be unique for each individual and 
according with the needs of her community.  The student does not know in advance what 
kind of adult she or he will become, and neither does anyone else.  There is no 
predetermined telos that the process of education will or even ought to yield; there is no 
preordained blueprint for what each individual “needs” in order to become the “best” 
adult one can be.  There are pre-existing models and criteria, of course, and a variety of 
impulses and goals to choose from as well.  But to say that growth aims at x is to put a 
label on something that Dewey believes should remain open, individual, interpretable.   
 R.W. Hildreth stresses this point, arguing that the lack of predetermined ends in 
Dewey’s educational framework is actually a strength instead of a liability, and indeed, 
Hildreth finds part of Dewey’s radicalism to be based on this point.92  In leaving many 
questions of educational ends open to individual communities and schools, Hildreth 
argues, Dewey not only places a faith in educational actors to make decisions regarding 
their own needs and interests, but also emphasizes the need for continual collective 
discussion and debate about how communities are to flourish.  Dewey provides 
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educational criteria, Hildreth claims, in the forms of growth, democratic control, and 
social interaction, and urges that educators and administrators use precisely those tools to 
maintain critical discussions about what educational goals and strategies are desired.  As 
such, Hildreth sees Dewey’s view as providing vital resources for educational 
communities to establish their own identities, but also to combat the overly 
“technocratic” standards and policies that increasingly govern American education policy 
(through for example, parts of the recent No Child Left Behind legislation and the 
increasing use of standardized tests).93   
 Naoko Saito also defends Dewey’s use of the concept of growth, pairing it with 
the Emersonian “gleam of light,” or the possibility for “rebirth of the new” in the midst of 
being and becoming, especially in the difficulties of movement and growth without fixed 
ends.94  She highlights the reconstructive character of growth and its ability to reawaken 
hope that might be lost through experience, stressing that this light can be seen as a 
touchstone for the possibilities present within experience and its evolution.  As such, she 
describes the potential of Deweyan growth to conceive of “education as the continuous 
process of conversion, metamorphosis, and internal transformation, toward the rebirth of 
one’s lost light.”95 
 Along with these defenses of growth, I think that an alternative way to frame the 
question of “growth towards what?” might be to ask, “growth as what?”  Indeed, growth 
is always a moving-towards, but there is never a concrete, final end achieved as the result 
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of such movement, and perhaps this is one reason why labeling a “towards what” is so 
difficult.  Insofar as there are end-points reached, or ends-in-view accomplished, these, of 
course, become new springboards for activity, temporary points of rest only to become 
unseated again, stirred up by the interplay of doing-undergoing, or the stability-instability 
through which Dewey characterizes the human world of experience.  Thus, with no 
univocal, universal end-in-view as the target towards which growth is moving, we might 
say that growth towards growth, or growth towards more possibilities of growth, or 
growth towards more possibilities of freedom and flourishing, or even growth towards 
life, is the best we can do, as long as we think of the need to define growth in terms of 
growth-toward.  Indeed, insofar as Dewey strives to identify the process of education 
with result of education, we are left always working in a circle with respect to growth as 
growing towards something.96  If we think about growth in terms of growth-as, this might 
offer more suggestions that answer the concern about what this idea means in the 
classroom, and how it might be something more helpful in actual educational settings, 
helping to set particular ends and goals.   
 It is in this light that I find it helpful to think of growth as agency, or as a felt 
experience of oneself as capable of activity and engagement, which I believe entails a 
sense of self-knowledge.  Likewise, self-knowledge entails a working (and thus, always 
changing) understanding of one’s own situation, capacities, possibilities, attitudes, and 
habits, and how these operate within environments, encompassing social, natural, and 
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institutional ones.  In viewing growth as agency, including a felt sense of one’s abilities 
for purposive action within situations, we can think of growth involving the expansion as 
well as refinement of understanding of one’s self and one’s surroundings.  I say this 
because expanding and refining one’s understanding of herself in relation to her 
surroundings thus leads to increased understanding of how she might act constructively 
within those surroundings, developing a part of the critical, flexible intelligence that a 
Deweyan education seeks to cultivate.  While I will expand upon the relation between 
agency and Dewey’s use of “intelligence,” I believe that an understanding of growth as 
agency takes seriously the manner in which the development and use of one’s 
intelligence is felt and experienced by students, especially insofar as one experiences 
herself as a capable agent with the potential of making purposive change.  Further, an 
individual who experiences herself as able to engage her capacities and her surroundings 
to make positive, purposive change is more likely to develop the potential to act upon and 
increase her sense of freedom.  Increasing one’s sense of freedom and possibility can thus 
involve the possibility of novelty, the possibility for continued expansion of one’s 
engagements, and the pursuit of applying one’s intelligence in an infinite number of 
ways.  Indeed, Dewey writes, “The great reward of exercising the power of thinking is 
that there are no limits to the possibility of carrying over into objects and events of life, 
meanings originally acquired by thoughtful examination, and hence no limit to the 
continual growth of meaning in human life.”97  While growth is characterized here by a 
limitless potential for meaning and infinite possibilities of connection in human life, I 
believe that such growth can only be actualized and become a conscious project for 
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oneself when she has the agency – the felt sense of herself as capable of developing and 
actualizing her intentions – to envision her possibilities as ever-growing, or to experience 
her possibilities of discovering meaning as endlessly expansive.  This is, for me, what 
Deweyan growth might ideally symbolize; and while it does not lend itself neatly to an 
answer of what it is aiming toward (despite the fact that it is always moving, changing, in 
process), it can give us some guidance in terms of how growth might be experienced.  
And in addressing how growth as agency is experienced, I find it crucial to bring in the 
question of how one’s embodied agency is experienced.   
 
Growth as Agency: Self-Knowledge, Control, and Embodiment 
 One important manner of backing up this reading of growth as agency also comes 
in Dewey’s persistent emphasis that educative experiences involve an increase in the 
degree of control over one’s environment.  If agency can be understood as a concrete, felt 
sense of one’s potentials for articulating intentions and acting upon them, then we might 
see a parallel between the development of agency and the element of learning that 
involves greater facility of action within one’s world.98  This element of learning is a 
significant part of educational growth, for Dewey, and is used throughout his texts on 
education.  As such, working with a few key places where this characterization occurs 
will help ground this reading. 
 In Democracy and Education, in fleshing out his “technical definition” of 
education as the reconstruction of experience, Dewey describes two principal features of 
                                                
98 In order for agency to be felt, of course, it must have the support of external conditions 
enabling it, such as freedom from certain physical, intellectual, emotional, and 
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how this reconstruction is educative: the first has to do with increasing one’s perception 
of new connections or continuities between elements of experience, thus increasing the 
meaning of these elements, and the second has to do with added powers of direction or 
control, based on these increases in meaning.  Of the first condition, he writes, with 
reference to the examples of a child reaching for a bright light and burning himself 
(though Dewey also extends the principle to a scientist’s work in a laboratory):  
 An activity which brings education or instruction with it makes one aware of 
 some of the connections which had been imperceptible. ... [referring to the child 
 and the light] ... By doing certain things, he makes perceptible certain connections 
 of heat with other things, which had been previously ignored.  Thus his acts in 
 relation to these things get more meaning; he knows better what he is doing or ‘is 
 about’ when he has to do with them;99 
 
Thus, as connections are discovered and developed between actions and consequences, or 
between an object and various aspects of its existence (e.g., the light is connected with 
heat, intense heat is connected with pain), the experience is educative.  However, and 
importantly, 
 The other side of an educative experience is an added power of subsequent 
 direction or control.  To say that one knows what he is about, or can intend certain 
 consequences, is to say, of course, that he can better anticipate what is going to 
 happen; that he can, therefore, get ready or prepare in advance so as to secure 
 beneficial consequences and avert undesirable ones.100 
 
Thus, the second side is the resulting gain in connecting the present with the future: 
through the perception of previously unforeseen connections and meanings, one adds to 
her powers of prediction and anticipation of consequences, or in other words, she adds to 
her abilities to work intelligently within her environments, better able to understand and 
manage her activities within them.  As opposed to being simply routine, mechanical 
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activities or “capricious activities” not aimed at generating any particular connections and 
not adding to the predictive powers of experience, a genuinely educative experience 
offers both meaning in the form of connection, and an increase in control in the form of 
understanding probable consequences that can direct one’s actions accordingly.101  
Dewey describes this similarly in Experience in Education: “Growth in judgment and 
understanding is essentially growth in ability to form purposes and to select and arrange 
means for their realization.”102 
 This is also a way in which Dewey characterizes intelligence in activity: an 
activity not just carried out on “blind” impulse or the automatic working of habit, but 
executed as the result of informing oneself about the conditions and making a deliberate 
decision regarding a desired direction is one that demonstrates intelligence.103  Thus, part 
of the task of education is to help develop this kind of informed, careful decision making, 
based in part on developing skills of inquiry, such that individuals develop the skills to 
approach a situation with unknown factors and discover how they might best work within 
it.  
 While there are too many references to this idea in Dewey’s work to include 
exhaustively at this point, I simply want to stress here that a key element characterizing 
the process of learning in Dewey’s view is this increased capacity for intelligent action, 
or the increased capacity for understanding how one’s actions will create certain effects 
                                                
101 Ibid. 
 
102 Dewey, Experience and Education, 56. 
 
103 To this effect, Dewey writes in Experience and Education, “Intelligent activity is 
distinguished from aimless activity by the fact that it involves selection of means – 
analysis – out of the variety of conditions that are present, and their arrangement – 
synthesis – to reach an intended aim or purpose” (57). 
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and develop effective habits for realizing positive effects.  While a more sustained 
discussion of the habit side of this equation will appear in the next chapter, I want to 
highlight here that this increased power of control in one’s environment requires an 
increased understanding of “what one is about” when one interacts with other persons or 
other things in one’s environment.  After all, Dewey claims in Experience and Education 
that “The ideal aim of education is creation of power of self-control.”104  As such, this 
leads into questions regarding how we know what we “are about” and how education 
works to increase our powers of self-control.  In this light, then, with the help of several 
of Dewey’s commentators, I turn to the question of self-knowledge as it concerns agency, 
especially insofar as it is a component part of intelligent, efficacious action.  In other 
words, if education involves increasing our powers of self-control and control within the 
conditions of our surroundings, then, I argue, such powers entail that we understand 
something about ourselves. 
 
Growth as Agency: Self-Knowledge and Self-Control 
 To achieve the kind of growth Dewey discusses, the growth that leads to 
actualizing possibilities inherent in a situation or developing a greater facility in 
responding to one’s surroundings, several elements must be taken into consideration.  As 
Cherilyn Keall notes in her essay, “Deweyan Self-Knowledge and Genuine Education,” 
individuals must be able to develop a secure and stable sense of self in the course of 
education if it is to be genuine, that is, if it is to truly help individuals have a sense of 
                                                
104 Ibid., 41. 
 70 
“what they are about,” or what the probable consequences of their actions are to be.105  
Such knowledge is a vital component in a genuine education, she argues, because if one 
is to truly develop the kind of intelligence that Dewey envisions in his philosophy of 
education, one must have an understanding and awareness of oneself as a person in the 
midst of situations.  This sense of self, she stipulates, is far from an atomistic 
individualism; part of the upshot of her argument is that the development of such self-
knowledge requires support from and interaction with others. I agree with Keall’s claim 
that a genuine education requires that such knowledge of self must be attended to and 
developed in the course of a self-empowering, socially-grounded education.  
 Keall notes that despite the lack of technical language regarding self-knowledge 
in Dewey’s work, a conception of self-knowledge might be gleaned from it, and while 
she outlines several characteristics of Deweyan self-knowledge in her reading, she also 
looks to R.D. Laing for his idea of “ontological security” to flesh out this interpretation.  
She bases her reading of Dewey on his language from Chapter 8 of Democracy and 
Education that a person is “lacking in mind” (acting blindly or without intelligence) “just 
in the degree in which in any activity he does not know what he is about, namely, the 
probable consequences of his acts.”  Dewey adds to this description that a person is 
“imperfectly intelligent” when taking chances with luck, basing decisions on “looser 
guesses” as to what their outcomes might be, or making plans without taking actual 
conditions into account, and such conditions include her own capacities.106  Keall claims 
that knowing “what one is about,” in connection with knowing the “probable 
                                                
105 Cherilyn Keall, “Deweyan Self-Knowledge and Genuine Education,” (paper presented 
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106 Ibid., 1.  Dewey, Democracy and Education, 110. 
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consequences of one’s acts,” does not constitute a particularly high standard for self-
knowledge.  She notes that knowing the consequences of one’s acts is, to some degree, 
unknowable (as some situations might have unforeseeable consequences), but on the 
other hand, to the extent they are knowable, knowing them is the result of a process; that 
is, knowing the consequences of one’s acts is a part of development, and, we might hear 
in her words, growth.107  She adds that a Deweyan conception of self-knowledge, 
emerging as a part of development, requires understanding the connections between past 
actions and past results – that is, knowing how one acted in the past and seeing how those 
actions had certain consequences, such that one might develop an understanding of 
probable consequences of action in the future.108  Dewey’s principle of continuity is at 
work in this element of self-knowledge.  Since we can study the consequences of our past 
actions, due to the fact that all experience takes up something from its past and modifies 
somehow its future we can estimate how our actions in the future may result.  Last, Keall 
adds that the kind of self-knowledge she is discussing is not the same as knowledge one 
might gain about oneself by surveying some aspect of oneself as an object.  She cites the 
examples of finding out how tall one is or who one’s biological parents are.  According to 
Keall, these are pieces of information that might add to one’s knowledge of self, but they 
are distinct from “the kind of self-knowledge that manifests itself as a background 
condition that is implicit in all of one’s acts.”109  This distinction itself may be 
problematic, in that pieces of “objective” knowledge such as one’s height and one’s 
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parents may very well be quite significant in one’s operative background of self-
knowledge.110  However, the main point of Keall’s claim is that the self-knowledge that 
carries us through the world, even if somewhat inarticulately, is something that a genuine 
education should foster.  She is calling attention to the need for education to encourage 
the development of a sense of self and sense of presence that undergirds one’s activities 
and pursuits, seeing it as vital if one is to grow into a free, intelligent, and flourishing 
adult.   
 To flesh out Dewey’s somewhat spare notion of self-knowledge, Keall draws on 
the ideas of “ontological security” and “ontological insecurity” from R.D. Laing.  
Experiences for a person suffering from ontological insecurity, Keall describes, are 
characterized by insubstantiality, unreality, discontinuity, a questionable autonomy, 
anxiety, and a separation between mind and body.111  On the contrary, experiences of a 
person with a sense of ontological security are characterized by “life, reality, wholeness, 
and continuity,”112 or in other words, a sense of existential stability and presence that the 
sufferer of ontological insecurity does not enjoy.  As one might expect, these two 
“existential settings” create vastly different results regarding the gamut of experiences 
these persons engage in.  Interestingly, Keall’s summary does not include the embodied 
character of the ontologically secure person, while the ontologically insecure person 
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might experience a split between mind and body.  While this may be a result of Laing’s 
characterizations and not Keall’s, I note this because I will go on to argue that the body 
can play a significant role in this kind of security for some individuals.  I read Keall’s 
addition of these concepts to Dewey’s as highlighting the way that knowing “what one is 
about” entails the kind of stability afforded the ontologically secure individual.  She adds, 
moreover, that neither of these “settings” is given from birth; for children to grow into 
ontologically secure individuals, help and support from others in the process of 
development is essential.  This brings her back to the link between self-knowledge and 
education, as she claims that developing this kind of security or knowledge of self is part 
of what a genuine education should accomplish.  This is because there are no guarantees 
that this kind of security will emerge on its own, and moreover, for the reconstruction of 
experiences in which education consists to be empowering, the individuals’ experiences 
of self must add to, or be a productive part within the experiences one engages in, rather 
than interfering with or creating added obstacles within them.113  I agree with Keall’s 
argument that a strong sense of self, or as she sometimes describes, sense of being a 
person, is a vital part of educative growth.  Also, we can see how this knowledge would 
be crucial for a person in developing powers of self-control and capacities of controlling 
one’s surroundings.  
 In a similar vein, Daniel Pekarsky offers a compelling reading of growth in 
relation to agency in his essay, “Dewey’s Conception of Growth Reconsidered.”  In 
addition to offering counter-readings to many criticisms of Dewey’s idea of growth, 
Pekarksy outlines the way that for Dewey, we are organisms interacting with our 
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environments, but in our unique capacity as human organisms, the beliefs we hold play a 
large role in the ways such interactions occur.  As such, the manner of growth for human 
beings “consists in the expansion and refinement of the agent’s understanding, where 
‘understanding’ signifies a grasp of the connections among events.”114  He claims further 
that understanding is not enough in all cases to constitute growth, because there are some 
cases in which understanding can inhibit active agency (such as knowledge which hinders 
confidence and self-esteem) and there are cases in which knowledge is gained without 
appreciation of what it might mean or what might result as a consequence of having it.  
Thus, Pekarsky argues, it is both knowledge and appreciation of its significance that are 
really necessary in educative growth, and it is the latter which can have a bigger impact 
on the agent’s ability to navigate, adapt to, and/or transform a situation.  This is important 
for educators to grasp, he claims because, “what it means is that they cannot, as some are 
wont to do, facilely assume that if they contribute to their students’ understanding of the 
world, this will automatically give rise to growth in appreciation; they will, on the 
contrary, have to search out those ways of fostering their students’ intellectual growth 
that will also enrich their lives along the appreciative dimension.”115 
 As such, what Pekarsky emphasizes in his account is the role of agency in 
connection with growth, highlighting that both knowledge and appreciation, combined 
with an active sense of how to use and enrich those faculties of experience, is really at 
issue when it comes to growth.  He writes,  
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 The connections ... established between growth and action suggest that the ideal 
 of growth is an ideal of human agency.  That is, it characterizes the life of human 
 beings  insofar as they are engaged in making sense of their situation, deliberating, 
 acting,  and then using the results of their actions to confirm, expand, or refine the 
 understandings, dispositions, and skills that guide their intellectual and practical 
 lives.116  
  
This echoes an element of what Keall also claims: in arguing that growth is not just about 
the acquisition of knowledge, or that genuine education requires the opportunities and 
support necessary to develop knowledge of self, both thinkers highlight that for Dewey, 
education is about the actual, experienced abilities of agents to act with intelligence, 
deliberateness, and a degree of self-awareness when it comes to cultivating agency.  This 
kind of agency, or intelligent efficacy, requires knowledge, understanding, and 
appreciation, but most importantly, requires that these elements come together in an 
active experience of one’s own capacities, such that individuals experience themselves as 
self-aware agents able to take up the problems they discover in their environments, 
understand their nuances and appreciate their complexities, and thus translate such 
appreciative knowledge into capacities to transform the environment as they transform 
themselves.  Indeed, this resonates with Dewey’s views on knowledge and its purpose in 
education: “Knowledge is humanistic in quality not because it is about human products in 
the past, but because of what it does in liberating human intelligence and human 
sympathy.  Any subject matter which accomplishes this result is humane, and any subject 
matter which does not accomplish it is not even educational.”117  Taking this emphasis to 
heart, Pekarsky stresses that if learning is to constitute real growth, it must work with a 
“humanistic,” appreciative approach, such that “the agent’s ability to meet life head-on is 
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enhanced.”118  To achieve this, the knowledge and appreciation students develop cannot 
be such to diminish self-esteem, impede curiosity, or degrade the effectiveness with 
which they relate to their worlds. 
 I should note here, following Keall, that Dewey does not often use language of 
self-knowledge or self-awareness, but this is not to say that his views do not 
accommodate such ideas.  In Democracy and Education, he does stipulate that there is a 
brand of self-consciousness that impedes action and an easy engagement with tasks.  In 
describing some of the desired attitudes to be fostered in engaging with subject matter, 
Dewey writes that “directness, open-mindedness, single-mindedness (or whole-
heartedness), and responsibility” are among the most important features of methods and 
approaches to subject matter.119  He goes on to describe directness by laying out its 
opposites: “self-consciousness, embarrassment, and constraint,” which all suggest that “a 
person is not immediately concerned with subject matter,” but is distracted, in part due to 
thinking about both the matter at hand as well as what others think of his performance.120  
Directness, on the other hand, is a sense of confidence, straightforwardness with respect 
to a task at hand, and interestingly, “denotes not conscious trust in the efficacy of one’s 
powers but unconscious faith in the possibilities of the situation.”121  Thus, Dewey marks 
off self-consciousness as an impediment to directly investing in a situation or activity. 
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While this is certainly a legitimate concern, this self-consciousness is decidedly not the 
same kind of self-knowledge that I (with Keall) am discussing.  Dewey’s comments here 
refer to self-consciousness in the way still often meant: that when one is overly conscious 
of herself, she becomes less able to “throw herself” into an activity completely; she might 
feel ill-at-ease in performing a task, too aware of her own thoughts and movements such 
that they impede a fluid engagement in it; or her interest and attention become divided 
and fractured; and it is important to note here that such self-consciousness often refers to 
or concerns one’s bodily engagement with an activity.   
 While it is true that this kind of self-consciousness is a potential result of concern 
with the body, it is not the same kind of self-knowledge that I am referring to (and on the 
flip side, some kinds of concern with the body in developing self-knowledge might 
distinctively reduce such bodily self-consciousness).  I will take up this concern more in 
the next chapter, but I want to note here that developing the kind of “unconscious faith in 
the possibilities of the situation” that Dewey finds necessary entails developing a strong 
sense of self, and moreover, a strong sense of embodied self, so that the kind of inhibiting 
self-consciousness that can impede one’s participation in actions is staved off, supplanted 
instead with an empowering sense of contact and connection with the possibilities of a 
situation.   
  In sum, I find Keall’s and Pekarsky’s claims about self-knowledge and agency to 
identify key elements in what a fully fleshed out Deweyan education would include, and 
thus their claims are significant for my own reading of growth.  However, because I am 
concerned with growth as agency and the role of self-knowledge, it is necessary at this 
point to look for ways that Dewey provides a reading of the self, the “site” or the 
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individual that undergoes growth.  It is my contention that a rich, agential self, as the 
subject of growth, is an embodied sense of self, who has capacities for and a degree of 
operative self-knowledge (in Keall’s sense) and agency (in Pekarsky’s sense).  Dewey’s 
conception of self, self-knowledge, and agency are all embodied notions; however, I also 
believe there may be more aspects to these phenomena than Dewey’s theories easily lend 
themselves to.  This is why I will take up thinkers from other traditions in later chapters; 
at the moment, however, I want to return to Dewey’s work on education and see more 
about how the self – specifically, the self as knowing-itself and as having agency – or 
better, the self as the subject of growth, appears in these pages.  I will take up some of 
Dewey’s other works, especially Human Nature and Conduct and Experience and 
Nature, in the next chapter, to enrich the senses of self, human character, habit, and 
embodiment he articulates there.   
 
Self and Self-Knowledge 
 One place to look for the kind of self-knowledge associated with agency in 
Dewey’s educational work is in the emphasis on growth as gaining increased powers of 
control over or within one’s environment; some of this has been fleshed out above.  
Another place is his discussion on the self as it emerges through engagement with 
interests, which occurs late in Democracy and Education in the chapter titled “Theories 
of Morals.”  In this chapter, he is juxtaposing two predominant views of moral 
engagement, those drawing from a kind of principle-based approach and those viewing 
self-interest as morality’s prime motivator.  In taking up this dichotomy and exposing its 
structure as flawed, Dewey critiques both sides in conceiving of the self as separate from 
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interests and principles.  Instead, Dewey claims that one’s self emerges in and through 
participation with one’s interests, and this participation thus determines the kind of self 
that arises.  He writes, “In fact, self and interest are two names for the same fact; the kind 
and amount of interest actively taken in a thing reveals and measures the quality of 
selfhood which exists.”122  As such, “self” is not something divorced from activity, 
process, the particularities of an occupation, or the others with whom one interacts; 
rather, it is an element that emerges from the inter- or trans- action of individuals with 
others and with objects and ideas in their surroundings.123  Since this discussion, 
however, is less about the ontological status of the self and more about moral 
frameworks, I will have more to address regarding the ontology of the self in the next 
chapter.  However, I include this further characterization of “unselfishness” for the links 
it presents with growth; here Dewey describes two associated qualities that generally 
characterize “unselfishness”:  
 (i) The generous self consciously identifies itself with the full range of 
 relationships implied in its activity, instead of drawing a sharp line between 
 itself and considerations which are excluded as alien or indifferent; (ii) it readjusts 
 and expands its past ideas of itself to take in new consequences as they become 
 perceptible. ... The wider or larger self which means inclusion instead of denial of 
 relationships is identical with a self which enlarges in order to assume previously 
 unforeseen ties.124 
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As such, the self described as “generous” reveals some helpful traits of the Deweyan self: 
first, it identifies itself with “the full range of relationships implied in its activity,” which 
I interpret to mean that the generous self understands itself through its connections with 
others, and if generous, with as many others as might be included in an activity or 
environment.  As such, Dewey emphasizes that the self emerges in concert with and 
through interactions with all its environing conditions; relationships with others are thus a 
primary means of developing a sense of self and knowing what this self is.  Second, and 
more to the point of the present discussion, the generous self “readjusts and expands its 
past ideas of itself to take in new consequences as they become perceptible,” which I 
interpret to mean that the generous self identifies itself with its process of growing, and 
thus, holds itself open and accountable to new connections and relationships that develop 
as new circumstances emerge.  This is not only one way in which we see Dewey’s 
characterization of growth as the process of discovering and deepening the connections 
perceptible in our worlds, but also a way in which we see Dewey’s concern with 
education as intimately linked with ethical life.  Moreover, with growth as both 
educational and ethical aims, we see the self as the subject of both as in-the-making and 
whose potential for future expansion builds insofar as it spreads its identifications into as 
many and diverse interests as possible. 
 But one may pause and ask at this point: if the self is one with its interests and 
emerges insofar as it engages with occupations, what does this mean for self-knowledge 
in the educational process?  Does this imply that knowledge of self – and especially of 
one’s embodied self – is illusory, or irrelevant, or so dispersed in action that to separate it 
out would stray from Dewey’s vision?  My response at this point emphasizes several 
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things: simply because I am addressing self-knowledge and the presence of the body in 
self-knowledge does not imply that the self is closed off or separated from its 
surroundings or importantly, other selves in its world.  Instead, to be true to a Deweyan 
perspective, a picture of self-knowledge would necessarily emphasize that anything 
characterized as “self” or “knowledge” emerges only in the context of social interaction.  
It is not simply alongside or in conjunction with others that “self” and “knowledge” 
emerge, but by virtue of transaction itself that anything identifiable as a self comes into 
being.  In other words, it is through interacting with others that anything like a self has 
the possibility of existing.  The development of the self is one manner of a human 
organism interacting with its world, and the kind of self that emerges is largely dependent 
on the character of its social environment.  We can come to know who we are only 
through our relationships with others and the contexts of our social worlds; indeed, 
Dewey writes in Experience and Nature, “If we had not talked with others and they with 
us, we should never talk to and with ourselves.”125  To return to Keall’s starting point 
with self-knowledge, Dewey claims that knowing “what one is about” is largely about 
knowing the probable consequences of one’s actions.  Having a sense of the probable 
consequences of one’s actions requires familiarity with one’s own capacities, proclivities, 
habits, and attitudes with respect to one’s social and physical environment.  More 
broadly, this kind of self-knowledge thus entails having a sense of one’s place in the 
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world, of one’s demeanor of within situations, of the character of one’s social self, and 
one’s felt, actual possibilities within the situations of one’s world. 
 
Growth: Agency, Self-Knowledge, and Embodiment 
 In having familiarity with one’s capacities, habits, attitudes, and so on – the many 
and varied ways one might know what she “is about” – brings me to this final, and vital, 
section of this chapter.  I have already asserted that growth is, in my reading, an ideal of 
agency, and such agency requires not only a degree of self-knowledge, but also a felt 
sense of possibility in one’s intelligence, in the capacities one has to deliberate 
thoughtfully and act efficaciously.  It is the felt sense of this agency that my focus will 
now turn to.  I argue that a strong sense of agency requires a stable and secure sense of 
one’s embodied self.  I do not believe I am straying from Dewey in this claim – I do hope, 
however, that through the course of this project, I might provide a richer, more complex 
conception of embodied self than Dewey does directly.  This is in part because there are 
several different avenues one might take when discussing the embodied self and this is in 
part due to vast differences in intellectual and philosophical concerns at the time of 
Dewey’s writing and writing in the early twenty-first century.  However, while these 
various avenues will be addressed in more detail at this section’s close, I wish to lay out 
some of the ways Dewey does address the body in the process of education.  For 
purposes of space, I will focus my attention on the two main texts I have been drawing 
from thus far; discussions of embodiment in some of Dewey’s other works will be taken 
up in the following chapter. 
 83 
 To begin, one place this comes up in Democracy and Education is in the chapter 
titled “Natural Development and Social Efficiency as Aims,” wherein Dewey discusses 
the educational aim of the body’s health and vigor.  Dewey references Rousseau in 
thinking about natural development and how this concern can impart specific aims for 
education.  He writes, 
 Natural development as an aim fixes attention upon the bodily organs and the 
 need of health and vigor.  The aim of natural development says to parents and 
 teachers: Make health an aim; normal development cannot be had without regard 
 to the vigor of the body – an obvious enough fact and yet one whose due 
 recognition in practice would almost automatically revolutionize many of our 
 educational practices.126 
 
I begin with this passage because Dewey acknowledges here how seriously this changes 
our picture of education.  He claims that paying attention to the “obvious” fact of the 
body’s needs and vitality is something not typically done in the educational practice of 
his day.  This suggests one way in which his methods – especially the focus on 
participation, on subject-matter arising organically from real life scenarios, his problem-
solving approach in general – aim to recognize this reality and remedy the potential 
hindrance of bodily “neglect” in students’ experiences.  Thus we find evidence here of 
Dewey’s concern with this issue; indeed, he states in this chapter that “The three factors 
of educative development are (a) the native structure of our bodily organs and their 
functional activities; (b) the uses to which the activities of these organs are put under the 
influence of other persons; (c) their direct interaction with the environment.”127  As such, 
he sees the “native structure of our bodily organs,” their activities, uses, and interactions 
as the fundamental “tools” of educational development; one might even think of them as 
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the “raw materials” which education and development “refine.”  Indeed, thinking of the 
body in this way may not be too far a cry from Dewey’s conception of embodied 
experience and the organic nature of human life more generally. 
 Further commenting on Rousseau’s statement that “Nature’s intention is to 
strengthen the body before exercising the mind,” Dewey writes that Rousseau “hardly 
states the fact fairly.  But if he had said that nature’s ‘intention’ … is to develop the mind 
by exercise of the muscles of the body he would have stated a positive fact.  In other 
words, the aim of following nature means, in the concrete, regard for the actual part 
played by use of the bodily organs in explorations, in handling of materials, in plays and 
games.”128  As such, the emphasis again is on activity, engagement, and the natural 
development of bodily facility in conjunction with intellectual facility and environmental 
interaction.  This, for Dewey, is to follow the path that comes most naturally to children, 
before they become accustomed to the classroom, the chair and desk, the tidy rows with 
the teacher up front, and so forth.  Dewey’s (perhaps quaint or provincial) ideal of 
childhood learning is that of the youth engaged in the regular tasks of a community, 
“learning the ropes” as she or he is immersed in the workings of the world (including the 
adult world).  This perspective often involves the reality of labor, the necessity of bodily 
tasks as tasks with meaning and purpose. 
 With this focus on participation and purpose in learning “naturally,” Dewey rails 
against the ways mind-body dualism is imparted in schools.  In the chapter titled 
“Experience and Thinking,” he claims, “It would be impossible to state adequately the 
evil results which have flowed from this dualism of mind and body, much less to 
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exaggerate them.”129  He breaks down these “evils” into three main issues: one, that 
bodily activity becomes “an intruder” in the disciplining of operations of mind; two, the 
fact that the body’s senses must be engaged for individuals to participate in and find 
meaning from scenarios is neglected; and three, that the separation of body from mind 
illusorily separates perception from judgment.   
 For the first issue, Dewey explains that the view separating mind from body thus 
separates mental from physical activity, and as education deals with intellectual matters, 
the body then becomes “a distraction, an evil to be contended with.”130  The body as a 
source of energy becomes a problem for the order of the classroom, and suppressing the 
body’s desire to move, to express, to do things becomes another primary issue that the 
teacher and the classroom must deal with and regulate, instead of employing 
productively.  In a somewhat cheeky description, Dewey points out: “the pupil has a 
body, and brings it to school along with his mind,” but notes that all too often, “A 
premium is put on physical quietude; on silence, on rigid uniformity of posture and 
movement; upon a machine-like simulation of the attitudes of intelligent interest.”131  The 
resulting effect of such “unnatural” quietude can be, Dewey claims, “nervous strain and 
fatigue” for both students and teachers, manifesting in oscillations between “callous 
indifference and explosions from strain.”   
 The neglected body, having no organized fruitful channels of activity, breaks 
 forth, without knowing why or how, into meaningless boisterousness, or settles 
 into equally meaningless fooling - … Physically active children become restless 
 and unruly; the more quiescent, so-called conscientious ones spend what energy 
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 they have in the negative task of keeping their instincts and active tendencies 
 suppressed, instead of in a positive one of constructive planning and execution; 
 they are thus educated not into responsibility for the significant and graceful use 
 of bodily powers, but into an enforced duty not to give them free play.132 
 
This description warrants attention, especially the final claim: that in suppressing the 
impulses to move and engage physically with their peers and their surroundings, students 
are educated into a “duty” not to give these desires free play; but also, in this neglect, 
they are not educated into “responsibility for the significant and graceful use of bodily 
powers.”  It seems to me that if education is meant to aid in increasing powers of agency, 
self-control, and effective, appreciative relationships with their environments, helping 
them understand what such a responsibility might entail and what actualizing “significant 
and graceful use of bodily powers” might mean for them as individuals would be hugely 
valuable educative experiences.  I believe that such experiences would be, for many 
students, substantial boons for their capacities of generating self-knowledge and helpful 
tools in developing individualized mechanisms of self-control, and thus, significant 
elements in the development of agency, of the felt sense of one’s capacities and 
possibilities.133 
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133 I note that I believe this attention would be valuable for many students.  I do not claim 
that this is a cure-all or that this kind of engagement would be valuable for all students.  I 
make this stipulation for several reasons, some of which will be discussed at more length 
later.  First, all individuals have different degrees of comfort, capacity, and confidence 
when it comes to paying attention to or using their bodies in particular ways.  This is 
something that would, of course, need careful attention when engaging the body in the 
classroom or in educative activities.  What may pose no challenge at all for one student 
may be devastatingly difficult, embarrassing, or even painful for another.  This is 
something that educators would have to pay close and careful attention to, understanding 
their students well in advance and making accommodations for activities as needed.  
Second, I acknowledge that, like this first concern, students with special needs and 
disabilities are likely to experience bodily activities, especially if they are conducted in a 
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 Of course, such possibilities do not emerge without corresponding constraints, 
because it is only within an environing context that action and movement take place.  
Such contexts include the reality of limitation when it comes to what actions are possible, 
desirable, socially condoned, and so forth.  However, the constraints typically put on 
student bodies in classrooms, including sitting in chairs for extended periods of time, 
only allowing full bodily movement at proscribed times and places, etc., arguably create a 
quite limited set of possibilities for activity.  I raise this point to clarify that while 
increased bodily engagement could produce increases in perceived bodily possibility, 
such possibilities always come about through bodily interaction with environments and 
the constraints imposed therein.  Given different constraints, bodies might develop 
different (and potentially broader) possibilities for action, movement, and meaning as 
part and parcel of school learning. 
 The second issue Dewey discusses regards the relatively apparent fact that any 
experience whatever, no matter how intellectually rigorous, necessarily involves the 
senses; that anything experienced and thus anything learned requires the engagement of 
eyes and ears, hands, lips, vocal organs, and so forth.  He writes, “[the student’s] senses 
are avenues of knowledge not because external facts are somehow ‘conveyed’ to the 
                                                                                                                                            
group setting, as quite different from those experienced by students who do not have 
special needs or discernable disabilities.  This presents issues that would have to be dealt 
with on a case-by-case basis, but I do believe that while certain activities might require 
modification, I do believe this kind of attention is likely to be helpful for many students 
with special needs as well.  In any case, part of what I believe bodily attention and 
activity might provide for students is a deeper, more familiar, and more compassionate 
relationship with their own bodies.  This is something I believe nearly all students might 
benefit from, though the mechanisms to attaining such benefits are bound to be very 
different from individual to individual. 
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brain, but because they are used in doing something with a purpose.”134  However, if the 
body or the engagement of multiple sensory organs is neglected, as he describes with the 
first concern, then the result for the second issue is a tendency towards repetition, 
automatism, and a “mechanical use of the bodily activities.”135  Over time, such 
mechanical use dulls the capacities for novelty and easy integration of all the senses, and 
can generally diminish bodily-intellectual engagement as a full, meaningful experience; 
one might say that such mechanism in activities represents experiences that prove mis-
educative, in that they do not foster growth and interconnection but rather, can foster their 
opposites: isolated perceptions and a lack of curiosity.  Dewey claims that such repetitive, 
mechanical activities have the destructive result of “narrow[ing] down the bodily activity 
so that a separation of body from mind – that is, from recognition of meaning – is set 
up.”136  Significantly, Dewey here locates, at least in part, the recognition of meaning 
with a union of body and mind.  Since we know that the recognition of meaning also 
entails a perception of connections and an understanding of how past actions relate to 
future actions, we can also see here a sense in which the use of the body as continuous 
with “mind” is an important element of agency. 
 The third concern Dewey raises here takes up the issue of perception in its 
connection with judgment.  He writes, “the separation of ‘mind’ from direct occupation 
with things throws emphasis on things at the expense of relations or connections.  It is 
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altogether too common to separate perceptions and even ideas from judgments.”137  
Arguing instead that “Judgment is employed in the perception,”138 Dewey laments the 
fact that the separation of the physical and mental can carry over into believing that 
perceiving and thinking are two distinct moments.  Moreover, this carries into his 
concern over students being told about things in classrooms and reading about things in 
textbooks, without truly experiencing the things being taught or the connections such 
things have with their own lives.  It is this concern that leads him to quip, “An ounce of 
experience is better than a ton of theory, simply because it is only in experience that any 
theory has vital and verifiable significance.”139  As such, it is important to remember that 
experience, for Dewey, is characterized by the tension of doing-undergoing, and the 
ramifications of such doings-undergoings can result in increased possibilities of action 
(or direction of doing-undergoing) in the future, and hence, an increased sense of 
experiencing one’s agency.   
 There are several other moments where this issue of mind-body dualism arises in 
Democracy and Education, and their sentiment generally furthers the ideas set out 
already.  However, there are also points at which Dewey explicitly links the body into 
discussions of activities and participation in learning exercises, including exploration in 
the sciences and arts, as well as at play.  One point where we see this arise is in his 
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its living significance (Ibid., 338).  
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chapter on “Educational Values,” in which he takes up the meaning and purpose of such 
activities.  He writes,   
 The educative value of manual activities and of laboratory exercises, as well as of 
 play, depends on the extent in which they aid in bringing about a sensing of the 
 meaning of what is going on.  In effect, if not in name, they are dramatizations.  
 Their utilitarian value in forming habits of skill to be used for tangible results is 
 important, but not when isolated from the appreciative side.140 
 
As such, Dewey is clear to note that such activities have an important place insofar as 
they bring about a concrete sense of the meaning of a certain thing; perhaps an idea, 
object, experiment, etc.  Moreover, they can offer practical channels of directing attention 
and interest, fusing such attention with engagement of students’ physical being.  As 
concerns aesthetic engagements, particularly involving literature, music, and plastic arts 
in the curriculum, Dewey notes (answering Peters’ concern) that “They are not luxuries 
of education, but emphatic expressions of that which makes any education 
worthwhile.”141  Such activities and expressions give students the ability to engage 
intellectually and physically/materially, giving them significance not only for this reason 
but also for their worth in adding to the appreciative element of education.   
 Last, Dewey makes mention of the union of mind and body in discussing the 
ways in which education prepares individuals for, but also partakes in, human enactments 
of freedom.  While above we noted how Dewey acknowledges the need for appropriate 
channels of bodily activity to engage in educational pursuits – the result of this need 
being the unfortunate tension of suppression and eruption described earlier – he also 
notes the care educators must take in engaging physicality in the classroom.  In 
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Experience and Education, Dewey is meticulous in describing that freedom of movement 
is insufficient in itself to count as an educational aim.  Dewey writes, “The only freedom 
that is of enduring importance is freedom of intelligence, that is to say, freedom of 
observation and of judgment exercised in behalf of purposes that are intrinsically worth 
while.”142  He goes on to discuss the common error of mistaking this freedom with 
freedom of movement, an interesting point with respect to his passionate claims about the 
evils of unduly restraining the body.  While he states rather boldly that this mistake 
should be scrupulously avoided in the classroom, he does note that the “external or 
physical side of activity,” while inseparable from the freedom of “thought, desire, and 
purpose,” should not be indulged or taken as a goal for its own sake.  He clarifies that “an 
increased measure of freedom of outer movement is a means, not an end”143 to this 
“inner” movement of thinking, desiring, and purposing.  He stipulates that strict 
conformity and an absence of movement is likewise inappropriate, saying, “Strait-jacket 
and chain-gang procedures had to be done away with if there was to be a chance for 
growth of individuals in the intellectual springs of freedom without which there is no 
assurance of genuine and continued normal growth.”144  Thus, while Dewey is 
understandably wary to give the body a completely free reign in the classroom, he is 
careful to note its connection to intellectual engagement and the development of interests, 
as well as its connection to the freedom of thought.  Finally, it is helpful to note that his 
focus on freedom of thought is tightly linked with the concept of growth: restraining 
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students from experiencing their embodied selves must be eliminated for genuine 
intellectual freedom and “normal” growth.  Returning to Democracy and Education, he 
claims, “When, however, education takes cognizance of the union of mind and body in 
acquiring knowledge, we are not obliged to insist upon the need of obvious, or external, 
freedom.”145  Thus, while physical freedom alone is hardly sufficient, we can see how 
taking the body’s needs into consideration is an important element in helping students 
develop a rich sense of freedom, agency, and possibility that an education might 
facilitate.  
 
Conclusion: Agency and Multiple Senses of the Body  
 In short, we can see that the engagement and development of the body is clearly 
an important concern for Dewey’s educational philosophy, and for several reasons.  Not 
only does physical activity in learning constitute a more “natural” or “organic” method of 
education, for Dewey, but the fact that many methods of schooling have neglected the 
body’s significance is a problem that he calls out as demanding attention.  Part of this 
concerns education in its earlier phases, where children’s powers of self-control are still 
very much in their formative stages.  However, I believe attention to this concern would 
benefit students at various levels, and especially in secondary education, as issues relating 
to the body in adolescence can start to become even more complex and difficult, and as 
relationship to one’s embodiment can, for some, have an even more significant role in 
one’s felt sense of agency and possibility.  It is with this in mind that I wish to explain 
why I begin with Dewey’s emphasis on the body in education, will move to his 
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conceptions of embodied self and embodied habit in the next chapter, and will take up 
different perspectives of embodiment in the chapters following. 
 While Dewey’s educational philosophy clearly recognizes the connection of 
embodiment and education, calling attention to the way in which due attention to the 
body would nearly “revolutionize” many educational practices, I believe his view of 
embodiment can be complicated to address differing ways in which the body is 
experienced, thus creating a fuller picture of the body as it might be taken up in 
education.  As noted in sketches so far, Dewey’s conception of the body is a naturalistic 
one – human beings and human bodies are organisms in environments – and are thus in 
inextricable relationships with their surroundings, as formed by them as we are in 
forming them.  While this presents a helpful perspective of embodiment to begin with, it 
does not present a terribly rich sense of what it feels like to live in and as a particular 
body.  While Dewey is clear that meaning depends upon our perception of connections 
between ourselves, our experiences, and our environments, more might be offered in 
terms of how we experience these meanings, insofar as we are the body-subjects of such 
perceptions of meaning and insofar as our bodies act as the conduits or vehicles of 
experience through which we engage with the world.  In seeking out more resources to 
flesh out this perspective, I will turn in chapter three to the work of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, who offers careful phenomenological descriptions of embodied subjectivity and 
the felt sense of experiencing embodied meaning.  Help from this perspective will flesh 
out an account of how attention to the body can aid in developing a sense of embodied 
agency, which is a part of what I believe a Deweyan, growth-oriented education should 
offer.   
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 From this point, however, I will take up another angle on embodiment, looking at 
the work of Michel Foucault in seeking to take Dewey’s organism-in-environment 
further, with respect to the social, political, and institutional environments which schools 
constitute.  This perspective will flesh out another angle with respect to the fact that while 
bodies are experienced “from the inside,” they are also acted upon, influenced, and in 
many ways, cultivated, shaped, and disciplined “from the outside.”  These influences can, 
indeed, be immensely significant for how we carry, perceive, and understand our bodies, 
and seeing into the social structures and histories that gave rise to some of these 
perceptions offers a perspective giving added weight to the ways these “outside” 
influences can strongly impact the “inside” experiences.   
 It is because embodied life carries with it the reality of both these aspects of 
experience that I wish to supplement Dewey’s perspective with these others, as I believe 
that each of them represents important insights with respect to how our bodies are both 
perceivers and creators of meaning while also being inheritors and conveyors of meaning; 
that is, that these perspectives each offer something vital in understanding how we 
operate as embodied agents with (varying degrees of) knowledge of ourselves and 
knowledge of how we interact with our environments.  In the final chapter of this project, 
I will return to Dewey’s philosophy of education and its emphasis on embodiment, 
situating these perspectives as additional resources for attending to the body, as Dewey 
believes we ought to. 
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CHAPTER III 
DEWEYAN AGENCY: SELF, HABIT, AND RECONSTRUCTION 
 
 In order to flesh out some of the claims outlined in the first two chapters, we will 
need to take up some of Dewey’s ideas in more depth.  To recall, Dewey claims that 
education is a reconstruction of experience, insofar as attending to and modifying present 
experiences can have a positive impact on future experiences.  Such reconstructions aim 
toward the ideal of growth, an idea that, I argue, is best understood as an ideal of agency, 
a concept articulating one’s felt sense of capacity for intelligent, deliberate action.  To 
enrich the ways one experiences her own agency, I claim that agency requires self-
knowledge, which, while never complete, helps one to understand her being in the midst 
of situations and helps her to anticipate the consequences of her actions.  Last, I am 
arguing that having a positive, stable sense of one’s embodied being can be a beneficial 
element in cultivating one’s self-knowledge and agency, and thus, is a worthy educational 
goal.  In the last chapter, we looked at how this nexus of concepts has roots in Dewey’s 
work on education.  In this chapter, it will be helpful to look more closely at some of 
Dewey’s other works, with an emphasis on his conceptions of the embodied self, the role 
of habit in constructing this self, and agency as an embodied possibility of this self.  In 
short, based on the claims outlined thus far, it is necessary to look at the ways Dewey 
envisions the self as embodied and habit-oriented, such that we might develop a picture 
of how this self reconstructs her experience as well as how she experiences her own 
agency within such reconstructions.   
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 In this chapter, I will take up some of Dewey’s discussions of the human being 
and ways these contribute to a conception of the self.  From there, I will focus 
specifically on the role of habit in his conception of the self, then turn to the role of the 
body in the operations of habit and the continuity of the self.  With these discussions in 
place, I hope to offer a more thorough account of how Dewey envisions the 
reconstruction of experience, with reference to the lived experiences of embodied selves.  
From there, I articulate some ideas in Dewey’s work that might be linked to a sense of 
agency, taking his characterizations of will, intelligence, freedom, and the feeling of 
culmination in the process of having an experience.  Finally, I will close the chapter with 
a discussion of why more perspectives on embodiment are helpful for fleshing out the 
aims of this project.  
 
The Re-Constructing Self: Organic Life and Emergent Mind 
 Since education is a process of reconstructing experience, according to Dewey’s 
definition, it will be helpful at this point to look more precisely at how such 
reconstruction occurs by looking at Dewey’s conceptions of the self and the habits by 
which the self operates.  To set up this discussion, it will be helpful to look at Dewey’s 
conceptions of the human being.  Of particular interest here is his characterization of the 
human as an organism in an environment and as a union of body and mind, so that we 
can see what kind of being it is that operates by way of habits and thus, directs its course 
of action with the possibility of intelligence and agency. 
 Dewey conceives of the human being first and foremost as an organism in an 
environment, thereby casting the human in a continuous relationship with other natural 
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phenomena and processes, refusing to separate human life as distinct from other forms of 
life.  In reading human life this way, several entailments follow, building his naturalistic 
point of view.  In Experience and Nature, Dewey takes up these issues in depth, and in 
the chapter titled “Nature, Life, and Body-Mind,” he gives an account of the human in its 
unique characteristics.  He describes what has come to be called an “emergent” theory of 
mind, in that he sees the phenomenon typically known as “mind” emerging out of other 
characteristics and behaviors by which human beings interact with their surroundings.  In 
his view, it is not the case that a mind or consciousness exists from the start in human 
life, in conjunction with something called body or matter.  The separation of these two is 
the result of linguistic convention and historical interpretation, he argues, and not only do 
these terms fail to capture the existential reality of human life in his view, they do it 
further injustice by hemming in the ways we typically think and talk about life.  In his 
account, “mind” signifies the development of patterns which discern and distinguish 
particular elements in experience as well as cultivating deliberately those habits which 
direct action.  In describing the union of body and mind, however, and his preferred 
phrase linking the two, he writes, 
 body-mind simply designates what actually takes place when a living body is 
 implicated in situations of discourse, communication, and participation.  In the 
 hyphenated phrase body-mind, ‘body’ designates the continued and conserved, 
 the registered and cumulative operation of factors continuous with the rest of 
 nature, inanimate as well as animate; while ‘mind’ designates the characters and 
 consequences which are differential, indicative of features which emerge when 
 ‘body’ is engaged in a wider, more complex and interdependent situation.146 
 
In other words, “body” refers to the way in which human life, continuous with all life, 
operates via interactions with the environment, taking up many of the same elements and 
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qualities of simpler forms of life and carrying them into new kinds of relations and 
networks.  This occurs as the human organism gets involved in more complex 
environments and thus requires more sensitive and integrative needs of operation.  In 
short, Dewey believes the problem of mind-body dualism is not a “real” metaphysical 
problem, but has come to be one due to the conventional ways we have come to 
characterize these phenomena: “the ‘solution’ of the problem of mind-body is to be found 
in a revision of the preliminary assumptions about existence which generate the 
problem.”147  In reality, he claims, we experience the world as body-minds, with no 
divorce between the two (other than those we import due to residual operations of 
dualistic thinking in our culture), and such body-minds operate by virtue of complex 
interactions with environments.  Such environments include the totality of ways 
“environment” can be connoted also: this includes ecological, physical, social, cultural, 
intellectual, and emotional environments as well.  To clarify however, while these are 
ways the human intellect has “carved up” our experience into different spheres, these all 
“coexist” as varying elements within a single situation. 
 What is important to note about the variety of elements present within a single 
situation is the way in which such elements are felt qualities, and Mark Johnson’s work is 
particularly helpful in emphasizing this point.  His work develops an account of 
embodied meaning drawing from pragmatism, phenomenology, cognitive science, 
philosophy of language, and aesthetics, basing his argument in the claim that all thought, 
cognition, language, and meaning, from the most “basic” through the most conceptually 
abstract, is rooted in the body’s structures, movements, and activities.  As such, his 
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account develops the ideas present in James and Dewey that a distinctly felt character, a 
qualitative product of our bodies interacting with an environment that pervades the 
feeling of a situation, is always a part of experience.  Johnson characterizes feelings as 
“consciously experienced bodily processes,”148 and highlights their significance when it 
comes to accounting for how humans understand themselves, their environments, and 
exercise capacities of thought at all levels.  As such, when it comes to my own efforts to 
articulate how agency is a felt, embodied experience, I am, in part, moving from 
Johnson’s work and hoping to develop a particular facet of how embodied experience is 
critical in accounting for human meaning, self-understanding, and the felt possibilities for 
action.  But I will return to this point about feeling later. 
 Coming back to Dewey on the mind and the self, since the phenomenon of 
“mind” is an emergent quality, manifesting in the more complex operations which 
humans enact, the concept of self might be seen as a similarly emergent phenomenon.  
Just as there is no preexisting mind calling the shots in human conduct, there is also no 
preexisting self that acts as a unifying nucleus of identity and activity.  The following 
section will explain more about how such a sense of self emerges via habit.  However, the 
point I would like to make with this characterization of human life is that for Dewey, the 
fact that many of the qualities that we often think of as distinguishing human life from the 
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rest of nature are, for him, continuous with the rest of nature and are a completely organic 
part of it.   Moreover, the fact that he casts the construction of body-mind as emergent 
also entails that its emergent qualities can undergo changes, or that its constructed 
character entails its reconstructability.  If mind and self are not static entities but 
phenomena emerging in the midst of situations, they are thus emerging by virtue of and 
in relation with the particular circumstances from which they emerge.  This entails that 
their particular constructions contain a degree of contingency, in that there are few parts 
of a human life that are determined in advance or set in stone for the duration of one’s 
existence (things such as the need to breath oxygen, for example, qualify as parts that do 
not change).  Rather, most of the elements constituting a given life, as well as a given 
culture, are subject to change, to reconstruction, and thus also to the deliberate 
reconstruction of intentional, informed activity – the activity of education.  The key to 
this reconstructive education is the reality that all things are in the making, in process, 
and this applies equally to the body-mind, the self, and the environments in which they 
develop.   
 
Habit: Patterns of Conduct, Patterns of Life 
 Dewey’s account of habit occupies an important place in his conception of the 
human being and of the individual self.  Habits not only organize human behaviors and 
structure patterns of conduct for Dewey, they also provide stable patterns of perception 
and interpretation of surroundings.  Thus, because of their central place in perception, 
thought, and action, Dewey locates phenomena such as will and intelligence within the 
province of habit.  In short, habit, for Dewey, expresses a critical idea of how humans 
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come to operate in their worlds, unify their experiences, and act with efficacy.  Moreover, 
because habits must work in concert with the many and changing impulses within human 
experience, these patterns of behavior are reconstructable, malleable, and have the 
potential for flexibility, adaptation, and transformation.  In short, habit provides a vital 
component of Dewey’s readings of human life, conduct, experience, and morality, and as 
such, understanding how habit works in his account of human experience will help us to 
see how habits constitute the “stuff” of ourselves and our agencies, as well as how they 
are reconstructed through experience and education. 
 
Habit and Self 
 Due to the centrality of habit as a functional phenomenon in human life, Dewey 
makes the bold claim that habits are constitutive of the self.  Indeed, he describes, 
“Character is the interpenetration of habits.”149  These claims are worth spending some 
time with.  If one’s character or self is constituted by a collection of habits, what does this 
entail for one’s felt sense of herself, of the “I” that resides at back of her experiences?  
Though some have claimed that this leaves Dewey with a poor account of what the self 
is, I agree with Vincent Colapietro in his view that though it might not be at the 
foreground of his philosophy, there is a sense of self at work in Dewey’s thought.150  This 
sense of self comes from the unity and continuity of habits we develop over time and the 
ways in which they grant us a sense of consistency and stability; in other words, we 
experience this consistency and continuity as a sense of self, a felt sense of agency, and a 
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sense of belonging to a community.  Were it not for the continuity and interconnection of 
habits, our lives would be characterized more like a loosely gathered bundle of activities 
rather than selves having the potential for unity, consistency, and integrity.  And indeed, 
human lives have the capacity for these characteristics, and indeed, are likely to be 
flourishing ones insofar as they can fruitfully combine such consistency and integrity 
with novelty and flexibility.  But first, it is necessary to flesh out what Dewey means by 
claiming that habits are the constituents of a self or of one’s character. 
 In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey provides rich discussions of his views on 
social psychology and morality, built upon the premise that humans are, as the saying 
goes, creatures of habit.  He claims that, being creatures of habit, “not of reason nor yet 
of instinct,”151 habits are what organize much of our experience into intelligible, 
manageable channels, offering us both recognizable ways of interpreting the world as 
well as utilizable avenues of acting within it.  Habits represent patterns of all kinds within 
human behavior: they include patterns of thinking, of perceiving, of interpreting, of 
relating, of acting, and of responding to the felt senses of situations, which is to say that 
nearly all human conduct is governed, in some way, by the way our habits structure such 
activities for us.  All activity, intellectual, physical, social, moral, and so forth, are affairs 
of habit according to Dewey. 
 But to get more specific about what habits actually are and do, let us look at a 
passage early in Human Nature and Conduct where this characterization is articulated.  
He begins by describing habits that are functions, such as breathing and digesting; things 
our bodies do without much, if any, of our conscious awareness.  He elaborates in 
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explaining that habits are also arts, such as writing or playing the piano; skills we develop 
that refine many of the functions and capacities of our body-mind’s abilities.  Inclusive of 
all such types of habits, Dewey characterizes habit as a manner of interacting with our 
environment; things such as walking, standing, sitting, and so on, all of which represent 
interactive relationships between our embodied selves and our surroundings.   Interaction 
between ourselves and our environments thus occurs at all these “levels” of habit, from 
breathing to walking to playing the piano.  He offers a brief survey of “bad” habits, those 
habits of behavior which we see as destructive and unnecessary and which we seek to 
change; in doing so, he notes the things that bad habits reveal to us about habits in 
general:   
 They teach us that all habits are affections, that all have projectile power, and that 
 a predisposition formed by a number of specific acts is an immensely more 
 intimate and fundamental part of ourselves than are vague, general, conscious 
 choices.  All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute 
 the self.  In any intelligible sense of the word will, they are will.  They form our 
 effective desires and they furnish us with our working capacities.  They rule our 
 thoughts, determining which shall appear and be strong and which shall pass from 
 light into obscurity.152 
 
There is a lot to unpack in this characterization, so I will take these claims one by one.  
First, “habits are affections.”  I read this to signal the fact that habits have an intimate 
relationship with our emotions; indeed, many emotions we have are ones we experience 
out of habitual responses to stimuli, as well as those which our cultural and social 
environments cultivate.  This might also signal that habits include the manners (and 
                                                
152 Ibid., 21, first emphasis mine, second emphasis in original.  Similarly, Dewey adds to 
this description further on, explaining why he has chosen the term “habit” to signify this 
phenomenon.  He writes that “habit” expresses “that kind of human activity which is 
influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a 
certain ordering or systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, 
dynamic in quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some 
subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity” (Ibid., 31). 
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mannerisms) by which we relate to things, carry ourselves, and express our emotions.  
Second, habits have “projectile power,” which means they can direct themselves toward 
the future.  Thinking back to Dewey’s claim that all experiences carry something from 
the past into the present, and that all present experiences somehow modify the future, 
habits are phenomena through which we see this continuity occur.  Habits take elements 
from the past, give aid in interpreting the present, and provide a structure for approaching 
the future; thus, they have the power to project elements of one’s behavior into new 
circumstances, including the patterns by which one perceives and relates to her 
surroundings.   
 Third, and quite importantly, habits signal “that a predisposition formed by a 
number of specific acts is an immensely more intimate and fundamental part of ourselves 
than are vague, general, conscious choices.”  I interpret this to claim that the habits 
(including, perhaps especially those that work unconsciously) that individuals and groups 
carry out has a significantly larger impact on behavior than general, yet consciously made 
choices.  If the continuity of habits creates a certain kind of disposition, it is this 
disposition which will not only frame our conduct, but will also provide avenues of 
activity in creating the person we become (which includes our conceptions of who this 
person is), being a more intimate and fundamental part of who we are than those things 
we choose consciously.  An example might be helpful here: say that I decide to work on 
being an environmentally conscientious person.  This decision is all well and good, but it 
is only one, and perhaps a relatively minor factor in my actually being an 
environmentally conscientious person.  The things I do in my day to day life, which 
might include being sure to recycle and compost all possible materials instead of 
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throwing them away, walk or ride my bike instead of driving whenever possible, 
informing myself about and purchasing only locally sourced food, etc. are habits of 
conduct that all have a bigger impact on my being an environmentally conscientious 
person than the fact that I choose the general goal of being environmentally 
conscientious.  In this example, of course, the decision I make leads the subsequent 
actions I take, but the point here is that the decision is a relatively small step in this 
process; the much more significant part is the extent to which these behaviors become an 
automatic or “unconscious” part of my life.  Moreover, this particular example highlights 
the role of social and political structure in actualizing my intentions: making any of these 
behaviors into a routine requires that certain facilities (e.g., recycling plants) and 
information (e.g. food sources) are available to me.  However, this demonstrates that the 
ways I relate to certain elements of my experience, especially insofar as they become 
relatively automatic behaviors, represents the degree to which I have made this conscious 
choice a part of my intimate daily existence, the degree to which it has actually impacted 
my disposition and way of perceiving the world.  In short, I read this claim to underscore 
the fact that habits constitute a much more significant part of ourselves than we might 
often believe them to, and often, than we would like to believe they do.  As such, Dewey 
believes it is a large responsibility of education to help individuals cultivate the habits 
that contribute most constructively to individual and social flourishing.   
 Continuing with the above quote: habits are “demands for certain kinds of 
activity; and they constitute the self.”  In demanding certain kinds of activity, they signal 
needs that must be met, desires that want fulfilling, and requirements of action within a 
given situation.  In claiming that habits constitute the self, Dewey is making a bold 
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statement about what the self actually is – it is not an immutable soul, an identity crafted 
by the mind alone, or a subject discovering herself in a variety of places in life.  Rather, 
the self emerges out of the continuity of habits conducted and influences imparted in 
return; the self is constructed via the habits an individual practices, including her habits 
of receiving and interpreting things from outside herself.  As such, the self is not an 
immediately given unity or a cogito asserting its existence, as if it could be stripped from 
its socio-cultural world or its past experience.  The self is the collective, interweaving, 
and unifying force of myriad habits, both of thinking and of acting. Significantly, such 
habits are not isolated phenomena: they always take place within a social structure and 
community.  Recalling that all habits are also interactions with environments, this means 
that habits – and thus, selves – cannot be conceived of apart from their context.  The 
conditions of one’s interactions thus become integrated into one’s habits and one’s very 
self, on these terms, meaning that habits and selves are always social phenomena.  
However, highlighting the fact that habits are acquired, learned manners of doing and 
thinking also highlights the fact that they are susceptible to change.  
 Finally, habits “are will,” and this can be read as an important link with Dewey’s 
sense of agency.  In forming desires and furnishing us with working capacities, habits not 
only create and perceive demands for certain kinds of activity, they also provide 
responses to those demands, in the shape of relatively stable channels of response to 
stimuli.  It is through those channels of response that we know how to conduct ourselves 
in the world, that we are able to have a sense of who we are in the midst of situations, and 
thus, it is through habit that we are able to perceive things to be done as well as how to do 
them.  Moreover, and importantly for my project, it is through the channels offered by 
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habit that we experience ourselves as able to do the things we perceive as needing done, 
that we can develop a sense of ourselves as having the potential, the know-how, and the 
wherewithal to accomplish the tasks we find demanding our attention.  Insofar as habit 
provides us with structures of understanding our surroundings and critically, 
understanding our relations with other people, it also provides us with means of 
cultivating efficacious ways of conducting ourselves within such interactions and 
relations.   
 To break down the analysis of habit further, it is important to note that habits, as 
providing us with means of going about the world, relate to all action, including thinking.  
What this highlights is that the idea of habit addresses the physical contact and immersion 
in a certain situation, as well as the intellectual or psychological framework through 
which one engages it.  While of course, these two spheres are separable only in linguistic 
description for Dewey, I find it helpful to make this distinction simply for the purposes of 
articulating habit’s depth and breadth.  In its broadest sense, Dewey writes, “Habit is 
energy organized in certain channels,”153 and when it comes to patterns of thinking, he 
characterizes habits as “conditions of intellectual efficiency.”154  We go about our world 
as much by habits of perception and thought as by habits of movement and physical 
activity, because the function of habit can organize and distribute energies as needed, as 
ways of taking past experience into the future and furnishing us with familiar modes of 
encountering it.  In this way, they create a kind of groundwork for how we approach 
thinking, as well as giving us resources for how to move into new directions.  They are 
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already-grooved pathways through which we travel in the world, enabling us to 
categorize and relate things to one another.  Broadly, Dewey’s rich sense of habit 
captures the way we rely on habits as a vital touchstone for how we make sense of things.  
He sums up, “Concrete habits do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, 
judging, conceiving and reasoning that is done.  ‘Consciousness,’ whether as a stream or 
as special sensations and images, expresses functions of habits, phenomena of their 
formation, operation, their interruption and reorganization.”155  
   Again, recalling the claim that habits are a more “intimate and fundamental” part 
of our constitution than those choices we make deliberately, this passage helps situate 
that idea with respect to patterns of thought: it is not that a consciousness or mind sits in 
the background and perceives, thinks, judges, and so on according to its will, but that a 
habit of perception is engaged when stimuli call for it; a certain mode of judgment is 
engaged when circumstances require it, and so forth.  Dewey explains that habits become 
“the sole agents of observation, recollection, foresight and judgment: a mind or 
consciousness or soul in general which performs these operations is a myth.”156  This is 
not to say that there is absolutely no self or no sense of unity to these perceptions and 
judgments, as there is a continuity of self in such habits, but that the conscious decision to 
perceive or judge in a certain way is not done by a mind or consciousness separate from 
or existing prior to these habits.  Further, such decisions have reality insofar as they take 
place through the habits one already has in place when perceiving and judging.  Again, 
this is not to claim that changes cannot be made and that decisions about one’s life and 
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outlook have no impact, as they certainly can and do.  It is simply to stress that the habits 
and patterns one enacts in such engagements are the primary way individuals carry 
themselves and encounter things in the world, and it is thus by those habits that such 
decisions are made and have effects.  Changing habits is certainly possible and often very 
beneficial; it is often, however, quite difficult.  And it is important to note that when such 
decisions are made to change parts of one’s life, the changes do not occur automatically 
because one has “willed” them; rather, they are willed into being insofar as they are made 
into new habits. 
 Because habits interact with one another, they build up and develop into a 
network of sorts, and when paired with the fact that they are continuous over time, it 
means that collectively, their interaction forms certain dispositions, what one might think 
of as attitudes, outlooks, approaches, or inclinations.  Indeed, in developing such 
inclinations, Dewey explains, “Every habit creates an unconscious expectation.  It forms 
a certain outlook.”157  In developing particular outlooks and expectations, it helps us 
direct energy into these already-grooved channels by giving stimuli an avenue into which 
we can make sense of them and through which we can direct our actions according to 
their need.  If we were to approach new situations without such avenues of perception 
and understanding, making sense of any new experiences would be a taxing challenge, 
with so many new variables to account for.  However, because we develop outlooks 
through the constant utilization of habits – again, largely unconsciously – we ready 
ourselves to meet experience head on.  Moreover, in developing these dispositions, we 
get used to watching out for certain things; for example, given a walk in the woods, a 
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painter might notice more nuances of color and texture in the landscape, while a chemist 
might have a keener sense for the compounds necessary for mushrooms to produce the 
particular smell emanating from them.  The habits governing these individuals’ lives 
operate differently with similar stimuli, but the sensitivities they have developed also 
emerge as a matter of habit.  What this signals is the fact that the more habits we develop 
in harmonious interaction with each other, and the more flexibly they can interact with 
each other and to new circumstances, the more we are likely to approach situations with a 
sense of clarity and purpose; in other words, the more we might be able to enact our will. 
 Again, I emphasize that habit covers both thinking and acting in Dewey’s 
account, but Dewey himself views such operations as fluid and continuous with one 
another; rather than characterizing such habits in their separation, he presents them in 
their interaction.  He writes, “Thought which does not exist within ordinary habits of 
action lacks means of execution.  In lacking application, it also lacks test, criterion.”158  
This reinforces the sense in which habits are what give reality and weight to certain 
patterns of thinking: insofar as a pattern of thinking might be desired, it is not made into 
action until there are channels for it to become realized.  Such channels are made 
available by habit.  And moreover, habits have the potential to shift and change, to 
become more flexible and fluid, and it is in this capacity that habits are also a powerful 
means of self-direction, of will, of agency.  It is because our selves are constituted by 
habits that they can change and transform, and since experience is continuous over time, 
the changes we make have the potential for changing the selves we become in the future.  
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This takes us to the question of how habits become flexible, as well as the question of 
why flexibility is a desirable trait of habits in general. 
 
Reconstruction: Habit and Impulse 
 In giving an account of Dewey’s sense of habit, it is also important to include an 
account of his conception of impulses, as these are at work both in developing certain 
habits but also in changing habits.  A part of how habits tend to work in human life – on 
both individual and social levels – includes the fact that as new conditions arise, old 
habits need to change to fit them, or sometimes fall away completely.  Such changes are 
not likely to occur of their own accord, because, as Dewey notes, once they are formed, 
habits have a tendency to perpetuate themselves.  Thus, various stimuli can operate as 
instigators of habit change; while some might be more easily identified as external, 
coming from the instruction, support, or rebuke of others, while others might be 
described as internal, coming from the desires or needs of an individual herself; but in 
reality, all functioning of habit and thus all emergence of habit change comes by way of 
the interaction between an individual and her environment. 
 Nonetheless, Dewey names these instigations toward change or the surges 
through which needs are called out by the name of “impulse,” which he also sometimes 
calls “instinct.”  Dewey describes, “Impulses are the pivots upon which the re-
organization of activities turn, they are agencies of deviation, for giving new directions to 
old habits and changing their quality.”159  Thus, they are active in experiences which call 
out a need for something different, something new to operate in engaging and orienting 
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the individual in a situation.  They might operate by inciting a feeling of need for a 
particular thing, or they might signal an energy that needs a particular manner of release 
that has yet to find one.  In any case, they are largely responsible for helping habits 
remain flexible and relevant; they communicate to habits when they have become stale 
and stagnant.  As noted above, habits do the perceiving, organizing, etc. that is done; 
impulses do the shaking up and keeping habits loose that is required for growth and 
adaptation.  Because habits can become fixed and rigid, and thus incapable of adapting to 
new needs that arise, and impulses on their own can be too chaotic and directionless, both 
are needed in reconstruction: “Habit as such is too definitely adapted to an environment 
to survey or analyze it, and impulse is too indeterminately related to the environment to 
be capable of reporting anything about it.  ...  A certain delicate combination of habit and 
impulse is requisite for observation, memory, and judgment.”160  Thus, a healthy, 
reciprocal relationship is needed between collections of habits and habits’ ability to 
assimilate and respond to impulses, especially as new or intensely felt ones arise.  
However, while habits and impulses function in relation to one another, this does not 
mean that they are opposite phenomena or that they are juxtaposed to one another.  What 
impulses do is to alert the individual that something, a desire or motivation is developing, 
which needs a channel in order to express itself.161  In order to accommodate their 
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relationship: he has characterized the relationship between impulses and habits to be like 
the movement of water coursing through certain channels.  While water (impulse) will 
exist and flow regardless, channels (habits) allow the water to flow in intelligible, 
organized, and productive directions.  In Experience and Nature, Dewey makes reference 
to this kind of phenomenon in discussing the meaning and order gained through 
communication: “Meanings having been deflected from the rapid and roaring stream of 
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presence and expression, habits must be amenable to the movement of impulse, as well as 
flexible enough to adapt to changing needs.  This is why flexible habits are among the 
targets of education and can motivate processes of growth: flexible habits are habits that 
can respond to the demands of impulses and the changes in circumstance or environment.  
They are thus the habits that are most likely to help individuals and societies move 
towards growth. 
 Flexible habits are desirable because they are ones that can accommodate 
changing needs and the fluctuation of impulses that arise in the course of a habit’s tenure.  
These habits are distinguished from inflexible ones by their sensitivity to new elements in 
varying conditions and they do not become hard and rigid in terms of their application.  
Examples of inflexible habits might be things like racist, sexist, or bigoted beliefs, in that 
they generalize far too much and refuse to take particularities of situations into account; 
they block off inquiry and openness of encounter in their refusal to adapt to new 
situations.  A flexible habit, on the contrary, is able to meet every new situation on its 
own terms, refusing to hold all circumstances to the same standard of assessment.  Habits 
can become more flexible over time, but there are also habits of flexibility – habits of 
thinking and responding with sensitivity and nuance – that are also a part of what makes 
habits more amenable to varying circumstances.  The habit of attending to one’s impulses 
is also a boon to allowing them to work flexibly and creatively, such that one is open to 
new stimuli and able to respond to its needs.162  
                                                                                                                                            
events into a calm and traversable canal, rejoin the main stream, and color, temper and 
compose its course” (Experience and Nature, 132). 
 
162 The idea of flexible habits becomes somewhat unclear, if habits are thought of not just 
in terms of patterns of thinking, but in terms of neural pathways or connections.  
 114 
 In brief, impulse is a force of generating change, amending habits and 
circumstances to respond more readily to the needs and the novel elements of a situation.  
While impulses can be powerful, violent eruptions of feeling, or expressions of 
dissatisfaction with a current circumstance, they can indeed be unproductive if not treated 
well.  The conditions under which they can be treated well is, again, through the way 
habits are developed to deal with them.  When working productively with one another, 
habits benefit from impulses in keeping them relevant and progressive, and impulses 
benefit from habits in finding necessary means of expression.  Dewey writes, describing 
how impulses, as pivots of adjustment, usher in the possibility of reorganizing habits to 
modify old patterns for new conditions: “Impulse is a source, an indispensable source, of 
liberation; but only as it is employed in giving habits pertinence and freshness does it 
liberate power.”163  As such, the relationship of impulses and habits can be destructive, if 
impulses are not channeled to give habits a new relevance – in such cases impulses might 
simply burst forth as expressions of discontent.  But when impulses and habits 
communicate well, impulses can serve as this kind of liberatory source: they make it 
known that something needs an outlet and they seek a habit through which to express this 
need.  In this way, impulses are also significant elements of experience insofar as they are 
an avenue of will: “They are agencies for transfer of existing social power into personal 
                                                                                                                                            
However, as Mark Johnson notes, this perspective need not deny the possibility of 
flexibility.  Rather, if patterns of neural connectivity can be parts of several potential 
neural pathways or assemblies, then the activation of a habit can open up the possibility 
of activating several possible patterns.  This way, neural connections need not tend 
toward one single, fixed pattern, but might be linked with several options for activity and 
response.  What this shows is that the richer the experience or habit, the greater the 
possibility of developing alternative patterns of action when the habit is activated 
(personal correspondence with Mark Johnson, August 6, 2012).   
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ability; they are means of reconstructive growth.”164  They represent a means through 
which individuals relate to their social surroundings, seeking out meanings and 
significances; upon finding them, one can assimilate them into habitual manners of 
operation, into her cache of personal abilities, through modifying old habits or cultivating 
new ones.  As such, impulses represent incitements toward reconstruction; they can be 
the sparks needed to generate new connections and reorganize experiences such that new 
conditions are created.  
 As one might anticipate, the centrality of habit in human life plays an important 
part in the process of education: insofar as education is a reconstruction or reorganization 
of experience, large parts of this reconstruction take place by way of new organizations 
of habits, new manners of relating them to one another, and developing new habits to 
meet new conditions.  Indeed, this is present in Dewey’s work on education; in 
Democracy and Education, he writes, “the human being acquires a habit of learning.  He 
learns to learn.”165  Thus, in learning to learn, individuals learn how to translate patterns 
from one situation to another, and to engage in situations with an eye towards discovering 
the meanings inherent within them.  Thus, we see a deeper justification behind Dewey’s 
claim from the previous chapter that a large part of educative experience occurs through 
the construction of and interaction with environments: if educators are to change the 
habits of their students, they must change the conditions in which they act: “We cannot 
change habit directly: that notion is magic.  But we can change it indirectly by modifying 
conditions, by an intelligent selecting and weighing of the objects which engage attention 
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and which influence the fulfillment of desires.”166  As such, we see that modifying 
conditions can go far in helping to foster the development of certain habits, which then 
develop into certain dispositions, and this is a significant part of the task education aims 
to accomplish. 
 What is more, this striving aims to develop those habits within the youth that can 
best meet the challenges of their present and increase their capacities for crafting their 
own futures.  Dewey writes, that for education to be most beneficial for the young, “What 
is necessary is that habits be formed which are more intelligent, more sensitively 
percipient, more informed with foresight, more aware of what they are about, more direct 
and sincere, more flexibly responsive than those now current.  Then they will meet their 
own problems and propose their own improvements.”167  In aiming for habits of 
intelligence, sensitive percipience, foresight, flexible response, directness and sincerity, 
and, again, more aware of what they are about, such habits are ones which both meet 
situations with generous attitudes and critical capacities, open-minded and open-hearted 
sensitivity, genuineness and straightfowardness, but also and importantly, a sense of what 
they themselves are about, what they are doing, how they are oriented, and how they 
work together.  Such descriptions might fall under the category of reflectiveness or 
awareness, or perhaps, self-knowledge, and I argue that the more such habits have a sense 
of what they are about, the more they are able to enact their purposes.  That is, the more 
self-knowing these habits are, the greater their agency and facility with practice they will 
be.    
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 Despite the fact that I have discussed habits of thinking and perception at some 
length here, as I noted above briefly, Dewey is clear that such intellectual habits are not 
in any way divorced from bodily and physical habits.  Rather, they might be seen as 
different sides of the multifaceted phenomenon of habit.  But their existence and their 
practice is continuous, or at least, they are ideally; and insofar as habits work together in 
forming a network or background condition for action, the more supportive of one 
another they are, the more efficacious all are likely to be.  As such, I turn now to the 
body’s role in the exercise of habits, the emergence of the self, and the reconstruction of 
both into ever-evolving phenomena.  
 
Habit and the Body 
 It is notable that Dewey often references habits of the body to demonstrate their 
intractability and the ways in which changing habits can provide the means to realizing 
desired ends.  In the chapter “Habits and Will,” Dewey uses the example of someone 
with poor posture as a prime example of how habit works: “A man who does not stand 
properly forms a habit of standing improperly, a positive, forceful habit.”168  And insofar 
as the conditions supporting his “poor” posture remain consistent, not much will get him 
to alter his posture on his own.  Dewey also notes that “a friend” helped him see this 
point, describing that the simple demand to stand upright and align one’s posture is not 
                                                
168 Ibid., 24.  I wish to note here that while I engage this example as one that Dewey uses 
and one which highlights the body, there are certainly limitations to it.  This is because 
the language of “poor,” “incorrect,” and “correct” posture carries connotations that there 
are right and wrong ways to carry one’s body.  While there are certainly more and less 
healthy ones, and postures more or less congenial to certain kinds of activity, I do not 
wish to imply than any kinds of bodies are “wrong” or “incorrect.”  I do not believe 
Dewey intends this implication either, but it is a possible criticism one could point out 
from the use of this example. 
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enough for this to happen in practice, especially with any consistency; an individual 
might temporarily stand with “proper” posture if commanded to, but without the 
continuity and practice of habit, the individual will not retain such posture into the 
future.169  Thus, Dewey claims that “habits must intervene between wish and execution in 
the case of bodily acts,”170 explaining also that intellectual and moral acts depend just as 
much upon habit’s operation, and thus, habit’s intervention if a desired change in 
behavior is sought.  
 Dewey discusses the vital relation between the bodily and intellectual elements of 
the working of habit, noting often how habit not only addresses these aspects of human 
behavior, but also that the fluidity with which habits are enacted requires that an 
interconnection exists between them.  He writes, “Our ideas truly depend upon 
experience, but so do our sensations.  And the experience upon which they both depend is 
the operation of habits ...  Thus our purposes and commands regarding action (whether 
physical or moral) come to us through the refracting medium of bodily and moral 
habits.”171  In other words, the fact that ideas and sensations rely on experience means 
they also rely on the workings of habit within experience, and whatever kinds of habits 
we have developed also rely on the “refracting medium” of bodily habit, as one of the 
modes through which we must engage action.  That Dewey includes moral habit here is 
significant for his overall purpose of the book, insofar as human morality and sociality 
are among its main targets.  But what is interesting about his approach is that when 
                                                
169 This friend is most likely F.M. Alexander, founder of the Alexander technique. 
 
170 Ibid., 24. 
 
171 Ibid., 26. 
 119 
viewed as matters of habit and not as matters of immutable reality or eternal truth, 
questions of morality and psychology can be addressed with the same practical, progress-
oriented approach as issues of bodily and intellectual habit; as phenomena with 
experiential reality, one might even say a tempered brand of necessity, but also with the 
potential for change and improvement.  
 But to return to the issue the body and its habits, I will return briefly to the 
example raised earlier: the person hoping to correct his posture.  Dewey explains further 
that trying to correct one’s posture requires that one find particular acts and movements 
to do so, and that thinking about correcting one’s posture is not the most effective way to 
go about doing it.  He claims even that thinking about it can backfire, insofar as thinking 
about it consciously can devote more attention to the incorrect posture than the correct 
one.172  Rather, this individual must develop ways of carrying his body, immediately, in 
the concrete, which can develop and build over time into the “correct” posture.  The 
important thing is that actions be taken and incorporated piece by piece; thinking about it 
is on par with the “general, vague, conscious choices” we saw above, while making 
changes in posture or activity, even if slight, are what remains more “intimate and 
fundamental” a part of this particular habit.  Blending this example with the moral habits 
at play in human conduct as well, Dewey explains,  
 Only the man who can maintain a correct posture has the stuff out of which to 
 form that idea of standing erect which can be the starting point of a right act.  
 Only the man whose habits are already good can know what the good is.  
 Immediate, seemingly instinctive, feeling of the direction and end of various lines 
 of behavior is in reality the feeling of habits working below direct 
 consciousness.173 
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This passage drives home the point that while habits include habits of thinking, there is 
much that conscious thought does not accomplish when it comes to our conduct, even 
that conduct we desire to enact.  The ideas formed out of desires, or as particular objects 
of intention, Dewey says, are the product of habits instead of the instigations for 
developing them.  Dewey stresses that the much more powerful factor in behavior is habit 
– and therein lies the significance of developing positive and flexible habits as early as 
possible, as well as the importance of being able to modify those habits when necessary.  
Part of what strikes me about the passage above is its concluding line – that much of the 
direction and ends of behavior guided by the feeling of habits working below direct 
consciousness.  Again, this does not mean that consciousness plays no role in how habits 
play out; but it stresses again that much of our conduct is guided by these below-
conscious feelings, the often-inarticulate but definitely felt senses of how things work and 
how we ought best engage with them.  These are matters of a body-mind’s habits, the 
ways that energy is channeled within and through them, and the felt sense of approaching 
situations.  This is an important part of the ways in which habits are will, that habits are 
agencies.  And it is through their interweavings that “individual” agencies might develop 
into a broader, more deeply felt and unified sense of agency; that is, the sense of 
experiencing oneself as able to enact purposes and intentions.  This is intelligence, for 
Dewey, and here I hope to underscore how this is embodied intelligence. 
 In working to change a certain habit or develop a new one, say, again, the 
correcting of one’s posture, the conscious intention to do so is merely one (minor) step in 
the process.  In developing ends of activity, Dewey claims, the way to enact them is 
really to focus on the means (or sometimes, the ends-in-view), which become ends in 
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their own right as they are achieved.  But in this emphasis he stresses that what must be 
focused on is the next action, the one closest to us and closest to being executed, in 
changing the what of an end or goal into a how; and the action closest to us, “the means 
within our power, is a habit.”174  As such, change that is desired, or impulses that are 
seeking release, find satisfaction not in the completion of a goal – say, the 
accomplishment of correct posture, as if this were something static or stationary – but in 
the ways in which habits can take them up and work with the desires or impulses in 
cultivating a means of expression.  So in the habit of correcting one’s posture, the next 
action to be taken is not standing up straight and refusing to budge, declaring oneself 
“cured,” but it is to work on feeling out how one’s habit of standing might be less than 
ideal in terms of health or in terms of executing certain tasks, and to begin making small, 
gradual changes addressing such felt sensations.   
 Dewey’s emphasis on the body’s role in habit, in my reading, emphasizes three 
things.  First, it highlights the fact that any changes to be made in one’s habits, which as 
we have seen, can be as dramatic as making changes in one’s self, take place gradually.  
Overhauls of repeated, learned patterns of conduct do not change themselves overnight, 
but take time to truly “take root” (a nice embodied metaphor) in order to become 
effective.  In a way, this is a manner of respecting the principle of continuity – that 
experiences of the present can modify the future, but that there can be no complete 
cutting off of experiences of the past.  Change surely happens, but it requires time and 
adaptation.  Second, and related to the first, all habit involves a degree of mechanization.  
Dewey writes, “Habit is impossible without setting up a mechanism of action, 
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physiologically engrained, which operates ‘spontaneously,’ automatically, whenever the 
cue is given.”175  While habit goes far beyond mechanization, of course, in that it can be 
flexible and reflective as well as modifiable, this is to highlight that insofar as some 
habits can take on the operation of a function – a relatively automatic action or response – 
that is the degree to which that habit has become effective. There are, of course, 
mechanized habits that are not always ideal and need shifting at some point in time, but 
their mechanization ensures that they will do their work in some respect.  Third, and 
perhaps this is simply to reiterate previous claims, but habits require a level of bodily 
relevance or incorporation in order for them to take root and become operative in the 
course of daily life.  This is simply to say that if a habit of thought – say, intentions of 
kindness or generosity – has no expression in one’s bodily comportment, activities, and 
relations with others, then such an intention really has very little, if any, efficacy in one’s 
conduct.  Just as the conceived intention to stand up straight can do little more than incite 
a string of related actions – and sometimes it will not even do this – the intention of being 
kind or generous is relatively inert unless it has bodily performance behind it.  This is 
why habits are such a significant part of agency: for intentions to be realized, they need 
the mechanisms to do so.  Agency might thus be seen also in the interconnected 
mechanisms of effecting one’s intentions; the felt sense of possibility as the product of 
such interlocking habits. 
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Agency: Embodied Self, Embodied Growth 
 With these outlines of Dewey’s conceptions of the human being, the human body, 
and the role of habit set out, it is necessary now to turn to what these concepts mean 
when it comes to a Deweyan sense of agency, since I am interpreting Dewey’s idea of 
growth as an idea of agency.  I described briefly in the previous chapter what I imagine a 
sense of agency to mean, roughly characterizing it as a felt sense of one’s capacities for 
deliberate action and for executing intentions, allowing one to experience herself as an 
effective actor in the world, as well as having the sense of expanding her possibilities 
further.  Such a felt sense requires that one have some degree of self-knowledge, insofar 
as she must have an awareness of “what she is about” in the midst of varying 
circumstances, and I am arguing that such knowledge also requires an embodied sense of 
such capacities and possibilities.  While Dewey rarely uses the language of agency as this 
kind of phenomenon, there are certainly other concepts he employs along this line, which 
together might help us approximate what a Deweyan sense of agency would look like.  
The key terms I will examine in this regard are will, intelligence, and freedom, as well as 
the way Dewey describes the culmination of having an experience and the associated 
feeling of satisfaction and rest that this can bring.  The previous material in this section 
will help to situate how our experiences of will, intelligence, freedom, and achieving 
ends-in-view all relate to issues of habit construction, reconstruction, and embodied 
agency.   
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Will  
 While some material on will has been discussed previously in relation to habit, it 
will be helpful to recall it here.  In describing character as the interpenetration of habits, 
Dewey characterizes will in a similar way; insofar as habits collectively develop into 
dispositions or “modes of response” to situations, habit accustoms us to operating with a 
particular bearing, with particular inclinations and perceptive qualities.  He writes, “Habit 
means a special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing 
predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrences of specific acts.  It means 
will.”176  This description connotes that will is marked by the general manner of 
engagement we adopt when interacting with the world, as well as the ways such 
dispositions generate certain kinds of actions.  In any case, will is not, for Dewey, a 
metaphysical concept or a quality of human life transcendentally present; it is a practical 
term for the ability to respond to stimuli in desired and efficacious ways.  Such responses 
are not generated piecemeal either; they emerge out of our habitual modes of engagement 
and the efficacy with which those modes interact with one another. 
 Dewey also discusses the will with direct reference to its use in moral theories, 
juxtaposing his conception of the will with theories abstracting it from action and habit.  
As opposed to something like a Kantian “good will” that may or may not be evidenced in 
actions, Dewey claims that the more everyday conception of the will, which he 
advocates, signals “something practical and moving.  It understands the body of habits, of 
active dispositions which makes a man do what he does.”177  This is a part of why Dewey 
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rejects moral theories which separate out the functioning of the will from the 
consequences resulting from it, but it also highlights that his conception of will is, 
unsurprisingly, about action and doing, and about the relation between the dispositions 
generated by habit and the effects such dispositions create.  Thus we see a link with will 
and the felt sense of agency insofar as will is a matter of crafting and then being able to 
rely on habits that produce well-functioning dispositions; in other words, habits that 
enable efficacious activity.178 
  
Intelligence 
 One of the most powerful expressions of what might be thought of as Deweyan 
agency comes through in his use of the term “intelligence.”  A prominent idea throughout 
nearly all of his work, he employs the term in a relatively particular way.  In a nutshell, 
intelligence is the deliberate use of the human powers of inquiry, observation, and 
judgment for the improvement of the conditions of life, individual and social, such that 
desired consequences might be sought out and brought into being through directed 
activity.  Intelligence is the exercise of deliberate observation and reflective thought, such 
                                                
178 Dewey also briefly discusses the idea he finds in vogue at the time of the book’s 
writing: the concept of the will to power.  Interestingly, while Dewey ultimately finds the 
idea rather uncompelling, this idea comes from a discussion of the self as an ongoing 
process, an idea which he describes as currently out of fashion.  With the influences of 
romanticism and the industrial revolution, the more fashionable name for the unifying 
action of the self’s continuity is referenced by the will to power (Ibid., 98).  While his 
characterization of this manifestation of will has resonances with the felt sense of rest he 
describes in the accomplishment of tasks (which will be taken up later in this section), in 
the end, his discussion of this idea is somewhat disparaging.  He links it with the thwarted 
energy of impulses with no proper avenues of expression, and individuals seeking self-
aggrandizement.  However, the impulse it calls out, he says, emanates less from a 
demand for power and more as search for the right ways to use already existing powers 
(Ibid., 99). 
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that one can link experiences from the past with present circumstances, paying attention 
to the ways in which past actions and their results played out such that present actions 
might have a sense of direction.  It is deployed when a confusing situation presents itself, 
in that part of its function is to organize and utilize certain habits that help to “clear up” 
and make sense of it, so that action becomes structured, directed, and manageable.  
However, it is deployed also as a habit, in that habits of intelligent response – that is, 
thoughtful, careful, and reflective approaches – can be cultivated as part of one’s overall 
demeanor.  Basically, intelligence is the direction of activities towards particular desired 
goals or circumstances, knowing that the environment in which one operates is always 
the flip side of such actions.   
 In The Quest for Certainty, the chapter titled “The Naturalization of Intelligence” 
outlines Dewey’s conception of what intelligence is, here juxtaposed with the concept of 
“reason,” so historically prominent in the philosophical tradition.  Dewey claims that 
reason is typically understood as a phenomenon separated from the “natural” world as an 
immutable, “superempirical” force of order.  Typically aligned with the purity of the 
human mind, reason hovers above the world of experience, in a sense, only allowing 
humans access to it in particular ways.179  Intelligence on the other hand, is a 
“domesticated” kind of operation, in that it exists in a “natural” way in human life, 
continuous throughout human activity.  Dewey explains the basics of Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle, emphasizing how the process of observation inevitably plays a part 
in constructing the reality of what it observes, thereby highlighting how the attainment of 
knowledge is a participatory process; that we are continuous with and influencing the 
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world when we make judgments upon it.  Such conclusions remove the absolute certainty 
that science might wish for, but they have much farther-reaching entailments in what it 
means to have knowledge and to use it in the world.  One of these conclusions that 
Dewey outlines is the fact that the belief in an immutable, transcendent reason no longer 
makes much sense; rather, intelligence in action – directed, deliberate choices made about 
desired outcomes and the likely actions to achieve them – is a much more efficient and 
practical way to think about the exercise of human powers.  Describing the opposition 
between reason’s fixed, universal character and intelligence’s flexible here-and-now-
ness, Dewey writes,  
 Intelligence ... is associated with judgment; that is, with selection and arrangement 
 of means to effect consequences and with choice of what we take as our ends.  A 
 man is intelligent not in virtue of having reason which grasps first and 
 indemonstrable truths about fixed principles, in order to reason deductively from 
 them to the particulars which they govern, but in virtue of his capacity to estimate 
 the possibilities of a situation and to act in accordance with his estimate.  In the 
 large sense of the term, intelligence is as practical as reason is theoretical.180 
 
As such, intelligence is one of the names Dewey gives to the kind of directed operation 
that aims to evaluate past and present circumstances such that present and future 
circumstances might be ordered and meaningful in ways we desire.  Indeed, “science” is 
related to this term also, in that science, for Dewey, is “a knowledge that accrues when 
methods are employed which deal competently with problems that present themselves;” 
as such, “the physician, engineer, artist, craftsman, lay claim to scientific knowing.”181  
Insofar as it refers to directed action, the concept of intelligence can be aligned also with 
“method” in Dewey’s work, but the key is that intelligence is within the natural sphere of 
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human capacities, and its power is demonstrated when human beings observe phenomena 
in experience, take record of its results and relationships, and adjust their actions 
accordingly, such that the best chance of desirable consequences comes about.  One of its 
distinguishing features, for Dewey, and also separating it from “reason,” is that it 
demands a connection between knowing and doing, and thus, it can make a difference in 
the world, it can impact the course of change. 
 Because intelligence has this rather broad scope, seen generally as the 
intervention and direction of actions in order to modify conditions, its uses extend far into 
various elements of life, and thus, into just as many elements of Dewey’s work.  In 
Human Nature and Conduct, many of Dewey’s discussions of intelligence focus on the 
continuity between intelligence in habits and intelligence in moral conduct, seeing these 
spheres as continuous with one another.  He claims that a similar kind of intelligence 
employed in intellectual pursuits or everyday life is employed in moral thinking.  This 
means that developing thoughtful, reflective, and flexible habits are that much more 
significant, in that they are they primary conduits of human behavior, and thus, all have a 
moral impact.  Discussing the function of deliberation, an important part of cultivating 
intelligence, Dewey writes,  
 The moral is to develop conscientiousness, ability to judge the significance of 
 what we are doing and to use that judgment in directing what we do, not by means 
 of direct cultivation of something called conscience, or reason, or a faculty of 
 moral knowledge, but by fostering those impulses and habits which experience 
 has shown to make us sensitive, generous, imaginative...182 
 
Thus, while we hear the ethical overtones in this description, all parts of it apply 
generally to his conception of intelligence more broadly speaking.  A significant part of 
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what intelligence cultivates is the facility (the habit) of judging the impact of what we do 
and using that (habit of) judgment to direct what we continue to do.    
 This conception of intelligence can be linked with agency in that intelligence is 
one way to think about the ability to decide upon and direct one’s habits and actions in 
ways that best effect one’s purposes.  This capacity might entail the experience of trust in 
one’s intelligence, or the confidence of intelligence in general that conditions might be 
moving toward the better – or at least, are able to do so.  Since intelligence “converts 
desire into plans, systematic plans based on assembling facts,”183 part of what this 
conversion requires is the belief (and the felt possibility of acting on it) that such plans 
are possible, that the work involved in developing plans might come to fruition in the 
world.  The feeling of security in this belief might also be thought of a component of 
agency.  Indeed, for Dewey, “the highest task of intelligence is to grasp and realize 
genuine opportunity, possibility.”184  Such realizations, especially when it comes to 
expanding the opportunities and possibilities available in the world, are both 
manifestations of, and prerequisites for, agency.  
 
Freedom 
 Similar to Dewey’s conception of the will, his idea of freedom has much more to 
do with the ability to exercise intelligence in action than it does with a metaphysical 
concept of freedom as a condition.  There is a kind of natural freedom that exists, he says, 
but this is only the condition for the kind of freedom in choice, purpose, and activity that 
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truly characterizes the exercise of freedom in human life, as well as those conditions 
which help to secure it and encourage its flourishing.185  Indeed, he stresses, “Intelligence 
is the key to freedom in act.”186   
 There are three key elements characterizing freedom, or liberty, in Dewey’s 
account.  He describes the practice of freedom as such: “(i) It includes efficiency in 
action, ability to carry out plans, the absence of cramping and thwarting obstacles.  (ii) It 
also includes capacity to vary plans, to change the course of action, to experience 
novelties.  And again (iii) it signifies the power of desire and choice to be factors in 
events.”187  These three characteristics are helpful for outlining some conditions of 
agency: the ability to effectively make and carry out plans, the ability to change such 
plans as needed and to experience new things, and the ability of making desire and 
feeling important elements in making choices.  How these conditions of agency are 
experienced by individuals is an issue I will take up in subsequent chapters.  
 Similar to some of the characteristics of intelligence Dewey describes, a part of 
freedom is using the knowledge of observation and prediction to outline future 
consequences in a desirable fashion.  Anticipating particular ends-in-view and making 
plans for their execution, Dewey links the human abilities to foresee and plan as a part of 
our freedom: “To foresee future objective alternatives and to be able by deliberation to 
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choose one of them and thereby weight its changes in the struggle for future existence, 
measures our freedom.”188  Such measures are, of course, not absolute; there are always 
elements of situations that remain out of our control, and even when ends-in-view are 
reached, conditions become destabilized again, calling out the need for new ends.  
Acknowledging this and mitigating the feeling that freedom might aim past its 
boundaries, Dewey stipulates, “We do not use the present to control the future.  We use 
the foresight of the future to refine and expand present activity.  In this use of desire, 
deliberation and choice, freedom is actualized.”189  In actualizing freedom, we make use 
of our ability to design purposes and execute them, carrying intentions and wishes into 
the future.  In doing so, we must have the sense that such executions are possible and 
plausible, and such a sense requires agency. 
 
Having An Experience 
 Again, linked with the freedom to articulate and carry out actions towards ends-
in-view, there is a sense of satisfaction that achieving such ends imparts.  In Art as 
Experience, Dewey outlines the ways that experience, as a constant interplay of doing 
and undergoing, contains a necessary tension between our activities as reaching toward a 
particular goal and the rest experienced when such a goal is reached.  Now, the 
attainment of such ends almost immediately shifts into a new springboard, a new starting 
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light” (Ibid., 214). 
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point of activity.  But there are distinctions to be made in the felt experiences that 
characterize these moments of engagement.   
 Dewey characterizes having an experience as the complete course of a doing and 
undergoing, experiencing tension and conflict and moving towards resolution, and 
experiencing a culminating moment wherein the experience’s contents come together in a 
kind of harmony.190  This harmony is a kind of equilibrium, a point of stability, a moment 
of rest in the midst of movement.  These moments of harmony, like those of tension, are 
distinguished so pointedly due to the felt qualities suffusing them, characterizing them as 
tense or harmonious.  We move through these stable moments only to initiate the 
beginnings of new experiences, but such culminations can contain significant lessons for 
how we continue to go about our world, as well as how we experience our own 
participatory self within it.  Indeed, Dewey aligns the function of intelligence with the 
perception of meanings which emerge through the ebb and flow of doing and undergoing.   
 It is such fluctuations that characterize human life, for Dewey, in that they are 
what allow for dynamism, novelty, change, and growth.  Without the potential for such 
changes, life would appear either totally fixed and static, or totally disorderly and chaotic.  
Instead, Dewey describes, our life is somewhere in between these two poles.  But it is the 
interconnection between them that gives experiences meaning, that allows us to find 
relative stability, and such stability is where we develop means of moving forward to new 
projects.  He writes, “Contrast of lack and fullness, of struggle and achievement, of 
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“ordinary” concept of experience.  Having an experience refers to the continuity and 
buildup involved in a single, focused experience; such an experience might be visiting an 
art museum, taking an English class, or mourning the loss of a loved one.  Its duration is 
less its defining characteristic as the way in which separate experiences unify into one, 
relatively bounded collection of experiences, which then gets the label an experience.  
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adjustment after consummated irregularity, form the drama in which action, feeling, and 
meaning are one.  The outcome is balance and counterbalance.  These are not static nor 
mechanical.  They express power that is intense because measured through overcoming 
resistance.”191  Thus, such points of rest are significant not only for allowing us a 
temporary respite from the flux of life; they are moments in which we experience the 
power of overcoming challenges, of establishing a peace in the midst of flux.  
Highlighting how significant these accomplishments can be, Dewey writes, “The moment 
of passage from disturbance into harmony is that of intensest life.”192   
 Indeed, such moments of intensest life, representing the culminating and uniting 
elements of an experience, are so meaningful in that they help us to build a sense of 
stability within the ever-changing flux of experience as it continues on, and such stability, 
again, is a distinctly felt quality.  Dewey claims that any consummatory moment is indeed 
the one in which a new beginning emerges, and thus, the harmony we feel does not last 
long as its own, singular phenomenon.  However, the feeling of such points of rest can 
help us to generate a strength in the sense that such possibilities exist, that even painful 
experiences can have meaning, and that life, constituted of ebbs and flows, is likely to 
ebb or flow again soon, providing solace depending on whatever one needs at the 
moment.  He explains, “through the phases of perturbation and conflict, there abides the 
deep-seated memory of an underlying harmony, the sense of which haunts life like the 
sense of being founded on a rock.”193  As such, he is positing that in the midst of life’s 
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movements, a sense of steady harmony is possible within the flux of activity.  This sense 
of harmony or stability is, in part, crafted out of the singular harmonies of 
consummations of experience, and might be likened to a sense of self that operates as a 
relatively stable element within experience, a self that is able to act with intelligence and 
direction, that can perceive the changing dynamics of life as inevitable and organize 
one’s purposes within them.  In any case, such a harmony signifies the felt sense of 
stability with life’s changes, the rest and recognition that accompanies achieving a 
projected goal, or that one has felt the connections between the various contents of an 
experience.  Indeed, this sense is also linked to growth: “Time as organization in change 
is growth, and growth signifies that a varied series of change enters upon intervals of 
pause and rest; of completions that become the initial points of new processes of 
development.”194  
 As such, we can discern more about what a sense of Deweyan agency might look 
like or what it might contain, and his descriptions of the felt, satisfying quality of such 
culminations are a helpful piece of this puzzle.  This is because, in part at least, the 
totality of the body-mind is implicated in such experiences – insofar as the sense of these 
experiences is consistently highlighted in Dewey’s accounts.  Indeed, he explains that 
such experiences offer a feeling of satisfaction, of achievement, of order and progress: 
“the experience itself has a satisfying emotional quality because it possesses internal 
integration and fulfillment reached through ordered and organized movement.”195  In this 
way we see that such culminations are not simply the accumulated moments of a given 
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timeframe or the conclusion of a certain phase; they are significant as culminations in the 
felt sense of achievement and completion that they offer.  They demonstrate the value and 
meaning of integrated and organized movement, and in return provide a satisfying feeling 
of unification. 
 So at this point we might take a survey of these ideas and their relation to agency: 
will, intelligence, freedom, the culmination of an experience.  Will provides a sense in 
which habits combine to form avenues of efficient action, insofar as will is demonstrated 
through the way habits interact to develop flexible and open-thinking dispositions.  
Intelligence provides a rich sense of how foresight and judgment are key components of 
efficient action for Dewey, insofar as it encompasses a broad range of types of action.  
Freedom represents both the conditions in which we act toward our own purposes as well 
as how significant the reality of choice is in our experiences.  Interestingly, it is also part 
of how Keall characterizes the need for self-knowledge in education, in that self-
knowledge is requisite for achieving the kind of freedom Dewey envisions as necessary 
for living a flourishing, fulfilling life.  And the felt sense of culminating experience 
provides us with evidence that Dewey acknowledges the importance of the feeling and 
the embodied reality of achieving goals and cultivating meaning in the unifying of 
experiences.  This shows us a way in which agency is felt, is experienced, is realized as a 
part of our engagements with the world.  
 Thus, in the collection of these terms, we can recognize ways that Dewey 
addresses the question of agency, insofar as agency is a question of intelligent action, 
effective manners of executing such action, and the potential for consequent satisfaction 
felt upon concluding an experience.  And as Dewey is clear to never separate the body 
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from the mind in his conceptualizations, we can assert with confidence that any sense of 
agency for Dewey is thus an embodied sense.  However, we might still seek out more 
when it comes to ways of characterizing how such agency is experienced, how such felt 
capacities and possibilities are lived through the entirety of one’s embodied habits, and 
not just in moments of culmination or completion of a goal.  
 
Body, Reconsidered: Body as Mine and Not Mine 
 At this point, we can affirm that Dewey finds the role of the body to be 
significant, and that his intentions in articulating phenomena of human life are to do so as 
holistically as possible.  What such a holistic approach might find wanting however, are 
more particularities and details of how such experiences do indeed include multiple sides, 
multiple vantage points from which experience can be viewed and articulated.  The 
question of embodied life is certainly no exception, insofar as I experience my body in a 
certain way as I live it, while others perceive my body in a very different way as they 
encounter me, and this encounter certainly cycles back into the way I experience my 
body in the first person.196  The potentials of this split in perspectives is what leads me 
into the following two chapters, with the incorporation of a variety of philosophical 
perspectives. 
 There is a sense in which the body I inhabit is always mine – it is me in a 
significant way; it is my vehicle of going about the world, my possibility of making 
meaning in the world, my unique opportunity of being.  The force of this first person 
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am?) and that which I am for others” is a key motivation for her own study on the place 
of the body in education (Embodiment and Education, 3). 
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perspective, while potentially operating with a different point of view on experience than 
Dewey, has important things to offer when it comes to developing an embodied account 
of agency.  If I am to act intelligently as an agent in the world, understanding and having 
a living, active sense of my potentials, I must experience myself, in or as my body, in 
such a way also.  Believing my body to make me inferior or experiencing my body as 
inhibiting for my activities are, I argue, inhibitions on my agency, on my ability to carry 
out my intentions in the world and in some cases, my ability to generate certain kinds of 
meaning.  Despite his emphasis on the body-mind as a unit, Dewey’s focus on will, 
intelligence, and freedom could be taken further in terms of how such qualities of 
experience are lived and felt, “from the inside” as it were, or what the lack of such 
qualities might entail in terms of one’s conception of self and perceived sense of her 
capacities.  As such, I will turn to some insights from the phenomenological perspective 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in the next chapter, looking to see how we might flesh out a 
perspective of the body as mine and as the source of my agential powers in the world.  
Such a first-person, descriptive account will, I argue, supplement the account of 
embodied agency that a conception of growth might aim for. 
 There is also a sense in which the body I inhabit is also not mine – I live it, but it 
is also the object of others’ perceptions, as well as a means of monitoring and controlling 
my behavior, my interactions, and thus, my possibilities.  This is not to say that such 
monitoring and controlling are of necessity a negative or dangerous thing, but they are 
elements of living in a social world and a complex culture, in which institutions shape 
many (if not all) of the day-to-day engagements in which I participate.  As such, my 
activities within such larger networks entail that there is an extent to which my 
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experience is not entirely mine, and my embodied self is a part of many overlapping 
networks of history, culture, and discourse.  Now, Dewey’s views are thoroughly social, 
in that habits, intelligence, experience, freedom, and so forth all take place within and 
through the support of a social history and a present community.  However, when it 
comes to the ways in which such supports might bear down on my embodied being in 
“invisible” ways, while Dewey is not dismissive of this reality, his account might be 
expanded and taken further, both to account for developments in contemporary culture as 
well as to deepen the reading of how such forces influence our existence.  I will thus turn 
to the work of Michel Foucault for assistance in how this perspective might be enlarged 
and enriched, insofar as his work highlights the extent to which social and cultural 
meanings come to be and continue to operate by means of their effects on the body, and 
the way that bodies carry out meanings even without consciousness of them.  Moreover, 
Foucault’s later work (as I read it) contains some insightful corollaries to Deweyan 
growth.  His emphasis on care for the self and self-transformation in this work carries a 
more positive program for articulating mechanisms of change in one’s life, which can be 
read along lines similar to Deweyan growth.  I thus take up some ideas from this part of 
Foucault’s corpus as well, aiming to highlight his concept of transformation as a 
particularly socially-embedded, constructivist approach to expanding the possibilities of 
one’s life and engaging in a particular kind of ethics.  The account of transformation 
offered emphasizes the bodily character of practice as enabling transformation and 
change, as well as stressing the imperative for deliberately engaging in practices of self-
transformation.  I claim that his account therefore supplements Dewey’s in presenting the 
theme of growth as the continual development and practice of one’s embodied agency. 
 139 
 I will turn my focus to these thinkers for the following two chapters, discussing 
how they add helpful additions to a picture of embodiment, which I find a critical part of 
what is at stake in human agency.  From there, I will return to the work of Dewey as well 
as these thinkers, articulating how such perspectives on the body add to a conception of 
agency, and thus how this emphasis on the body can be beneficial for educational 
discourses of growth. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AGENCY AND THE BODY IN MERLEAU-PONTY’S PHENOMENOLOGY: 
HABIT, EXPRESSION, AND TRANSCENDENCE 
 
Why Phenomenology? 
 We left the last chapter with a discussion of how multiple perspectives of the 
body are possible, and indeed, might have much to offer a reading of the body when it 
comes to education, growth, and agency.  In short, this discussion presents the reality that 
bodies are experienced and thus, addressed philosophically in different ways, according 
to the different vantage points from which bodies are “examined” or described.  Dewey 
offers us what we might call, generally, a third-person perspective, insofar as his account 
of the body-mind and of embodied habit gives a naturalistic description of body-minds as 
complex organisms transacting with their environments.  While I find much compelling 
about this view, and indeed, it corresponds with his conceptions of growth, the 
reconstruction of experience, and education more broadly construed, I believe there 
might be more to explore when it comes to thinking about embodied agency.  It can be 
argued that Dewey’s naturalized, habit-oriented approach to the body might limit the 
scope of thinking about the body as it is experienced by the self or subject, and more 
might be addressed in terms of how human beings live their bodies, in the first person, as 
sources of agency.  Specifically, I believe some insights of phenomenology can be 
helpful here, insofar as phenomenology seeks to describe embodied experience, 
providing a careful and in-depth perspective on how perception and consciousness – our 
primary mechanisms of contact with the world – occur through our bodies.  As such, I 
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posit that elements of a phenomenological standpoint can bring added exposition to some 
of the phenomena Dewey describes, but it can also bring an increased awareness of the 
significance of the body in one’s conceptions of self and conceptions of possibility.  In 
this way, I believe that there are important ideas regarding embodied agency to be found 
in phenomenological literature. 
 However, this literature is quite broad in its reach, so narrowing the scope of 
discussion is necessary here.  Thus, I will focus my energy in this analysis on the work of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, as his work is known as one of the most extensive and 
penetrating presentations of embodiment within the phenomenological tradition.  Given 
that his corpus alone is rather extensive, this chapter will focus mostly on 
Phenomenology of Perception and insights raised there which relate to the body as a 
source or site of agency.  To do so, I will begin by briefly characterizing Merleau-Ponty’s 
perspective on the body, its relation to subjectivity, and its embeddedness in the world, 
linking these views with Dewey’s to help situate them with respect to this project.  The 
next section will take up his discussions of embodied habit as a means of relating to the 
world, which will take me into a section on the body as a means of expression.  The final 
section of this chapter will take up the body in its relation to the transcendent character of 
human subjectivity, highlighting how it is a condition for experiencing oneself as an 
agent.  Throughout each of these sections, I hope to show how Merleau-Ponty’s analyses 
provide helpful dimensions for understanding agency as an embodied phenomenon. 
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Merleau-Ponty, the Body, and Being in the World 
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty is known in the continental tradition for being a 
philosopher of the body: his phenomenological work emphasizes the role of embodiment 
in consciousness, perception, and being in the world most broadly speaking.  Inspired by 
Descartes, Husserl, Heidegger, Bergson, and many psychologists of his day, Merleau-
Ponty explores the centrality of the body in the operations of human consciousness, 
describing how the body interacts with the world in a huge variety of ways.  His most 
famous work, Phenomenology of Perception, conducts painstakingly close analyses of 
both mundane and extraordinary bodily events (referencing both everyday activities of 
perception as well as studies of “pathological” cases of brain damage, bodily injury, and 
atypical psychophysical conditions), drawing conclusions about the character of 
embodied being from the range of experiences he describes.  While many of his 
conclusions come by way of descriptive assertions, his work on the body and its place in 
human perception and consciousness stands as a classic, in-depth philosophical treatment 
of the body. 
 Recent theorists from both pragmatist and phenomenological traditions have 
explored valuable comparisons between Dewey and Merleau-Ponty.  To list some notable 
treatments, Richard Shusterman takes up the ideas of both thinkers (among others) in 
developing his somaesthetics, an approach to the study of bodily experience and as a way 
of using the body reflectively to enhance aesthetic appreciation and self-cultivation.197  
                                                
197 Richard Shusterman, Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and 
Somaesthetics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  Shusterman critiques 
Merleau-Ponty’s vision of the body for emphasizing the unreflective and passive 
elements of bodily existence, finding Dewey’s work to remedy some of those problems.  
I find his reading of Dewey and his emphasis on habit and reconstruction helpful, but I 
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Shannon Sullivan develops her pragmatist-feminist account of transactional embodiment, 
inspired by Dewey’s work and incorporating insights from Merleau-Ponty on the body as 
meaning-creating and communicative.198  Joseph Margolis claims that Merleau-Ponty 
serves as a touchstone in thinking about comparisons between Dewey and continental 
thought, ultimately arguing that phenomenology and pragmatism need the insights of the 
other in moving forward philosophically into the twenty-first century.199  Mark Johnson’s 
work, as discussed in the previous chapter, incorporates insights from Merleau-Ponty 
while building on a Deweyan conception of the body, emphasizing the role of 
embodiment in human thought and meaning-making.200  Marjorie O’Loughlin, one of the 
primary thinkers of embodiment and education referenced in the introduction, also culls 
insights from both Dewey and Merleau-Ponty in arguing for increased attention to the 
body in educational practice.201 
                                                                                                                                            
believe his reading of Merleau-Ponty overlooks many ways the active body is present in 
his work, as well as ways that his work can be read to encourage engagement in somatic 
reflection. 
 
198 Shannon Sullivan, Living Across and Through Skins: Transactional Bodies, 
Pragmatism, and Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001).  Sullivan’s 
account particularly critiques Merleau-Ponty’s characterization of the body’s anonymity, 
claiming that this negatively complicates the intersubjectivity and communicativity at the 
heart of his work. 
 
199 Joseph Margolis, “Dewey in Dialogue with Continental Philosophy,” in Reading 
Dewey: Interpretations for a Postmodern Generation, ed. Larry Hickman (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1998), 231-256.  Margolis contends that Rorty’s early 
comparison with Dewey and Heidegger is misguided and concludes that Dewey’s 
affinities with Merleau-Ponty’s work not only run much deeper but have much to offer 
coming philosophical work; he claims that “naturalism without phenomenology is blind 
and phenomenology without naturalism is empty; and their ‘relationship’ is neither 
additive nor hierarchical in any way” (249). 
 
200 Johnson, The Meaning of the Body. 
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 What Merleau-Ponty demonstrates through his extensive descriptions, and which 
so many later thinkers draw insight from, is the way in which the body is the source of 
our existence: it is the condition for allowing me to experience anything at all, let alone to 
experience the richness of the intersubjective and cultural world.  He does not assert 
outright that the body ought to be recognized as the source of our agency in the world, 
and in a sense, embodied agency is not the primary focus of his work; however, his 
examinations of how we move about the world, understand others, and create meanings 
via the body are all dealing with the body as our location of possibility in the world.  
While agency as such is not the forefront of his study, he asserts repeatedly that the body 
is the center and source of all human experience, and that all of our experience is rooted 
in our mechanisms and habits of perception.  Indeed, he claims, “All consciousness is, in 
some measure, perceptual consciousness.”202  As we might glean from Dewey as well as 
Merleau-Ponty, such mechanisms and habits of perception are thoroughly embodied 
phenomena: they occur not simply in or through our bodies, but in a sense as our bodies 
themselves, as our bodies are interwoven with the world and with other people.  In this 
way, while Merleau-Ponty does not always reference the idea of agency in this work, one 
might claim that the reality of embodied agency lies at the heart of his approach: because 
all consciousness is in some way perceptual and all perception occurs by way of the 
body, the body is thus placed as the center of action and intention, the source of human 
experience and meaning. 
                                                                                                                                            
201 O’Loughlin, Embodiment and Education. 
 
202 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New 
York: Routledge, 1958), 459.   
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 In order to get a handle on how Merleau-Ponty develops his perspective on the 
body, however, it will be helpful to look at several emphases in how he views embodied 
consciousness.  One way to begin is to compare his approach with Dewey’s naturalism.  
As there are certainly divergences in how they conceive of the subject, there are also 
similarities in their approaches, specifically regarding problematics of earlier traditions 
that they work to unravel.203  Both Dewey and Merleau-Ponty find serious problems with 
the way philosophical traditions of dualism have considered the body in relation to the 
mind and the world, and thus both aim to recast the question of what the body is and 
does, and both do so, in part, by examining the actual, living interweavings of human 
consciousness, embodiment, and habitual activity.  With echoes of Dewey’s emphasis on 
organisms in environments and mutually constitutive relations between them, Merleau-
Ponty describes the body as the center and “pivot” of the world we experience: 
 The body is the vehicle of being in the world, and having a body is, for a living 
 creature, to be intervolved in a definite environment, to identify oneself with 
                                                
203 One difference between the subject in Merleau-Ponty and the self in Dewey might be 
found in the degree of “givenness” of subjectivity in Merleau-Ponty versus the 
“construction” of the Deweyan self.  There are similarities here, as can be seen in the 
former’s statement that “everything is both manufactured and natural in man” (Ibid., 
220).  But while Merleau-Ponty does not assert that subjectivity exists prior to its 
manifested expressions, and he definitively claims that it exists in and through the body, 
he does grant a ontological reality or undenability to subjectivity, which might stem from 
the fact that he works more squarely within the Cartesian legacy.  Dewey, on the other 
hand, characterizes the existence and emergence of the self as constructed via action and 
transaction, in dialogue and co-creation with its environment.  So while their views share 
many overlapping commitments, Merleau-Ponty might take subjectivity more as a given 
phenomenon than Dewey’s view of the self would be.  We can see that, like Dewey, 
Merleau-Ponty stresses the “holistic” character of experience, while his emphasis on 
embodiment may exceed Dewey’s; in stressing that the subject’s situated existence 
happens through the body, he writes, “In so far as, when I reflect on the essence of 
subjectivity, I find it bound up with that of the body and that of the world, this is because 
my existence as subjectivity is merely one with my existence as a body and with the 
existence of the world, and because the subject that I am, when taken concretely, is 
inseparable from this body and this world” (Ibid., 475). 
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 certain  projects and be continually committed to them. … for if it is true that I am 
 conscious of my body via the world, that it is the unperceived term in the centre 
 of the world towards which all objects turn their face, it is true for the same 
 reason  that my body is the pivot of the world … I am conscious of the world 
 through the medium of my body.204 
 
Being the vehicle or pivot of my being in the world, Merleau-Ponty thus asserts that the 
body is the often unthematized center or source of human experience.  We can hear 
resonances of Dewey here; in emphasizing the “intervolved” character of the body and 
the co-constitution that occurs between body and environment, or between my body and 
projects to which my environment commits me (as well as those I choose within it), we 
hear a likeness with Dewey’s emphasis on organisms and environments mutually creating 
one another.  Merleau-Ponty might be said to take his analysis in a different direction 
from Dewey, however, in focusing on the ways in which the body develops its “silent” or 
unspoken operations with respect to its movements in its world, forming the basis that 
allows us to explore the world in the conscious ways that we do.205  This is not to say that 
Dewey neglects this reality per se, but it is to acknowledge that Merleau-Ponty’s 
emphasis takes on a different cast: the descriptive analysis of perceptual consciousness as 
experienced through the body.  
                                                
204 Ibid., 94-5. 
 
205 Drew Leder’s book The Absent Body engages Merleau-Ponty’s work and method of 
phenomenological description in explaining how the body tends to operate “silently,” 
disappearing into the background of experience when it is working properly.  He claims 
that typical bodily functioning tends to “eclipse” itself in perceptual experience precisely 
because the typically functioning body does not announce its operations or make itself 
felt while it is doing the work of perceiving, breathing, moving, and so on.  He describes 
that this tendency to recede into the background helps to explain what makes Cartesian 
dualism a plausible hypothesis, though concluding that dualism does not stand up to lived 
experience.  See The Absent Body (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
 147 
 Another way to approach an understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s perspective on the 
body – again, in a vein not unlike Dewey – is to explore how he situates his analysis on a 
middle path between interpretive extremes.  In setting up his analytical perspective in 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty argues that extremes of both empiricism 
and intellectualism miss the mark in terms of expressing human existence, with an 
emphasis on how each misses something significant about the role of embodied 
existence.  He devotes several chapters to explaining how classical psychology over-
intellectualizes our experience of the body and interprets our relation to it as almost 
“magical” in its mystery, while on the other hand, classical physiology over-mechanizes 
the body as object and divorces it from the way it interprets and enacts meanings.206  
What he hopes to achieve with phenomenology is the creation of a middle ground 
between these perspectives, one which establishes its content by describing in careful 
detail the way that embodied consciousness experiences the world.  Situating his view in 
this way, he writes,  
 Man taken as a concrete being is not a psyche joined to an organism, but the 
 movement to and fro of existence ...  Psychological motives and bodily occasions 
 may overlap because there is not a single impulse in a living body which is 
 entirely fortuitous in relation to psychic intentions, not a single mental act which 
 has not found at least its germ or its general outline in physiological tendencies.  It 
 is never a question of the incomprehensible meeting of two causalities, nor of a 
 collision between the order of causes and that of ends.207 
 
                                                
206 Shusterman critiques the characterization of this relationship as “magical,” claiming 
that it encourages a passive perception of the body and disfavors the practice of reflective 
bodily cultivation (Body Consciousness, 59).  I disagree on this point, finding the 
description of this “magical” relation to convey the depth and wonder that the 
phenomenon of body-mind presents.  Further, instead of finding this to block reflective 
bodily awareness, I feel that recognizing and cultivating this “mystery” can be a 
distinctive and fruitful part of somaesthetic awareness.   
 
207 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 101. 
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In this way, he aims to set up a perspective that takes psychological and physical data as 
equally significant, showing also how their operations and expressions are always mutual 
and interlinked.  In the course of his study, at times he emphasizes the place of the body 
more intensely than the mental; this is in part due to traditional philosophy’s historical 
privileging of mind over matter, but also due to the fact that any psychical life that we 
wish to speak about and examine finds its very existence and its manifestations in the life 
of a living body.  Indeed, he also claims, “the body expresses total existence, not because 
it is an external accompaniment to that existence, but because existence realizes itself in 
the body.”208  In his view, then, because existence realizes itself, takes place through, or 
happens in the body, to separate “body” and “mind” into two ontological spheres is to 
abstract elements of the single “incarnate significance” which is human life and push 
them away from each other in interpretation; and again, we hear the resonance of 
Dewey’s preference for “body-mind,” asserting that the separation into two terms is a 
linguistic convention rather than an ontological reality. 
 To flesh this out more fully, in concluding the first part of the book, which sets 
out his perspective amid the prejudices of interpretive extremes, he writes,  
 I am my body, at least wholly to the extent that I possess experience, and yet at 
 the same time my body is as it were a ‘natural’ subject, a provisional sketch of my 
 total being.  Thus experience of one’s own body runs counter to the reflective 
 procedure which detaches subject and object from each other, and which gives us 
 only the thought about the body, or the body as an idea, and not the experience of 
 the body or the body in reality.209 
 
As such, his account is focused on articulating what the experience of the body actually 
contains and expresses, what the body in reality does, which he claims, is a different kind 
                                                
208 Ibid., 192. 
 
209 Ibid., 231. 
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of account than those which take up the body as an abstracted part of reality.  All of the 
descriptions he incorporates into this study, moving from sense experience, perceptual 
synthesis, motility, language, and sexuality, to our experience of spatiality, temporality, 
the cogito, and freedom, are all expositions detailing entailments and elaborations of the 
book’s central idea, that “The body is our general medium for having a world.”210  In 
being this general medium, the body is thus the center and source of all our perceptions 
and meanings, and thus is the “pivot” of our consciousness, our actions, and our ability to 
move and enact intentions in the world; in other words, it is the vehicle of our agency. 
 Because nearly the entirety of this book might be examined as an articulation of 
embodied agency, working on different elements of our body’s situatedness in the world 
and “natural” powers within it, it will be necessary to narrow the focus of this chapter 
into particular elements of bodily being.  The first will be Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of 
habit, insofar as these convey both a connection with Dewey’s analysis of the human self 
as well as a picture of the extent to which habit is a necessary medium of interpretation 
and action in our lives.  The second will focus on the body as expressive, insofar as its 
power of navigating and working within the world includes – or really, largely rests on – 
its potentials as an active, meaning-making and meaning-conveying phenomenon.  Last, I 
will take up the idea of transcendence as it appears in this work, exploring this capacity 
of the body and subjectivity to move beyond itself as an important characteristic in 
describing the experience of agency.  I believe that these analyses can help flesh out ways 
in which these elements of life are components of a view of embodied agency, especially 
                                                
210 Ibid., 169. 
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insofar as they further a picture of embodied agency through the first person, or 
embodied agency as experienced.  
 
The Body and Habit 
 As noted above, one of Merleau-Ponty’s primary inspirations is Descartes, and 
throughout Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty complicates the Cartesian 
cogito.  Arguing that one must establish the phenomenon of thinking on the basis of 
existence rather than existence on the foundation of thought, Merleau-Ponty claims that 
“I think” already implies, “I am, I exist” and this, for him, always comes back to the 
body’s existence.  Indeed, in the chapter, “The Spatiality of One’s Own Body and 
Motility,” he claims, in describing motility as a form of basic intentionality, 
“Consciousness is in the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can’.”211  As 
such, placing motility as one of our basic manners of being toward the world, Merleau-
Ponty describes bodily motion not as the execution of a previously mapped out 
representation in one’s mind, but as the exercise of intention itself.  In this way, the role 
of habit comes into his account, insofar as habit is one of the body’s ways of “reading” 
and responding to its environment.  He thus describes the acquisition of habit as “a 
rearrangement and renewal of the corporeal schema,” a new synthesis of the body’s 
perceptions and responses, or a new “grasping” of a meaning.212  Juxtaposing the 
                                                
211 Ibid., 159.  Elaborating on this, he describes, “Consciousness is being-towards-the-
thing through the intermediary of the body.  A movement is learned when the body has 
understood it, that is, when it has incorporated it into its ‘world’, and to move one’s body 
is to aim at things through it: it is to allow oneself to respond to their call, which is made 
upon it independently of any representation” (Ibid., 159-161). 
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conception of learning habits as a kind of intellectual synthesis, he writes, “the subject 
does not weld together individual movements and individual stimuli but acquires the 
power to respond with a certain type of solution to situations of a certain general 
form.”213  In other words, habit represents something much “deeper” than fusing certain 
stimuli with certain responses, or even the taking up of a new practice; it represents one 
of the body’s powers of responding to situations.  Like Dewey’s conception, habit is not 
simply about the fact that we employ routinized behaviors in our daily lives; it is 
emblematic of one of the ways the body takes up and takes on meanings, as one of its 
unique (and often overlooked) capacities for going about the world.  Indeed, in his 
language of “rearrangement and renewal,” we can also hear echoes of Dewey’s emphasis 
on reconstruction.  Such reconstructions or renewals represent the body’s potentials to 
continuously “revise” itself through the medium of habit.  
 Merleau-Ponty continues on to illustrate his claim that acquiring a habit is not an 
intellectual synthesis, but a bodily one.  Using the example of dancing, Merleau-Ponty 
describes the way in which developing a habit of dancing is not a matter of interpreting a 
certain path of motion, using what one knows from other types of movements (like 
walking or running), and applying them to the particular motion of a dance.  He explains, 
instead, how the body forms this habit by “understanding” the motion itself, and 
“understanding” must then take on a different meaning than the one philosophy has 
                                                                                                                                            
212 Merleau-Ponty describes the idea of corporeal or body schema (translated also as body 
image) as “a total awareness of my posture in the intersensory world, a ‘form’ in the 
sense used by Gestalt psychology” (Ibid., 114), and insofar as it enables me to have a 
sense of bodily spatiality and positioning, it is “a way of stating that my body is in-the-
world” (Ibid., p.115).  Body or corporeal schema is thus a kind of bodily knowledge of 
situation, spatiality, and capacity, orienting the body’s way of being in the world.  
 
213 Ibid., 165. 
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traditionally given it: “it is the body which ‘catches’ (kapiert) and ‘comprehends’ 
movement.  The acquisition of a habit is indeed the grasping of a significance, but it is 
the motor grasping of a motor significance.”214  But, he asks, what does it mean to grasp a 
motor significance?   
 He gives a few examples to illustrate: he describes a woman who adjusts her 
movements so that a feather in her hat does not run into objects as she moves, and a 
person driving a car who can judge accurately whether or not the car can fit through a 
narrow passage.215  While these examples might seem a bit particular, what they show is 
the extent to which the body can take on new meanings and carry itself accordingly, 
without the intermediary of conscious thought working to articulate those meanings, 
without making calculations to determine needed margins of space, and so forth.  More 
importantly, what they show, in having grasped a motor significance, is the way bodily 
habit can seamlessly incorporate new elements into its operation, which take place 
because the body is the center of the potentials for all such motor significances.  
Likewise, this highlights that, in grasping a new motor significance or a new bodily 
meaning, some element of navigating the world effectively is gained as a power, as an 
                                                
214 Ibid., 165. 
 
215 This is one of few places in which Merleau-Ponty employs a female body as an 
example, and generally, these tend to portray a rather limited scope of feminine bodily 
movement.  Judith Butler claims that Merleau-Ponty’s general neglect of sexual 
difference in his treatment belies a body-subject that is male and not gender-netural.  See 
“Sexual Ideology and Phenomenological Description: A Feminist Critique of Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception,” in The Thinking Muse: Feminism and Modern 
French Philosophy, ed. Jeffner Allen and Iris Marion Young (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1989), 85-100.  Carol Bigwood responds to this claim by drawing on 
Merleau-Ponty’s fusion of the nature/culture dichotomy in conceptualizing the body, 
arguing that Butler’s view goes too far in de-materializing the body through emphasizing 
cultural inscription.  See “Renaturalizing the Body (with the help of Merleau-Ponty),” 
Hypatia 6, no. 3 (Autumn 1991): 54-73. 
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adjustment or renewal of the body’s contact with the world, such that it can move within 
the world more smoothly, more effectively.  Such adjustments, taken on as habits, might 
be thought of as individual bodily agencies, insofar as they represent potentials of 
activity, despite the fact that the subject herself will often not be consciously aware of 
them.  In short, Merleau-Ponty writes, “Habit expresses our power of dilating our being-
in-the-world, or changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments.”216  And here, 
instead of thinking of these “fresh instruments” simply as a feather in a hat or a car one is 
driving, one can think of such new instruments as new ways of seeing, new engagements 
of the body, or new potentials discovered through it.  In “dilating” our being-in-the-
world, habit allows us to adjust our bodily patterns in order to best accommodate our 
needs, as well as work with bodily potentials to take on new practices.  Moreover, this 
“dilation” of being-in-the-world also helps to clarify the execution of purposes: bodily 
adjustments work in conjunction with formulating intentions, allowing the needed 
“collaboration” of action and intention to manifest.  For example, in deciding one wants 
to learn how to dance, she begins taking up the necessary adjustments and actions that 
collectively culminate in the practice and skill of dancing.  In doing so, her body adjusts 
to these practices, taking up dancing as a new habit, a new form of expressing its life.  
 Another prime example of how habit works is found in musicians.  In looking at 
the ways musicians incorporate the habit of playing an instrument into their bodily 
networks, we can see how it is not the synthesis of intellectual meanings, nor a purely 
physiological set of responses.  Merleau-Ponty writes, “The example of instrumentalists 
shows even better how habit has its abode neither in thought nor in the objective body, 
                                                
216 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 166. 
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but in the body as mediator of a world.”217  Here we find again the dichotomy between 
“thought” and the “objective body,” as prejudices from classical psychological or 
physiological approaches might characterize this phenomenon.  Rather, Merleau-Ponty 
claims, in mediating the world, the body “knows” its instrument and its music, beyond 
understanding it cognitively and beyond working with a set of “bare” physical reflexes.  
Describing an organist approaching a new instrument, finding his way about it and 
learning its particulars, the distances between pedals, the number of stops, and so forth, 
Merleau-Ponty says that the musician “settles into the organ as one settles into a 
house.”218  Summing up, he claims, “our body is not an object for an ‘I think’, it is a 
grouping of lived-through meanings which moves towards its equilibrium.”219  As such, 
the body as a grouping of lived-through meanings constitutes an experiential “I can,” and 
this “I can” has the power of continuously modifying and renewing itself.   
 Indeed, another way that Merleau-Ponty describes the acquisition of habit is the 
body’s “absorption” of a new meaning, that it has “assimilated a fresh core of 
significance.”220  In taking up new “cores of significance,” or new networks of 
meaningful, embodied response, we are exercising our body’s abilities to continually 
discover more possibilities for meaning, expression, and exploration of its contacts with 
the world.  As such, the feeling of taking up new cores of significance, of discovering 
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new modes of exercising the “I can,” lends itself to thinking about bodily agency as the 
felt capacity of one’s ability to formulate and execute purposes.   
 Merleau-Ponty claims that the prevalence of habit in human life forces us to 
rethink what it means to “understand” something, as well as what it means to 
“understand” the body.  Because the body can incorporate such motor meanings “on its 
own,” as it were, this means that “understanding” must go beyond the traditional 
conception of interpreting and categorizing, of subsuming phenomena under categorical 
concepts.  He elaborates, “To understand is to experience the harmony between what we 
aim at and what is given, between the intention and the performance – and the body is our 
anchorage in a world.”221  Because the body is our anchorage in the world, it is thus also 
our anchorage with respect to phenomena as “basic” as sensing, perceiving, and moving 
through space, but also to phenomena as “complex” as developing a sense of self and 
cultivating one’s own capacities.  It is not that such phenomena are experienced as 
explicitly related or referred to the body in all instances (though it surely is in some, for 
better or worse, as we might think of Dewey’s concern with self-consciousness as an 
inhibitory factor of experience).  But the body is our anchorage insofar as our purposes 
are carried out through our bodies, (often) without the reflective moment of thinking 
about how our body is going to do something.  Insofar as the body is this anchorage, the 
pivot point that initiates all our experiences and that point to which all experiences return 
in moving toward the future, I wish to extend Merleau-Ponty’s readings to the claim that 
the body is thus the source also of our agency.   
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 Habit is one of the significant phenomena that the body employs to incorporate 
potentials and expand its powers, representing a manner in which the body generates 
meanings through its contact with the world and their patterns of “folding” into one 
another.  Moreover, it is in part due to the phenomenon of habit that the body can develop 
particular capacities for expression, which will be the focus of the next discussion. 
 
The Body and Expression 
 When Merleau-Ponty describes the body exercising powers of expression, we 
should hear “expression” in a broad sense.  It does not simply refer to expressing oneself 
through art, language, or even movement, though these forms are indeed included in the 
body’s powers of expression.  It calls on the expressive capacity of the body as such, in 
its being and doing, as a power of the body for conveying meaning and moving past 
itself, simply by virtue of the fact that our bodies realize and carry our existence (and we 
can think of “ex-pressing” in its sense of pushing or moving outward).  Merleau-Ponty 
describes the body as “a power of natural expression,”222 suggesting that its very 
existence is an expressive “act” or series of acts, signifying a sense in which it 
communicates what we are as human subjectivities.  He elaborates, “Now the body is 
essentially an expressive space. ... But our body is not merely one expressive space 
among the rest...  It is the origin of the rest, expressive movement itself, that which 
causes them to begin to exist as things, under our hands and eyes.”223  As such, the body 
is not one expressive object among others, but is the source of all our expressive 
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possibilities.  In saying that the body is expressive movement itself, he is characterizing 
the body as both the origin as well as the execution of such expression: the body, as such, 
is both the wellspring of expression and the act of expressing.  It is via the body that any 
further expressive acts – speaking, writing, dancing, etc. – find the condition of their 
possibility and the resources for their reality. 
 Let us take an example here to illustrate: again, let us think about the act of 
dancing.  While the body is the impetus, the motivation of the expressive desire to be 
enacted through dance, the body is also the instrument of the expression, and its patterns 
and movements are the expression itself.  The body is the origin of the expression – it 
harbors the expressive possibility within itself, felt perhaps as a desire or impetus to 
dance – as well as manifestation of expressive movement.  We can also think about a 
gesture as simple as a smile: in taking on this physiological “shape,” we might say that 
the body is expressing a certain emotion, but for Merleau-Ponty, the emotion is not 
antecedent to the expression.  Rather, in taking on this gesture, the body is experiencing – 
both “inwardly” and “outwardly” – a certain modality of feeling, one which is found in 
the context of our intersubjective world.   
 In this vein, it might be helpful to look at another claim Merleau-Ponty makes 
about the body’s expressive existence: its affinity to art.  He writes, 
 The body is to be compared, not to a physical object, but rather to a work of art.  
 In a picture or a piece of music the idea is incommunicable by means other than 
 the display of colours and sounds.  ...  A novel, poem, picture or musical work are 
 individuals, that is, beings in which the expression is indistinguishable from the 
 thing expressed, their meaning, accessible only through direct contact, being 
 radiated with no change of their temporal and spatial situation.  It is in this sense 
 that our body is comparable to a work of art.  It is a nexus of living meanings, not 
 the law for a certain number of covariant terms.224 
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With this comparison, Merleau-Ponty is thus casting the body’s expressive capacities, in 
a way, as inherent within the body’s very existence, similar to the way a painting or poem 
expresses its “idea” or its “content” by virtue of its “material.”  That is, the words of the 
poem are the poem, they are the material which constitute its existence, and their 
collection into a whole gives them an expressive power beyond their ability of expression 
standing alone; indeed, their collection into a poem creates this unique, individual 
“thing,” existing just as it is.  The colors of a painting on a canvas are simply that – a 
collection of interrelated colors – but their material existence gathers together and 
conveys a meaning that far exceeds their bare existence as colors on canvas.  As this 
particular painting, a new “nexus of meanings” is constituted, a center of significance 
emerges, and a certain possibility of seeing is opened up.  Likewise, the body’s 
interwoven parts and its interweaving with the world create a dynamic synthesis, which 
expresses its style by virtue of its being.  The body itself expresses existence – each body 
a particular style or variety of existence – and its existence is inseparable from its 
expression.   
 Likewise, as my body is expressive, so is it also receptive and sensitive.  Insofar 
as it is my body that perceives and to a large extent, organizes my interpretations of an 
environment, it is also through the body that I respond to my social world.  Merleau-
Ponty writes, “It is through my body that I understand other people, just as it is through 
my body that I perceive ‘things.’  The meaning of a gesture thus ‘understood’ is not 
behind it, it is intermingled with the structure of the world outlined by the gesture, and 
which I take up on my own account.”225  As such, the interactions we have with other 
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people are also, to a large extent, carried out by bodily understandings and 
interpretations.  In giving the example of watching someone gesticulate violently while 
angry, he claims that understanding these gestures is not a matter of inference or 
deduction that this person is experiencing anger; rather, one realizes, viscerally and 
directly, that one is witnessing anger.226  To return to the earlier point about the body’s 
understanding, this is a case in which the body’s understanding matches the body’s 
expression: insofar as one is expressing anger, an interlocutor reads this expression with 
the body as well.   
 
The Body, Transcendence, and Agency 
 In the chapter titled, “The Body as Expression, and Speech,” Merleau-Ponty 
devotes a good deal of explanation to describing how new meanings can enter our body’s 
repertoire, which also signifies the body’s ability to continually acquire new habits and 
patterns, to modify itself in new ways.  Similar to the ways that learning new words or 
new bodily gestures can open up a new pattern of understanding for us, he claims that 
this capacity – while reliant on the existence of habit – is one of the ways our bodies 
transcend themselves, changing and evolving and moving beyond their own boundaries.  
He writes, describing how acquired meanings must have at one time been novel:  
 We must therefore recognize as an ultimate fact this open and indefinite power of 
 giving significance – that is, both of apprehending and conveying a meaning – by 
 which man transcends himself towards a new form of behavior, or towards other 
 people, or towards his own thought, through his body and his speech.227 
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In this passage, Merleau-Ponty is calling attention to several things: first, that the power 
of attributing significance to things (both understanding and expressing meanings) is 
open and indefinite; that is, that it presents a possibility that can always grow and evolve 
in our lives.  Second, that this power of giving meaning is one of the ways in which 
human beings transcend themselves – that is, move beyond ourselves, toward others, 
toward our physical and social environments, towards our own modes of thinking, 
towards a new form of behavior or practice,.  Transcendence signals that primordial 
capacity that allows us to be directed toward things outside ourselves; it is what enables 
our contact with and engagement in the world.  Moreover, this kind of transcendence 
occurs through one’s body, in that it is our existence as realized in the body that allows us 
to extend ourselves beyond it.  As such, it is largely through the mechanics of my body’s 
interaction with the world and with others that my ability to take on new meanings is 
presented to me, as well as how I am able to understand myself and my own capacities 
anew.  Specifically, part of what characterizes this interaction is subjectivity’s ability to 
transcend itself, which it does via its embodied situation.  What this highlights is that we 
are not trapped within our bodies and minds but move within the world and with other 
people, as part of our constitution.228  As such, this ability to transcend ourselves and 
                                                
228 The phenomenon of transcendence, while expressing part of what Merleau-Ponty 
often refers to as “typical” or “normal” patterns of consciousness and behavior, is at 
times contrasted with individuals experiencing conditions of physical or psychological 
limitation or disability.  Indeed, some of Merleau-Ponty’s critics have singled out this 
element of human life, in that its experience varies vastly between populations and 
individuals and can be seen to characterize how some groups of people experience 
oppression.  Iris Marion Young’s “Throwing Like a Girl” is a case in point, as she 
deploys resources from Merleau-Ponty as well as Simone de Beauvoir in articulating how 
women in a patriarchal society often experienced their transcendence as “ambiguous.”  
See “Throwing Like a Girl,” in Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist 
Philosophy and Social Theory (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 148-153.   
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make contact with our worlds is what allows us to experience our purposes as existing in 
the world, as being carried out through time and with others. 
 In the chapter titled, “Other Selves and the Human World,” Merleau-Ponty 
describes the communication between the body and the world:  
 I have the world as an incomplete individual, through the agency of my body as 
 the potentiality of this world, and I have the positing of objects through that of my 
 body, or conversely the positing of my body through that of objects, not in any 
 kind of logical implication, ... but in a real implication, and because my body is a 
 movement towards the world, and the world my body’s point of support.229 
 
As such, Merleau-Ponty articulates the agency of my body as the potentiality of this 
world, this world which I have as an incomplete individual and which I rely on as 
support.  But what does it mean to experience the agency of my body as a potentiality of 
my world in my own incompleteness?   
 We might begin by recalling the fact that any and all possibilities we have or 
experience, Merleau-Ponty reminds us, are through the vehicles of our bodies.  As such, 
we might begin by saying that the agency of my body is simply a manifestation of the 
potentials of my world.  Moreover, it is the body’s agency that situates a world around it, 
or situates itself within the world, insofar as he describes positing objects through my 
body’s agency, or conversely, as my body’s positing itself via the objects around it.  In 
any case, he articulates the intimate interweaving between the body and world, insofar as 
my body moves toward it and the world is its support.  In this way, we can articulate a 
better sense of the body’s agency as potential in and of this world: the body, as the 
realization of our existence, as expressive space through and through, is thus also the 
bearer of our agency, as a part of its potentials of moving-toward or realizing itself in its 
                                                
229 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 408, first emphasis in original, second 
emphasis mine. 
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world.  Furthermore, in feeling one’s embodied subjectivity as transcendent, that is, as 
able to reach into the world and act as an agent among others, she experiences and 
expresses her agency as a thoroughly embodied capacity.   
 Another way we see this kind of concept in Merleau-Ponty’s work, while not 
often described as agency, may be in his use of the idea of transcendence.  In “The Body 
as Expression, and Speech,” Merleau-Ponty discusses how words and gestures have their 
meanings not in the phonetic utterance of a word, nor its written sign, nor in the bare 
physiological motion that might constitute a gesture.  Rather, these things have meaning 
because of the place they occupy in a shared world of expression, a world with 
experiential meanings that have developed into cultural ones.  He writes, 
 The meaning of the gesture is not contained in it like some physical or 
 physiological phenomenon.  The meaning of the word is not contained in the 
 word as a sound.  But the human body is defined in terms of its property of 
 appropriating, in an indefinite series of discontinuous acts, significant cores which 
 transcend and transfigure its natural powers.  This act of transcendence is first 
 encountered in the acquisition of a pattern of behavior, then in the mute 
 communication of a gesture: it is through the same power that the body opens 
 itself to some new kind of conduct and makes it understood to external 
 witnesses.230 
 
This passage shows more clearly how transcendence operates; if transcendence is seen in 
the acquisition of a pattern of behavior, or a habit, this is because the body’s ability to 
appropriate cores of significance has taken up one of these such cores, such that this new 
set of meanings has transfigured – rearranged, renewed – the body’s modulations of 
being.  A new pattern of meaning has found a place for realization and expression; a habit 
is acquired in that something which transcends – goes beyond – my body’s “natural” 
abilities has been incorporated into precisely those “natural” abilities; in a sense, 
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awkward though it sounds, they have become natural.  We can link this back to his claims 
about the body as expressive: insofar as the meaning of a painting or poem, while 
contained in its “material,” transcends that material existence, the body’s ability to 
convey meaning and incorporate new meaning exemplifies this transcendence.  My body 
enacts transcendence not only in moving towards the world and towards others, but 
insofar as my body’s capacities include the possibility of modification and renewal 
according to new circumstances, it also transcends itself towards its own existence.  In 
this way, we can cast transcendence as significant for experiencing embodied agency in 
that the intentions one forms call for a conduit of becoming actions, and we can 
characterize transcendence as one of the ways in which purposes become realized in the 
world, through the embodied subject’s ability to move beyond itself.    
 In concluding his book, we see Merleau-Ponty make another gesture in 
highlighting the body’s central role in human life, which we might extend to the 
experience of agency.  In describing his life, as a psychological and historical structure, 
operating through a certain style, exercising freedom by means of these structures, he 
writes, 
 For this significant life, this certain significance of nature and history which I am, 
 does not limit my access to the world, but on the contrary is my means of entering 
 into communication with it.  It is by being unrestrictedly and unreservedly what I 
 am at present that I have a chance of moving forward; it is by living my time that 
 I am able to understand other times, by plunging into the present and the world, 
 by taking on deliberately what I am fortuitously, by willing what I will and doing 
 what I do, that I can go further.231 
 
Here we see a more explicit statement about the conditions of our life and the way in 
which our actions might carry a profound sense of purpose, for ourselves and perhaps far 
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beyond ourselves.  We must exist as we are such that we can move forward, we must take 
up ourselves and our time such that we might have a shot at understanding them, let alone 
changing them.  While not mentioning the body explicitly in this passage, it should be 
evident that any of Merleau-Ponty’s references of this sort include the existence of the 
body as a central phenomenon within this life we take up, this psychological and 
historical structure that we are, in understanding and best moving forward with ourselves; 
in taking on deliberately what we are fortuitously.  In translating the contingencies of our 
lives into sources of action, we must recognize that, given to the world in our bodies and 
communicating with it through them, we can best take up our fortuitous existences in 
recognizing their real, actual characteristics.  I am arguing here that a significant manner 
of taking up these characteristics is by understanding how the body is the “home” of our 
living potentials of agency, and as such, agency extends deeper into our experience than 
being a rational or purely intellectual faculty.  Rather, it articulates a sense in which we 
experience the potentials our embodied lives present us with, and thus, I believe it 
constitutes a powerful wealth of resources for thinking about growth.  If consciousness is 
not originally an “I think” but an “I can,” we might do well to consider how the “I can” is 
experienced through felt, embodied being.  And in order to understand how the “I can” is 
experienced through embodied being, not to mention how the “I cans” of individuals 
differ from one another, we might glean from phenomenology how to listen to the 
testimonies and the nuances of the “I can” such that we might help them develop into 
their richest potentials. 
 Moreover, listening to such testimonials in developing potentials of agency 
requires that we attend to the felt qualities of our and others’ embodied experiences.  This 
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draws on the fact that agency is an embodied capacity, but also on the fact that the 
experience of agency is part of the felt sense of any given experience, and such felt 
senses are experienced through our bodies’ embeddedness in relationships with our 
worlds.  As such, agency develops as a felt sense of capacity, of the feeling of ability in 
understanding oneself and one’s situation such that one might be a capable actor within 
it.  This does not arise from one’s cognitive faculties alone, but through the embodied 
contact one has with a situation.  What Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment helps us 
recognize, with respect to embodied agency as this kind of felt capacity, is not just the 
way in which it emerges out of situational contexts and is perceived through them, but 
also the way in which our bodies are the conduits or vehicles for that agency.  They are 
the expressive spaces we inhabit and transcend, giving us the resources for enacting and 
cultivating our agency as living beings.  In giving careful attention to this reality of 
human existence, Merleau-Ponty also gives us resources for listening more carefully to 
our bodies’ expressive agencies and attending more carefully to those of others around 
us; and indeed, this might be seen as part of his goals with phenomenology, describing 
the nuances of embodied experience such that we might do the same, and in doing so, see 
our worlds anew. 
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CHAPTER V 
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, AND CARE OF THE SELF: 
CONDITIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF EMBODIED AGENCY 
 
 
Why Foucault? 
 
 At this point, we have looked at the work of Dewey and Merleau-Ponty on 
embodiment, habit, and agency as part of a reading of Deweyan growth.  In the last 
chapter, we saw that Merleau-Ponty’s ideas about the body as expressive and subjectivity 
as transcendent articulated ways that agency is rooted in the body’s movement and 
intentionality, but also how this entails ways that embodied subjectivity moves beyond 
itself and forward into the future.  As such, we were looking at agency from a somewhat 
“interior” or first-person perspective, working with descriptions of how agency is felt, 
experienced as a certain quality of potential and possibility within lived experience.  At 
this point, we will take up a perspective that might loosely be characterized as the 
opposite of the previous one: we will be looking at one manner of how conditions of 
agency are influenced from the “outside,” so to speak.232  In taking up the work of Michel 
Foucault, we will be looking at how his analyses develop accounts of embodied 
                                                
232 While I believe that language of interiority and exteriority is, at bottom, insufficient to 
characterize these modes of experience, as all experience is overlaid by multiple 
influences whose “sources” are not one or the other, and indeed, the separation of the two 
is spurious as well, I use these terms to put into relief the different approaches that these 
thinkers emphasize and ways that each contributes something meaningful to a picture of 
embodiment.  Indeed, part of what Merleau-Ponty emphasizes is the extent to which 
humans are a combination of the “natural” and the “manufactured,” and Foucault is clear 
that part of how “outside” forces work is through the degree to which they are 
experienced as “interior” ones.  Nonetheless, while the distinction suffers from this 
ambiguity, I struggle at this point to find a clearer manner of characterizing the 
differences in approach that each perspective offers. 
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subjectivity through the genealogies of particular domains of human life.  His 
genealogical method targets particular aspects of life – e.g., sexuality, psychiatric 
medicine, and state punishment – and performs a particular kind of history with respect to 
them.  To take the example of punishment and the prison system, Foucault’s genealogies 
examine historical records and documents which detail the practices and policies of this 
kind of institution (with this example, he begins in seventeenth century Europe), 
following certain practices and what they entail about the subjectivity of those implicated 
in them.  In tracing out the continuities and discontinuities in this history, he discovers 
themes which reveal something about the subject in this picture, and in particular, points 
at which a change in practice signals that something is shifting about the way this subject 
is conceptualized.  I will take up this example in more detail, but here I simply want to set 
out a little regarding Foucault’s approach, and emphasize that what his method targets is 
the development of situated subjectivities over time.  For each domain of life he takes up, 
a different kind of body-subject is revealed, and this body-subject, like the domains it 
arises within, reflects changes over the course of its existence, in relation to its context. 
 In terms of my project as a whole, what this perspective adds is a particular 
account of how subjectivities – and significantly, embodied subjectivities – are produced 
through the environments in which they live and act; it thus provides a sharper edge to 
the social side of Dewey’s emphasis on growth as an educational aim.  In a way, Foucault 
can be read as taking Dewey’s naturalistic paradigm about the human being as an 
organism in an environment and pushing it to a certain extent, reading the role of 
“environment” in a thoroughly historical-cultural way.  Foucault’s genealogies aim to 
reveal the extent to which our bodily habits and practices both construct and carry 
 168 
forward historically-emergent cultural meanings, despite the fact that many of these 
practices or meanings may not be evident to us.  That is, we may acknowledge that a 
particular practice means something, but we might not be aware of how such a practice 
came to mean the particular thing attributed to it, insofar as we “assume” that certain 
practices or meanings are a “natural” part of what human beings are or how they 
operate.233  Foucault, rather, aims to develop a story of the history of certain practices and 
meanings, showing how our modern subjectivities and enactments of bodily life are 
products of our cultural and historical present.  Thereby, one can argue that Foucault’s 
work not only shows the contingencies of many cultural phenomena, but that doing so 
can be a first step in articulating how the oppressiveness of some cultural practices might 
be changed, since there are no cultural absolutes; according to his genealogies, no 
meanings about human life are etched in stone in a metaphysical sense, but are 
developments pertaining to the cultural and historical context in which they arise.  
Moreover, showing the historical contingencies behind a certain contemporary practice or 
meaning might open up possibilities for crafting a different social reality, for oneself, 
one’s community, and that community’s future.   
 But in order to show how Foucault’s work does this, it will be necessary to 
articulate several other elements of his perspective.  First, his conception of subjectivity 
differs from the consciousness-based view of Merleau-Ponty, and while it has some 
comparable elements with Dewey’s notion of the body-mind, a discussion of what 
embodied subjectivity means for Foucault will form the first section of this chapter.  
                                                
233 I put these terms in scare quotes because part of what Foucault highlights is that many 
of these assumptions may not even be realized as such; many are latently held, 
unarticulated or unformalized beliefs of a culture, which have become so normalized as 
to operate largely without notice. 
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Within this section too, I will outline some of Foucault’s terminology, in particular his 
conception of power, as it is necessary for understanding his approach to genealogy and 
his perspective on embodied agency.  Second, I will articulate what Foucault means by 
“discipline,” as a phenomenon within human practice with some similarities to Deweyan 
habit, that characterizes repeated action as both a constraining and enabling capacity 
within embodied subjectivity.  Third, I will take up Foucault’s later work on care of the 
self, askesis, and practices of freedom, as these pose a distinctive approach to an 
articulation of agency within his work.  Specifically, these elements are important for 
setting up his emphasis on self-transformation in this later work, which I will argue can 
be likened to Deweyan growth.  The upshot of this perspective, I will claim, is that self-
transformation poses a situated, self-aware, embodied, and practice-oriented approach to 
changing one’s self and sometimes, one’s relationship to her community, and as such, 
presents a helpful addition to thinking about educational growth as involving the 
development of a felt sense of agency. 
 What I hope to incorporate with the addition of Foucault’s work is a perspective 
that acknowledges the situated, social character of the conditions of embodied agency, 
but also one that recognizes how such conditions might be modified.  Such modifications 
might occur on relatively small scales, but his work, in my reading, performs steps that 
are necessary to uncovering the interconnected and often unarticulated character of 
embodied subjectivity in relation to complex social organizations.  Specifically, his 
earlier work on discipline and the construction of subjectivity emphasizes the historical 
conditions by which subjectivity is characterized, and thus, this work highlights the social 
and cultural conditions that influence and inform many of our potentials for agency, 
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including our conceptions of it.  His later work, while developing a conception of ethical 
subjectivity along a different line of emphasis, highlights ways individuals might relate to 
themselves and others in ways that foster possibilities of transforming oneself, thus 
emphasizing the expansion of agency possible within one’s situated existence. 
 I would also like to stipulate here that the reading I offer of Foucault is a 
particular, though not unshared view.  While some readers of Foucault view his work as 
articulating the vast extent to which contemporary life is thoroughly determined by social 
forces, nearly (or completely) eliminating the possibility of genuine agency, I read 
Foucault as offering a stark diagnosis for many aspects of life, which might then be taken 
up into the task of living our lives meaningfully.234  While these critical readings stem, 
understandably, from the fact that his work emphasizes the extent and depth of cultural 
influence on many of our most personal beliefs and intimate practices, I believe, 
following thinkers like Ladelle McWhorter, Margaret McLaren, and others, that his 
analyses offer such a penetrating picture of cultural influence in order to pose the 
question to the reader of how one is to act, knowing the extent of such influence.235  
                                                
234 Michael Walzer’s critique is an instance of attacking Foucault’s political theory for its 
failure to provide a coherent constructive alternative vision of social life or values 
resulting from his critique of disciplinary society.  See “The Politics of Michel Foucault,” 
in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy (New York: Basil Blackwell, 
1986), 51-68.  Nancy Fraser’s critique is an analysis of Foucault’s rejection of humanism, 
claiming that his neglect in promoting an ethical alternative for contemporary life leaves 
his rejection unjustified.  See “Michel Foucault: A Young Conservative?” Ethics 96, no. 
1 (1985): 165-184. 
 
235 Ladelle McWhorter’s book takes up critiques of Foucault’s work, arguing that his 
critical project does create resources for others to craft their own projects of 
transformation and empowerment, based on an understanding of their social milieu.  See 
Bodies and Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of Sexual Normalization (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1999).  Margaret McLaren likewise finds positive resources in 
Foucault’s work for feminist theory and empowering conceptions of embodied 
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Additionally, recent work by Vincent Colapietro, Colin Koopman, and C.G. Prado 
conducts fruitful comparisons between Dewey and Foucault, around the themes of 
improvisation and the cultivation of freedom, the constitution and development of the 
self, and critiques of modernity, respectively.236  
 
Subjectivity and the Body 
 To begin, we might say that Foucault’s conception of subjectivity is an 
historically and socially situated one.  Subjectivity does not occur in a vacuum.  
Following this premise, one way to approach Foucault’s conception of subjectivity is to 
follow his line of thinking with respect to one or another of his genealogical histories, as 
each of these unearths some form or facet of the subject and the patterns through which it 
constructs an identity.  Because Foucault’s analyses posit subjectivities as developing 
within and with reference to their cultural context, a context which contains huge 
numbers of diverse and sometimes overlapping domains of life, there is no singular, 
stable subject to simply describe or analyze.  Subjectivities emerge through participation 
in various domains of life, and thus can convey several “types” of meanings at once, 
emerging in different ways according to differing circumstances.   
                                                                                                                                            
subjectivity.  See Feminism, Foucault, and Embodied Subjectivity (Albany: SUNY Press, 
2002).  
 
236 Vincent Colapietro, “Situation, Meaning, and Improvisation: An Aesthetics of 
Existence in Dewey and Foucault,” Foucault Studies 11 (February 2011), 20-40; C.G. 
Prado, “Educating the Self: Dewey and Foucault,” in John Dewey and Continental 
Philosophy, ed. Paul Fairfield (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2010), 
174-193; Colin Koopman, “The History and Critique of Modernity: Dewey with Foucault 
against Weber,” in John Dewey and Continental Philosophy, 194-218. 
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 In mapping out a Foucaultian notion of subjectivity, then, it will be helpful to 
think about some of the types of subjectivity that he studies: while he explores areas as 
diverse as sexual, religious, civic, medical, and psychiatric subjectivities, I will focus in 
this chapter on two facets of subjectivity that Foucault’s work takes up, disciplinary and 
ethical subjectivity, in order to articulate some of the defining features of the modern self 
as described in his work. To be clear, it is not just that varying types of subjectivities 
emerge with respect to their cultural contexts, but the category of subjectivity itself 
emerges as a cultural-historical phenomenon.  Thus, the various facets of subjectivity that 
emerge are illustrations of some ways it has emerged.  However, before explaining the 
details of Foucault’s conceptions of subjectivity, it will be helpful to clarify some of his 
terminology, as it is important for understanding both his method and the frames in which 
he analyzes his subject matter. 
 First, Foucault uses the term “power” in a particular way: he rejects the view that 
power is a one-dimensional and one-directional force, operating from an authority or 
institution that has control and exercising its mandate “downward” onto a populace.  This 
image of power is too simplified and univocal to explain how power operates in 
contemporary cultural settings.  He asserts that power is everywhere, in that it is a 
dynamic operating within relations of people, being exercised from multiple points onto 
multiple points within any given network, and that individual subjects, as well as 
authoritative bodies, are indeed “bearers” of power.  He insists that power can only be 
exercised in relations; that power can only be manifested or used over another who also 
contains power and can offer resistance or mutually enforcing power, as otherwise, such 
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power would be ineffective and basically, false.237  Foucault also claims that power is 
productive – of certain modes of being, of certain collections of knowledge, for example 
– and is not simply repressive.  He insists: “We must cease once and for all to describe 
the effects of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it censors’, it 
‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’.  In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it 
produces domains of objects and rituals of truth.”238  In producing reality, domains of 
objects, and rituals of truth, power produces real effects that structure our world; it 
produces areas of knowledge that take certain phenomena as thematic for building a field 
of inquiry, and it produces practices and protocols that standardize and legitimize 
interpretations of such phenomena. Indeed, its workings constitute one of the 
mechanisms through which subjectivities are produced as components of these realities.  
One of the primary ways power is exercised within networks of individuals and 
collectives is, to work with another of his key terms, through exercises and practices of 
knowledge, hence his term, power-knowledge.   
 Power-knowledge signals the phenomenon occurring when operations of power 
function to develop particular, often highly specialized forms of knowledge, which then 
reinforce the power of the body who possesses this knowledge, effectively controlling or 
regulating the ways in which this knowledge is used.  Foucault writes, “power produces 
knowledge... power and knowledge directly imply one another; ... there is no power 
                                                
237 Foucault includes an exception here: in the case of what he calls “total domination,” 
there is an exercise of power towards a person or populace with absolutely no 
possibilities of resistance or counteraction.  Such cases would be ones of abject slavery or 
certain forms of physical imprisonment, in which the oppressed person(s) literally has no 
option other than capitulation; that is, in cases of total domination, even choosing one’s 
own death is not a live option. 
 
238 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 194.  
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relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge 
that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.”239  An example 
of this can be seen in the development of prisons and the increasing dimension of 
“inwardness” of punishment, as penal institutions in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries gradually developed practices aimed more at “correcting” the prisoner’s soul 
than brandishing and displaying the prisoner’s tortured body.  As particular domains of 
life, such as state-run disciplinary measures, develop specialized knowledge around the 
efficacy of particular penal practices, the types of criminality they observe in their 
populace, the means of understanding and evaluating such types, the means of 
incarcerating, monitoring, and treating such types, etc., they can then exercise this 
knowledge via their positions of power by exercising certain practices within their 
institutions, aimed at achieving a specific result from their population.240  In short, the 
term power-knowledge does not claim that power and knowledge are the same thing, but 
that in contemporary society, power and knowledge are often tightly interwoven within 
specialized networks of meaning, operating in mutually reinforcing manners with respect 
to one another, and are often codified into domains of life – like medicine, punishment, 
etc. – such that their meanings come to be experienced as “natural” or normalized truths.   
 Last, the idea of “games of truth” is an important concept in Foucault’s analyses.  
He uses this term to refer to knowledge practices that purportedly reveal truths to us; they 
                                                
239 Ibid., 27. 
 
240 One of the clearest forms in which this kind of treatment emerges is seen in Foucault’s 
analysis of the Panopticon, the physical structure of a prison (and later, hospitals, 
barracks, and schools) which imbues the space of its subjects with possibilities of being 
monitored at all times.  The result, via disciplinary practice, is that individuals 
“internalize” the implications of this space and, believing themselves always seeable, 
always monitorable, monitor and regulate themselves. 
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are interlocking networks of ideas that operate as truths within certain areas of 
knowledge.  For example, in much of Greek antiquity, Foucault explains, truth was not 
available to every individual; rather, truth was withheld for an elite class who underwent 
certain practices of the self, which were part of the work of attaining knowledge and 
achieving truth.  For example, such practices might include daily reflection or meditation, 
fasting, or renunciation of earthly attachments.241  He claims that with Descartes and 
Enlightenment thinkers, truth is now “available” to all who endeavor to investigate with 
their own perceptions and abilities – truth is now operating under a different set of rules 
and with different contexts of access; the “game” has shifted to allow more participants, 
and as such, the meanings of the truths in the game likewise shift.  The (ordinary) subject 
comes to be a prominent part of the network of truth, as the being who knows, with 
powers given to all such subjects by the “natural light,” who can conduct scientific 
inquiries on his or her own merits, who has access to knowledge and truth simply through 
occupying a different place in a different game of truth.  In short, the sets of rules, 
contexts, modes of access, and modes of work required to attain truth signal the varying 
ways that knowledge can operate as truth in the context of a given “game,” or a given 
domain of experience with “truth-content;” that is, a domain in which truths have an 
impact on our understandings of ourselves and our environments.242   
                                                
241 Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in Ethics: 
Subjectivity and Truth, vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New York Press, 1997), 
288. 
 
242 Foucault’s choice of the term “games” for these networks of practices and truths is 
indeed a peculiar one.  He clarifies that his use of this idea is not meant “in the sense of 
an amusement,” but “a set of rules by which truth is produced.”  Importantly, these rules 
and productions lead to results that are considered “valid or invalid, winning or losing” 
(Ibid., 297).  As such, his choice of this term highlights the fact that these games produce 
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 Seeing ourselves as ethical individuals is another such example: the domain of 
ethics contains a vast number of such truths, operating in relation to each other such that 
we find ourselves occupying a place within it, understanding ourselves by virtue of our 
place within it.  What these truths are, though, and the ways they relate to each other, 
show dramatic changes over time.  The thrust of this idea is that, like subjectivities 
emerging with respect to the contexts governing different domains of life, truths emerge 
as similarly situated and contingent realities. 
 What these terms help to set up are the frames through which Foucault conducts 
his genealogies, the lenses through which he analyzes the emergence of particular 
characteristics of subjectivity.  In claiming that there is no singular, static subject, that 
subjectivity is constructed via the various domains of life we find ourselves in, we thus 
come to be subjects because we are subject to the meanings, demands, proscriptions, and 
practices of these domains.  For example, part of what Foucault’s History of Sexuality 
volumes show is how we are “defined” as sexual subjects by the types of sexual practices 
we engage in, the partners we choose to engage in these practices with, the types of 
relationships we have with these partners, the identifications that are associated with 
these partners and practices, the meanings, spaces, and communities associated with these 
identifications, and so forth.  Moreover, these definitions and identifications largely 
revolve around the modes of discourse that organize, interpret, and codify the related 
practices and interpretations.  We come to experience ourselves as these particular 
subjects due to the way we occupy a position within (or outside) the ways these practices 
are schematized within the spectrum of possible sexual experiences, and we come to 
                                                                                                                                            
winners and losers, those who are privileged and disenfranchised by the games’ dictates, 
despite their contingency (which Foucault’s earlier work is at pains to show). 
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know our position via the ways we confess or divulge our sexual practices and desires to 
a particular authority.  These authorities, such as the church, medical, or pedagogical 
establishments, have particular systems of knowledge and discourse organized to 
comprehend and codify such behaviors, and thus such establishments, in understanding 
behaviors and individuals in codified ways, offer avenues of self-understanding based 
around these codifications.  In this offering, we are given channels through which to 
“understand” and interpret our own behaviors, giving us – often without our knowing 
participation – manners in which to conceptualize our own subjectivities, venues through 
which we build relationships to ourselves.  For example, the labels “heterosexual” and 
“homosexual” signify more or less stable identities associated with sexual practices and 
partnerships.  The identities exist in the discourse, and so contemporary subjects work 
within it to identify themselves as sexual subjects (or be identified by others), including 
those who reject this binary and work to create practices and identifications that move 
beyond it.  As such, these labels – and their rejection – provide avenues through which 
we come to understand and relate to ourselves, our desires and practices, and our 
communities and societies. 
 Similarly, the element of discipline in our society operates such that we can be 
understood as disciplinary subjects, insofar as we define our relations to ourselves by 
codes of behavior that operate in various cultural spheres and areas of knowledge, 
regulating our activities according to the interpretations of these knowledges.  For 
example, institutions of schooling operate by the establishment of particular spaces, 
schedules, practices, and codes of conduct, and not only do these proscribe the behavior 
of its participants (administrators, teachers, students, parents or guardians), they impart 
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norms of understanding these individuals; as authorities might view individuals through 
the lens of the institution’s codes, individuals are also “invited” to view themselves in the 
terms of the institution’s practices and aims.  Moreover, we regulate ourselves through 
the “gaze” these codified knowledges exercise on our activities, using the internalization 
of this gaze as a constant form of self-supervision and self-correction in order to conform 
to standards or comport ourselves in intelligible ways.  I will take up the role of discipline 
in its construction of the embodied subject in more detail later, but I include this brief 
description here to signal an important facet of how subjectivity operates for Foucault.  
Because discipline is significant for constructing subjectivity as we know it today, it is an 
important part of understanding the motivations and compulsions behind other elements 
of subjectivity.   
 In Foucault’s later work, his focus turns to another dimension of subjectivity, now 
looking at the ethical subject, the subject who constructs a relation to herself via the lens 
of moral life, in particular, the moral life of her culture and community.  In other words, 
she is as an ethical subject insofar as she experiences her relation to herself as subject to 
the ethical mores, authorities, conventions, and practices of her culture, including the way 
those mores and practices influence her relationships with others.  Foucault’s view of 
ethics more broadly is concerned with this element of subjectivity in particular, in that 
one has or creates a relation to herself through the things she does (or does not do), vis a 
vis what her community and culture predominantly does (or does not do), in terms of 
what considered is right, wrong, appropriate, productive, etc.  As such, Foucault views 
ethics – the relation to oneself – as one part working beneath a larger umbrella of moral 
life.  Another important part of morals is the moral code operating in one’s culture, which 
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addresses matters of behavior, norms of conduct, and so forth.  In this way, there are 
several significant features of one’s ethical identity (and these features are consistent with 
analyses of subjectivity generally speaking, for Foucault): one, it is always situated with 
respect to her environment and situation, her intersubjective existence and her 
relationships with others; two, it is always under revision, via the ways her conduct is 
subject to the scrutiny of others and herself, and is linked with her identity as a whole.  
 I should include a further clarificatory note here.  While Foucault discusses 
characteristics of the ethical self that he finds in writings from antiquity, this does not 
mean he anachronistically imposes subjectivity onto these historical figures.  This could 
be seen as problematic, given that the subjectivity he analyzes in his earlier genealogies is 
a distinctly modern development. Foucault’s work on the concern with the ethical self in 
antiquity examines ways in which individuals related to and made sense of their own 
conduct and their own senses of self, soul, or personhood.243  For Foucault, this is also 
one element of a larger schematic, as he analyzes ethics through a four-fold structure.  
This includes: (1) an ethical substance, or the part of oneself that is subject to ethical 
demands (this could be soul, desire, will, intentions, etc.); (2) a mode of subjection, or the 
way in which individuals are incited to recognize moral obligations (demands of reason, 
divine law, etc.); (3) a manner of working on the self, or “self-forming activity,” 
(reflection, meditation, ascetic practice, etc.); and (4) a telos, what individuals aspire to 
be via ethical practice (pure, immortal, self-mastered, etc.).244  Using this structure as a 
                                                
243 I acknowledge that each of these terms might be problematic as well, but use them for 
lack of a better term at the time. 
 
244 This four-fold ethical relation to self is outlined in “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” in 
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, vol 1, 263-267.  However, I am grateful for Arnold 
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genealogical tool, Foucault examines the ethical practices of antiquity, claiming that 
while manifestations of each of these elements might vary across cultures and epochs, it 
functions as a means of analyzing the kind of ethical demands that individuals 
experienced themselves as beholden to and the practices they developed to achieve them.  
Most of my attention in taking up this work will focus on the third element, the ascetic 
practices of self-forming (and self-transforming) activity.   
 As such, Foucault’s aim in these analyses is to see how individuals experience the 
relationships they have with themselves, via their contexts and the demands therein, and 
this project can be read as continuous with his earlier work; both show elements of how 
individuals develop relations to self through engaging in certain practices, forms of work, 
and forms of reflection.  In my view, however, the later work is not trespassing on his 
earlier developments of subjectivity, but rather, examines a similar phenomenon – 
relation to self – in the recognition that the conditions of these relationships are structured 
by different conditions than those emerging in the modern era.  Moreover, one might say 
that Foucault’s looking to antiquity for clues about the relations to self established there 
constitutes a particular instance of postmodern subjectivity working on oneself: seeking 
the historical trajectory of one’s culture to better understand the conditions of one’s 
present self.  
 In interviews with Foucault late in his career, we see this picture of the ethical self 
in clearer terms.  In a 1984 interview published under the title, “The Ethics of the 
Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” while discussing practices that fall under the 
heading of “care of the self” in Greek antiquity (a significant element of ethical practice 
                                                                                                                                            
Davidson’s clarifying summary of this structure in “Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics” in 
Foucault: A Critical Reader, 228-9. 
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of Greek culture), Foucault explains his rejection of positing a subject as the basis from 
which to begin philosophical inquiry:  
 What I rejected was the idea of starting out with a theory of the subject ... and, on 
 the basis of this theory, asking how a given form of knowledge [connaissance] 
 was possible.  What I wanted to try to show was how the subject constituted itself, 
 in one specific form or another, as a mad or a healthy subject, as a delinquent or 
 nondelinquent subject, through certain practices that were also games of truth, 
 practices of power, and so on.  I had to reject a priori theories of the subject in 
 order to analyze the relationships that may exist between the constitution of the 
 subject or different forms of the subject and games of truth, practices of power, 
 and so on.245 
 
There are several telling descriptions in this paragraph, which are helpful for seeing 
Foucault’s views of subjectivity.  First, the subject is not a substance: it is not a thing, an 
unchanging essence or presence within the individual, it is not some kind of core or 
nucleus around which all other elements of individuality circulate.  It is not something 
given prior to having knowledge; rather, it emerges in relation to varying contexts and the 
knowledges operative therein, which then shape its contours.  It is not unified or acting as 
a centripetal force in the various dispersions of our engagements, it is not a ground from 
which our lives arise or a ghost hiding in the back of the machine, organizing its inputs, 
outputs, and actions.  It is multiple in its very “existence” and it is not really an existing 
thing; it is a manner of relating to oneself that emerges through the relationships we 
experience in our social-cultural worlds.  Foucault continues to describe the subject as a 
form, not a substance, and its form is shaped by the context in which one is acting and the 
character of the relationships that take place in that context.  For example, while it is the 
same individual that might go to a political meeting and then go to a doctor’s office, 
because these contexts are shaped by different purposes, different networks of power and 
                                                
245 Foucault, “Ethics of Concern for Self,” 290. 
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knowledge, different practices of conduct, and so forth, the relationship she experiences 
to herself in these instances is not the same and thus the subjectivity (or selfhood) she 
expresses in these contexts is not the same.  This expresses Foucault’s belief that 
subjectivity is a matter of context and relationship; that the operative meanings in a 
certain context are what determine the kind of relationship you cultivate with yourself, 
the dimension of subjectivity you experience at that time.246  And this is not some kind of 
inauthentic cow-towing to authority or simple conforming to convention either; this is a 
part of how we comport and conduct ourselves differently according to the demands and 
knowledges of varying domains.  
 Second, in refusing the idea that the subject is an unchanging inner self but is a 
flexible network of relations, Foucault also stresses the thoroughly historical character of 
any kind of subjectivity.  Because the subject does not occur in a vacuum, any sense of 
subjectivity is inextricably constituted by the social and cultural norms and practices of 
one’s existence.  Importantly, however, this is not to say that the subject is stripped of all 
agency in being socially constituted through and through, or being merely a confluence of 
external forces, despite the fact that some of Foucault’s critics read him this way.  It is, 
however, to stress that the manifestations of my subjectivity, or the collective ways in 
which I live my life and reflect on myself, arise in response to my historical situation, my 
cultural context, and my immediate community.  Foucault writes, “I would say that if I 
am now interested in how the subject constitutes itself in an active fashion through 
practices of the self, these practices are nevertheless not something invented by the 
                                                
246 This “fragmentation” of the subject occurs along bodily lines also, for Foucault.  This 
is to say that because it is a different subjectivity (a different relation to self) that emerges 
in say, a political meeting and a doctor’s office, there are different bodies that correspond 
with these subjectivities. 
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individual himself.  They are models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, 
suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group.”247  Thus, 
the practices of my daily life, the manners in which I reflect on my conduct and identity, 
the ways in which I aim to fashion myself creatively, are responses to the models that 
exist in my world.  This is also not to say that the subject is void of creativity or inventive 
power, but it is to say that such creative expressions and experimentations are situated 
within the cultural context of one’s historical present.248 
 Moreover, it is important to stress that the subject, constituted by its relations to 
various domains of life, is not done so in an abstract or purely theoretical way.  The 
subject creates itself in and through the practices it undertakes and the ways these 
practices are viewed, used, and reflected upon within the domains they occupy.  For 
example, in his analyses of ethical practices in Greek antiquity, Foucault finds writing as 
a recurring theme in reflecting on and documenting the self.  There were, he claims, 
several methods of writing by which individuals took stock of their actions, thoughts, and 
intentions, often with the thread of ethical development and self-cultivation as their focus.  
This is one example of a practice of the self, demonstrating its construction in active 
realities, not just in a theoretical network of symbols or coded knowledges.  He explains, 
                                                
247 Ibid., 291. 
 
248 Charles Scott clarifies this point also, here regarding the creation of the subject via 
desire: “We thus note at the beginning that the subject of desire, i.e., a specific way in 
which an individual relates to himself or herself, is not structured primarily by desire or a 
force of will, but by a circulation of powers that emerges as individuals are formed 
relative to desire within given cultural circumstances. The subject takes its form of 
movement from cultural problems that have to be faced because of the values and 
purposes that are found in the relations at hand” (“Foucault, Ethics, and the Fragmented 
Subject,” Research in Phenomenology 22 (1992), 113, author’s emphasis). 
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“It is not just in the play of symbols that the subject is constituted.  It is constituted in real 
practices – historically analyzable practices.”249  Thus, it is not just in the dynamics of 
theory and interpretation that the subject is constituted, but in the exercises of living 
itself; these exercises, however, always take place within the bounds of a reality that is 
suffused with theories and interpretations, regardless of whether or not they are 
consciously present.  Interacting with networks of abstracted meanings, the subject 
constitutes itself through the activities it undertakes, the results of these undertakings, and 
the spaces created by these results.250  This mutual construction, according to Foucault, 
takes place at a huge variety of levels in contemporary life.  This is how we come to 
experience ourselves as mad or healthy, as delinquent or non-delinquent, as acting and 
                                                
249 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 277. 
 
250 Edward McGushin applies Foucault’s analyses of subjectivity to examine the 
subjectivities of philosophers, those individuals who perform these abstract 
deconstructions of the subject.  He writes, of the situation in contemporary academia, 
including the daily rigors of study, teaching, writing, conferences, committees, 
publications, etc.: “The processes, practices, relations, and discourses that give rise to and 
maintain this situation are what determine the modern philosophical subject and they are 
the setting within which the critique of the subject takes place. The subject, then, is not 
something produced at the level of theory and it is not something that exists at the level 
of consciousness, rather it takes shape at the material level of bodies and practices. … 
These practices create the experiential space within which we become available to 
ourselves and to each other as subjects of action and knowledge and as objects of 
knowledge and control. This space is not some sort of static, neutral container … that we 
exist within and observe objectively, but rather it is a dynamic space shaped by the 
processes, activities, and relations that unfold through or in it – we constitute this space 
when we engage in the practices of philosophy by which we are constituted as 
philosophers” (“Foucault and the Problem of the Subject,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 
31, no. 5/6 (2005), 642-3, author’s emphasis).  In this way, the practice of philosophy as a 
particular domain of power-knowledge that “plays” a particular game of truth is 
constituted precisely by the practices of those who engage its rules: philosophers.  On the 
reverse side, it is the space and the domain of philosophy as a professional practice that 
governs the conduct, activities, and comportment of philosophers, when conducting 
themselves deliberately and publicly as philosophers.  The subjects create the space, and 
the space in turn creates the type of subjects that occupy it. 
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thinking ethically.  We occupy these varieties of cultural space, creating ourselves as mad 
or healthy, delinquent or not, by virtue of how we occupy the spaces which determine 
these subjectivities, how we act within the games of truth that operate in these spheres. 
 In terms of these constructions occurring through practices, it is important to note 
that the way subjectivity is experienced is always bound up with the way the body is 
experienced, for Foucault.  Because subjects develop in the context of their culture and 
the various domains of life they engage in, bodies can be be seen as the “points of 
contact” by which the subject “ingests” or “in-corporates” the norms of the culture.  In 
brief, whenever we consider subjectivity in Foucault’s work, the body is always also at 
issue, as subjects are always body-subjects; similar to how, for Dewey, “mind” or “body” 
always implies their union, body-mind.  For Foucault, it is often the body and its 
practices, its doings and undergoings, its enablements and its constraints (including those 
it puts on itself) that are the most salient features of a given domain (its “analyzable 
practices”), and the body’s uses, controls, and relations to identity are thus also at issue in 
addressing facets of subjectivity.251  Take disciplinary practice in the penitentiary, for 
example.  Foucault’s genealogy of prison practice demonstrates how punishment 
                                                
251 Despite the fact that both Dewey and Foucault emphasize the active elements of self 
or subject construction, I add a cautionary note here that this does not entail that their 
conceptions of the body-mind and the body-subject are identical.  Foucault’s conception 
of the body-subject is a far more fractured perspective on what constitutes a “self;” in 
emphasizing the contingencies surrounding each manifestation of subjectivity, one might 
say that a singular self and a singular body are fictions in his view.  Dewey’s union of the 
body-mind, while stressing the relationship between these two elements of human 
existence, does not reflect the same ontological fragmentation that Foucault’s perspective 
does.  While this difficulty may ultimately make their conceptions of the self or subject 
rest on differing (and potentially irreconcilable) metaphysical presumptions, a more 
thorough analysis of the issue would take the discussion away from my focus here.  My 
emphasis in putting them in dialogue is to show the extent to which practices construct 
the kinds of “bodies” and “selves” we are; and as I read his later work, Foucault presents 
some powerful ways to think about agency within this construction. 
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transitioned from abusing and displaying the bodies of criminals in the public sphere to 
the “correction” of their souls through rigid, monitored practice, with punishment aimed 
less at the body and more at the offenders’ inner life.  However, the mechanisms for this 
shift all concern bodily practice, though less overtly and publicly than the torture that 
preceded it.  Instead, inmates operate by a regulated schedule, occupy small and regulated 
spaces, move according to the institution’s dictates, and so forth.  Foucault explains, 
“even if they do not make use of violent or bloody punishment, even when they use 
‘lenient’ methods involving confinement or correction, it is always the body that is at 
issue – the body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution and their 
submission.”252  Thus, while the body is no longer the explicit target of punishment, it is 
nonetheless still at the center of the operation of treatment, and this theme is seen 
throughout Foucault’s genealogies.   
 Despite the fact that the body may not always be at the forefront of a particular 
practice, institution, or intended goal, such practices and goals can only take place 
through the body and its productivities, and many institutions are constructed in 
particular ways in order to maximize – or at least, regulate – the body and its 
productivities.  This takes us to a particular character of embodied practice, at work in 
punishment, in schooling, and in myriad other forms of life: discipline.  While this will be 
the focus of the next section, I would like to close here by emphasizing that for Foucault, 
just as subjectivities and truths have histories and complicated interrelations with the 
domains of life and networks of power-knowledge operating in them, the case of bodies 
is no different.  Bodies are likewise historical, culturally-infused, and situated: as 
                                                
252 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 25. 
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McWhorter writes, “these bodies are not entities originating outside of power and outside 
of history.  They are historically constructed tools and targets of normalizing power.”  
But, she also stresses, with respect to her own body, that it has “‘a mind of its own,’ or at 
least ... a developmental course and power all its own.  And that changes things.”253 
 
Discipline and Agency 
 At this point, I will take up the issue of discipline in more depth, sketching out 
what this term means for Foucault as well as how it relates to embodied agency.  Briefly, 
while some critics read Foucault’s claims regarding discipline solely as a mechanism for 
social control and an instrument of normalization, I hope to show that while these 
elements are a part of how discipline functions, its purview extends beyond this 
interpretation.  Discipline, in my reading, also represents the mechanisms by which 
individuals and groups enact particular forms of agency, insofar as disciplinary practice 
presents avenues in which energy and intention can enable the execution of purposes.   
 In Discipline and Punish, Foucault’s focus begins with a genealogy of penal 
practices in 17th and 18th century Europe, tracing the shift from public, brutal corporal 
punishment to a focus on the interiority of inmates and an emphasis on the correction or 
rehabilitation of the soul of the accused.  Using this case of inmates in prisons, as well as 
soldiers and to a lesser extent, students, the book also traces movements outlining the 
growth of discipline as a mechanism that functions to create a certain kind of body, and 
in so doing, creates a certain kind of subject.  His analyses reveal that in defining the 
relationship between bodies and spaces, and between bodies and objects of manipulation, 
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a relationship between body and soul is also defined, resulting in an embodied 
subjectivity that uses discipline both as a means of relating to others and to one’s 
environment as well as relating to oneself.  As such, discipline emerges as a means of 
providing concrete avenues for crafting and refining relations to one’s body, one’s 
surroundings, one’s tasks, and ultimately, one’s sense of self and sense of purpose within 
this given environment, this particular domain of life.  To situate this discussion, I would 
like to note here that while the disciplinary subject in a prison or the military is less to the 
point of my project, Foucault’s analyses here are relevant for articulating what he means 
by discipline and how he characterizes disciplinary practice as part of modern 
subjectivity.  No less to the point is the way in which the effects of discipline are 
experienced by the body, showing how bodily engagements in social institutions have a 
profound effect on the forms of subjectivity that accompany them.254   
 The analysis of prison construction and the body’s presence and movement within 
it highlight one of Foucault’s main aims with respect to this study: unraveling the ways in 
which the body is regarded, conceptualized, and infused with power through their 
relationships with these structures and the regulating practices which take place in them.  
In tracing the historical emergence of practices that target their effects on the soul of the 
prisoner instead of just his body, Foucault seeks to discover if this shift “is not the effect 
of a transformation of the way in which the body itself is invested by power relations.”255  
In articulating ways that the body might be “invested by power relations,” Foucault is 
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seeking to expose ways in which practices not even explicitly targeting the body are still 
mechanisms for monitoring and controlling it, for regulating the types of relationships 
that one might develop to one’s embodiment.  Even if the investment is thus more subtle 
(prisoners no longer enduring public bodily torture), this does not necessarily mean it is 
any less thoroughgoing, insofar as the continued existence of inmates (and similarly, 
soldiers and students) is sustained by the operations individuals and groups learn to 
practice in their daily lives.  In other words, taking on routines of daily activity, exercise, 
movements, engagements, tasks, etc. provides a framework in which bodies and subjects 
become accustomed to a certain type of productivity, and they become accustomed to 
such productivity in a certain kind of space.  They become disciplinary subjects insofar as 
their bodies and souls become objects of disciplinary practice: body-subjects that can be 
measured and evaluated with respect to the disciplinary procedures at play in that 
institution.   
 By way of example, I will explain this phenomenon with respect to military 
training, using Foucault’s descriptions of documents detailing the training of European 
soldiers from the seventeenth century.  These documents, under Foucault’s analysis, 
describe how the soldier’s movements, being regulated to the finest precision, transition 
one from being a “peasant,” an ordinary (male) body, into having the stature and air of a 
soldier: “posture is gradually corrected; a calculated restraint runs through each part of 
the body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning silently into the 
automatism of habit.”256  Through exercise, structured life, and repetition of activity, he 
gains strength and refinement with respect to routinized movements (such as marching 
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and handling a rifle); he controls his body and maintains a readiness to engage it in 
proscribed ways.  He disciplines it, refines it, habituates it to these forms of practice: he 
develops the body of a soldier.  But of course, these refinements and habituations are not 
according to his own definitions or proscriptions.  The soldier adopts these practices 
insofar as they are prescribed by his military training – a socio-political entity that 
operates with certain sets of knowledge and practices of power.  The soldier’s body, at 
once “docile” insofar as it is malleable, moldable according to these demands, as well as 
disciplined insofar as it is strong, capable, and refined according to these demands, thus 
provides a touchstone for how disciplinary practices get literally incorporated into our 
lives and how powers are manifested in our bodies’ workings. 
 Foucault describes bodies as “docile” in terms that are not terribly far from 
Dewey’s; Dewey describes the young as educable because their body-minds are 
characterized by both immaturity and plasticity, that is, the capacity to grow and the 
malleability to take on characteristics of training.  Similarly, Foucault calls the “docile 
body” one “that may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved,” also calling 
disciplines the “methods…which made possible the meticulous control of the operations 
of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a 
relation of docility-utility.”257  As such, bodies are docile because they are transformable, 
and bodies take up disciplines to regulate, refine, and channel that docility into particular 
avenues of use (ironically, often increasing its docility through discipline, insofar as 
increased discipline can make bodies increasingly able to transform anew).  Thus, 
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docility is the condition for discipline, and discipline enables bodies and subjects to 
funnel the potential of a capacity into practiced powers of skill and art. 
 Thus, discipline has a dual characteristic, not unlike Dewey’s characterization of 
habit.  Discipline can be used in the service of social control and indeed, of oppression, 
and it can also be used in the service of social emancipation and positive transformation.  
Because it has both of these possibilities within its potential, it will be necessary to 
discuss each of these in turn, and particularly, why I wish to emphasize its transformative 
potential.  Part of what is significant about discipline is the fact that it acts as a creative 
force, a productive force, in terms of fashioning bodies into having particular powers and 
skills.  As such, bodies can be made to accord with a particular design, as we see with 
Foucault’s soldier, and this design can be deployed to further the interests of a particular 
social or political power, again, as we see with the soldier.  In terms of its capacity to 
dissociate power from individuals in this respect, Foucault writes,  
 Thus discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies.  
 Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and 
 diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience).  In short, it 
 dissociates power from the body; on the one hand, it turns it into an ‘aptitude’, a 
 ‘capacity’, which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of 
 the energy, the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict 
 subjection.258 
 
In this way, the disciplinary subject develops as a set of particular powers, through 
particular uses of his or her body, which are regarded as aptitudes and capacities by an 
outside party; in this regard, the capacities which inhere in the subject are used to 
function as terms of the relationship between the individual and the disciplining 
authority, and can be extrapolated from the individual and used only in terms approved 
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by the outside party.  For example, the soldier gains remarkable skill and precision with a 
rifle; and part of the way this disciplinary power works entails that such skill and 
precision must also only be deployed in ways that the military authorities prescribe.  For 
Foucault, all of these skills and all of these relationships are matters of discipline.  It is in 
this way that discipline takes on the character of being a “political anatomy” in his 
work;259 discipline is the mechanism by which we understand ourselves and structure our 
activities (thereby, giving structure to our selves) with reference to the larger social, 
cultural, and institutional powers operating in our worlds.   
 However, also like Deweyan habit, discipline is a mechanism by which we gain 
needed and empowering capacities in the course of our daily lives.  While on one hand, it 
is the means by which the military crafts an ordinary individual into a soldier, largely to 
serve its own purposes; on the other hand, it is also at work when children learn to read 
and write, when students raise their hands in the classroom, when a pianist executes a 
delicately wrought sonata.  All such practices are also matters of discipline, insofar as 
individuals and groups, through participating in some structured, repeated practice or 
another, gain capacities of bodily subjectivity.  Thus, disciplinary practice cuts both 
ways: it trains and develops, gearing individuals toward specific kinds of productivity, 
and the direction and use of such productivity depends largely on the contexts in which 
the training and development occur.  As such, discipline can and does manifest in 
oppressive, disempowering fashions (e.g., students in schools enduring the “straightjacket 
and chain-gang” procedures Dewey discusses in Democracy and Education), just as it 
can and does manifest in empowering, agential fashions as well (e.g., students taking up 
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an inquiry or practice according to patterns they have learned in class).  The thrust of this 
point is that discipline, like habit, is a part of growth; though like Dewey’s critics worry, 
discipline can work in directions that decidedly do not empower persons.  In sum, as 
Foucault claims, “[d]iscipline ‘makes’ individuals”260 and such making is very much a 
matter of context, of social organization and the authority regulating its practice, of 
political transparency and the (purported or actual) purpose of particular tasks and 
activities, and of the experiential application of the skills it imparts and the ways in which 
individuals have freedom in relating their powers to these broader factors. 
 To clarify, Foucault posits that bodies are suffused with disciplinary practices in 
many domains of life – penal systems, military systems, and school systems are just 
examples where the implementation and effects of discipline are relatively salient 
features of the institutions themselves.  But part of what the effects of discipline entail are 
that bodies and subjects are always bound to different aspects of political life in one way 
or another, specifically, in that bodies relate to larger social spheres through processes of 
normalization.  This is not to say that bodies become disciplined according to the dictates 
of a political sovereign, nor that their politicization means they are completely 
subservient to political forces.  It is to say that discipline is one of the mechanisms 
through which individuals and groups are normalized with respect to one another, and 
especially with respect to the dominant parties within any power-knowledge network.  
However, what this means is that while people have the potential to re-inscribe and re-
entrench existing political practices and cultural meanings, they also have the potential to 
resist and re-interpret such practices and meanings.  Again, just as discipline imparts and 
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develops powers and capacities, it can oppress or it can empower, depending on context, 
transparency, and the degree of freedom in the direction of its uses and expressions.261   
 This description, sprinkled with comparisons to Deweyan habit, raises the 
question of how Foucault’s conception of discipline differs from habit, especially in 
terms of what my emphasis on embodied agency gains from this perspective.  There are 
certainly many points of comparison between Dewey and Foucault on these matters: 
habit and discipline both articulate patterns of repeated activity which lead to patterns of 
development, through which individuals and groups “become who they are” in a sense. 
Interlocking habits constitute character; discipline “makes” individuals.  Both are 
acquired and subject to historical, cultural, and social determinations, and they share the 
structural similarity of providing channels for productive activity, relieving the actor from 
having to invent responses to situations every time a new circumstance emerges.  Thus, 
both can also provide meaningful conduits of self-understanding; both are infused with 
the powers and knowledges of social historicity, and thus both habit and discipline are 
subject to oppressive patterns and empowering possibilities.  Given the extent of this 
similarity, what makes Foucault’s account distinctive, and helpful for my reading?   
 One differentiation, though a minor one, is simply the contemporaneousness of 
Foucault’s account.  More than half a century separates the two, meaning that certain 
elements of Foucault’s reading are more relevant to contemporary circumstances of 
embodied subjectivity, agency, and education.  However, the biggest benefit for this 
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project comes from merging his analyses of discipline with the forthcoming discussion on 
practices of freedom and self-transformation.  His analysis of disciplinary power provides 
a lens through which individuals and groups might become more self-aware, more 
cognizant of social and political powers and oppressions, more conscious of how the 
current dynamics structuring their lives are the products of complex social histories.  In 
this vein, when it comes to students and their experiences of embodied agency, I believe 
that Foucault’s account of discipline can offer tools in terms of understanding the 
historical present and manners in which discipline, oppression, and agency are largely a 
matter of our culture’s treatment of embodied life.  This is one point on which I think 
Foucault’s account adds a sharper edge than Dewey’s, and thus, can be helpful in terms 
of understanding the conditions of one’s agency and the myriad ways in which the body 
is implicated in it.  For example, the question of students sitting at desks for large periods 
of the day, having their movements monitored and their bodies hemmed in by hallways 
and classrooms, moving place to place according to a strict timetable and a bell signaling 
the breakage of time, might be read through a disciplinary lens, revealing how students’ 
bodies adapt and conform to those spaces and structures.  Notwithstanding attitudes that 
dismiss the value or presence of their bodies conveyed through content, the regulating of 
embodiment through the physical and temporal structures alone might be seen as a 
diminishment of what kinds of movements, and thus, what kinds of meanings are 
possible in schools.  Limiting possibility in this way separates the body and life one 
experiences in school from the body and life one experiences elsewhere; a separation of 
the kind Dewey would lament.  A part of what this separation teaches students, however, 
is that while in school, you operate according to a certain disciplinary practice and adopt 
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a certain kind of (docile) embodiment: you sit at a desk, you raise your hand, you stroll 
through hallways, you take up tasks as they are assigned to you.  In separating off this 
subjectivity from those experienced elsewhere, and particularly in experiencing one’s 
school-subjectivity as inhibiting or restrictive, students can also develop and reify the 
separation between learning and being active, experiencing pleasure, and developing 
meaning.  As such, the bodily subjectivity developed in schools is one which students 
may feel particularly divorced from, which they quickly disconnect with at the end of the 
school day, in favor of a subjectivity with more pleasure and possibility to offer them.  
 However, I believe the empowering effects of Foucault’s analysis might be most 
powerfully felt when combined with his later work on care for the self, practices of 
freedom, and especially, self-transformation, as these present potentials for taking up 
disciplinary practices with the perspective of enacting and cultivating one’s embodied 
agency through them.  In this way, Foucault’s account can add productively to Dewey’s 
work on habit and a conception of growth as agency, insofar as self-transformation 
presents an approach and orientation to growth that acknowledges the disciplinary 
practices shaping one’s present, as well as the embodied and agential character of taking 
up projects of growth as expressions of one’s freedom, of one’s agency. 
 
Care of the Self, Askeses, and Self-Transformation 
 The theme of transformation in Foucault’s work stems from his interest in the 
development of subjectivity in antiquity and some of the practices that were evident in 
how individuals related to themselves, understood themselves, and conceived of self-
cultivation.  His studies emphasize the theme of self-cultivation and transformation in 
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terms of the work one must do in order to attain to a transformed state of self, which his 
reading claims is also a requirement for subjects to prepare themselves in gaining access 
to the truth.  However, in my view, his focus on these ideas extends beyond this historical 
interest alone.  In what follows, I will take up some of Foucault’s later work (often 
referred to as his ethical work) in outlining how he treats the themes of transformation 
from the texts of antiquity he analyzes.  As such, material from the interviews and essays 
in Ethics vol. I: Subjectivity and Truth and The History of Sexuality vol. 3: The Care of 
the Self will form the primary basis for this discussion.  In taking up these themes, I will 
address what Foucault means with the phrase “care of the self” and how he reads this idea 
through antiquity.  I will then address how askeses, or practices of transformation, are 
seen to be a part of this care, as well as how what Foucault terms “practices of freedom” 
are a part of this conceptual network.  Last, I will link these ideas to the overarching 
theme of self-transformation, showing how this theme can be seen to articulate an aspect 
of embodied agency that takes up the disciplinary character of practice discussed above.  
In short, this element of Foucault’s work highlights the embodied and practice-oriented 
character of agency as a felt, experiential quality of existence that takes place within a 
historically situated social context, and as such, I believe it can provide helpful additions 
to accounting for the conditions of agency that operate as a part of growth.  I read 
Dewey’s growth and Foucault’s transformation as sharing similar goals of conducting 
one’s life so that continued growth, continued transformation, or expansion in the 
possibilities of knowledge, agential action, and fulfillment from experience are a central 
part of life’s projects.  In this way, I believe Foucault can provide a more concrete sense 
of how growth is experienced as a situated yet open set of possibilities than does 
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Dewey’s account, and that his work on transformation shows how the body’s practices – 
while imbued with meaning from without – can be empowering pivots of action and 
change.  Thus, while I begin this section with a brief exposition of care of the self, I do so 
in order to situate the theme of self-transformation in Foucault’s work, as my ultimate 
goal in incorporating this set of ideas is to articulate a sense in which self-transformation 
might be a supplement to thinking about embodied growth, particularly in the context of 
education.   
 In these later texts, Foucault draws on material beginning from Plato and his 
contemporaries and leading up to Christian spiritual texts from the 4th and 5th centuries of 
the Roman empire, thus taking up a large swath of literature covering Greco-Roman 
philosophical and spiritual practice.262  Typical to his style of genealogy, he examines 
continuities and discontinuities in the progression of these texts, here with the focus on 
the kind of ethical subject at issue in these discourses.  Foucault’s study thus takes up 
ways in which the individual relates to himself and conceives of himself as concerned 
with ethical principles and practices.  This emphasis on the self, however, is not to say 
that ethics in this period concerns the self as its only matter or as the sole locus of ethical 
sensibility.  The emphasis on the self is a product of the documents as well as Foucault’s 
investigation: because his focus is on the question of subjectivity – that is, the 
conceptions of the human self and types of self-understanding operative over time – 
much is made of the practices that articulate what the self is and articulate what kind of 
work the self must do in order to achieve its “highest” being.  However, it is clear that 
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this subject is not creating itself in isolation; a certain kind of subjectivity is emerging in 
the context of a certain kind of intersubjectivity.  Thus, while much is made of the focus 
on self-cultivation and self-transformation, these are significant emphases insofar as they 
attune and prepare individuals for life most broadly considered: relating to oneself, living 
in their communities, able to mind their affairs effectively, and so forth.  Indeed, much is 
made of the relation one has to oneself insofar as that relation informs and impacts the 
relations one has with others, often emphasizing others in one’s care. 
 In “The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” an interview 
conducted in January of 1984, Foucault articulates the idea of care for the self (epimeleia 
heautou) as an ethical precept, saying, “in antiquity, ethics as the conscious practice of 
freedom has revolved around this fundamental imperative: ‘Take care of yourself.’”263  
He continues to explain this ethical precept (in this interview and elsewhere) as operating 
in conjunction with the more often-cited ethical mandate of Greek antiquity: “know 
thyself.”  However, while today, Foucault notes, we tend to construe “know thyself” as 
the fundamental demand for self-knowledge such that one can know her limits, avoiding 
impiety and hubris, Foucault claims that “know thyself” originally functioned as a 
correlate to caring for the self.  It does not appear as a very emotionally-inflected care or 
concern, but as a mode of relating to oneself, such that one can understand oneself and 
understand how to best conduct oneself in his or her affairs; in a way, care leads to 
knowledge of self, but knowing oneself is not the primary injunction.   
 It is important to note that this care for the self is not specifically concerned with a 
singular type of attitude or an approach of tenderness toward oneself; it is not the same 
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kind of self-compassion one might think of today in terms of self-care.  It was, to use 
Foucault’s terms, a problematization of relating to oneself – identifying one’s relation to 
oneself as a theme of analysis and concern – that emphasizes practicing and exercising a 
care for the self.  As concerned with one’s ethos, or the mode of one’s being and behavior 
with respect to the modes of being and behavior of one’s community, Foucault explains 
that “extensive work by the self on the self is required for this practice of freedom to take 
shape in an ethos that is good, beautiful, honorable, estimable, memorable, and 
exemplary.”264  Thus, concern with oneself, as concern with one’s ethical bearing, 
including the character of her interactions with her community as a critical component of 
understanding one’s life, requires extensive work: practices, disciplines, and processes of 
transforming oneself in order to continually craft this ideal ethos.  Again, while the focus 
often centers around the relation one builds to oneself in this regard, this relation is 
informed by and reflected in the relations one has with others.  As such, care for the self 
is a foundational practice of caring for and relating to others.   
 Foucault claims that for the Greeks, care for others should not be put before care 
for oneself, insofar as the relationship with oneself is ontologically prior to relationships 
with others.265  However, while this claim may be problematic, insofar as both 
ontologically and ethically the relationships we have with others may arguably have 
either an equal or more significant status than the relationship one has to oneself, the 
premise regarding care for oneself does not remove the question of relationships with 
others or see these relationships as insignificant.  Moreover, insofar as the concept of an 
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antecedent self, existing prior to its relations, came to be a part of how the self was 
conceptualized later, we can see roots of the ontology of the “autonomous” self in this 
claim.  And if the relation to oneself exists prior to relations with others, then it follows 
that maintaining a level of care for this relationship ought to come first, and Foucault 
explains that caring for the self was seen as an ethical practice in itself.  However, this 
care also “implies complex relationships with others insofar as this ethos of freedom is 
also a way of caring for others.”266  Claiming that this care for others extends through 
one’s household but also into the community and one’s friendships, Foucault highlights 
the fact that care for the self requires the assistance and support of relationships, 
especially with those one learns from, saying, “Thus, the problem of relationships with 
others is present throughout the development of the care of the self.”267  Foucault clarifies 
further that an entire community of individuals who care for themselves and others, but 
see their relation to themselves as a necessary foundation for taking care of life’s affairs, 
might be envisioned as a well-functioning, well-interconnected, flourishing polis.268   
 It is also somewhat unsurprising that the question of freedom and thus, also the 
question of care for the self, was not a universal question for the ancient Greeks and 
Romans.  Foucault is candid about the fact that free individuals in this period were elite 
men with the means and access to such practices (i.e., they had time, money, status), and 
were concerned with their lives – their bodies and souls – as well as their public ethos 
and social standing.  Thus, it is clear that freedom in this context implied, in addition to 
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ontological freedom, the conditions of not being a slave and not being a woman, and this 
may be a part of why such freedom was examined and made an object of concern: such 
freedom was not simply given to everyone, it was not a condition of all lives.  As such, 
for those with access to it, it was problematized in that it was made an object of concern 
and a positive theme of one’s life, so that it might be practiced at its fullest, or most 
ethically rich extent.  Such an extent, in this period, however, still did not imply the 
inclusion of marginalized others into the sphere of freedom’s possibilities.  While this is 
an important issue to acknowledge with respect to the care for the self and askeses that 
were a part of this care under Greco-Roman antiquity, I wish to note that Foucault 
straightfowardly recognizes these facts in his analyses, acknowledging the limitations of 
who such freedom applied to and how this influenced its conceptualization; however, he 
proceeds to focus his course with respect to how such care and such practices were part 
of creating a certain kind of ethical subjectivity.269  Thus, with respect to my own project, 
I wish to acknowledge these serious drawbacks of using these ideas, and I am not 
certainly advocating that we take them up in order to recreate or mimic the same kind of 
ethical selfhood; this would be a rather absurd and impossible suggestion.  Rather, I take 
up Foucault’s analysis of these ideas in order to think about the theme of self-
transformation, which he gleans from these texts and elaborates on in his perspective, 
especially emphasizing its embodied character.  As such, I want to explore ways it might 
enhance a sense of embodied agency, and in order to show this, it is necessary to outline 
the ways in which Foucault arrives at this theme.270   
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 As such, in terms of the current discussion, the biggest upshot of the premise of 
caring for the self is what it entails: the work involved in executing this kind of care, the 
pursuits one undertakes in order to cultivate oneself.  These pursuits range widely, 
including some extreme public measures, but many – and arguably, more – of these 
practices are everyday undertakings such as meditation, reflection, writing, fasting, etc., 
and sometimes the careful documentation of such dealings.  However, the significant 
thing here is that work is involved in changing oneself, in transforming one’s state so that 
one might ready oneself for a higher goal; for perfection of the soul, attaining to a 
spiritual truth, training for the hardships of life, preparing oneself for public life, and so 
forth.  Such practices are referred to in these texts as askeses (askesis as the singular, and 
in which we see the root of the word “ascetic”), which one practices with particular aims 
of self-transformation in mind.  In “Technologies of the Self,” when referring to 
traditions inaugurated by Stoicism, Foucault explains, “askesis means not renunciation 
but the progressive consideration of self, or mastery over oneself, obtained not through 
the renunciation of reality but through the acquisition and assimilation of truth.  It has as 
its final aim not preparation for another reality but access to the reality of this world.”271  
Thus, unlike a self-denying (often religiously motivated) asceticism that despises the 
body and the material world it inhabits, the asceticism that Foucault emphasizes from 
these texts focuses on practices of self-cultivation, on techniques of examining one’s state 
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of body and soul and aiming for transformation via developments in these states.  He 
writes, of techniques of the self more broadly construed, another manner of describing 
meaningful, contextualized askeses in this network of ideas, that they “permit individuals 
to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on 
their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform 
themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or 
immortality.”272  Thus, while the goals of these practices vary, the common theme among 
the ways these askeses appear is the fact that they stress the importance of deliberate 
attention to “bodies and souls” in their connection to “thoughts and conduct, and way of 
being,” while aiming for transformations of those ways of being.  He describes further, in 
“The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom,” that ascetic practice in 
this approach, is “not ... a morality of renunciation but ... an exercise of the self on the 
self by which one attempts to develop and transform oneself, and to attain to a certain 
mode of being.”273 
 Furthermore, while these askeses are generally targeted towards transforming 
one’s being or one’s soul, it is evident that concerns of the body play an important role in 
these practices.  Not only are sexual practices a significant part of this care – and for 
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(“Sexuality and Solitude,” in Ethics, 177). 
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Foucault, an important touchstone of historical continuity/discontinuity, making it 
significant genealogically – but the daily routines, activities, diet, and fluctuation of 
energies are also attended to and recorded in many of these exercises.274  While Foucault 
explains that some of them convey an “ambiguity” with respect to the body and its role in 
processes of self-cultivation, he also claims that in the records of these practices and 
techniques, “all the concerns of the body take on a considerable importance.”275  Thus, 
while we see the body emerge as a site of ascetic practice and self-care in these ancient 
texts, we see this concern emphasized further in Foucault’s own reading of these themes 
(which will be taken up in more detail in the following section). 
 Finally, these practices of the self, askeses aiming for self-transformation, being a 
significant part of ethical life and an important activity in attaining to the truth, are 
especially relevant when it comes to spiritual, intellectual, and often, educational matters.  
In Foucault’s tracing of this concept, he claims that it arises in earlier texts in connection 
with pedagogy (in Plato’s Alcibiades in particular) in that care of the self sometimes 
emerges out of need to due “the deficiencies of education;”276 care of the self is needed to 
correct the bad habits and false opinions learned from others (including “bad teachers”) 
and to “unlearn” such habits is an important task of self-cultivation.277  Foucault explains, 
however, that this connection between care of the self and pedagogy wanes over time, 
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Foucault explains that many of his letters take account of minute experiences, feelings, 
and issues of the body throughout the day, including emotions and states of being brought 
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and that the later texts of his research display an ethical concern with oneself that 
stretches through one’s entire lifetime, rather than one stressed more heavily in youth.  In 
these texts, instead of emphasizing this care as simply a part of maturing, the care for 
oneself, practiced through askesis, becomes a constant preoccupation that one is never 
too young or too old to leave need of.  In a description sounding nearly parallel with 
Dewey on education, Foucault describes the view that “Attending to oneself is therefore 
not just a momentary preparation for living; it is a form of living.  ...  it becomes a matter 
of attending to oneself, for oneself: one should be, for oneself and throughout one’s 
existence, one’s own object.”278  Thus, as we hear echoes of Dewey in the background, 
claiming that education is not the preparation for a rich and fulfilling life, but is such a 
life, we can begin to outline resonances between the care for self and the aim of 
transformation with the projects and processes of Deweyan growth.   
 Moreover, another connection we might find here is through an idea that has 
already been evoked: the sense in which freedom is a practice, and that there are certain 
practices of freedom that take freedom itself up as an issue, with the aim of fostering and 
enhancing its own existence and its own expression.  This is a concern that Foucault 
articulates in this work on antiquity, but it comes to be a part of his thinking about ethics 
and freedom more generally speaking.  Though I concede that it was not a condition 
available to all persons in the history he examines, and in different ways, it is clearly still 
not available to all equally today.  If we still wish to cast ourselves as free individuals, 
and especially, if we want our students to experience themselves as free individuals, how 
might we think about conducting this practice, in contemporary terms?   
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 Foucault responds to this set of concerns in an interview, asking, “what is ethics, 
if not the practice of freedom, the conscious practice of freedom?”  He explains further, 
“Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics.  But ethics is the considered form that 
freedom takes when it is informed by reflection.”279  As such, ethics requires freedom, 
but freedom then takes shape as ethics when it is practiced in a conscientious, reflective, 
and one might add, agential way.  And one of the important ways this ethics takes shape, 
for Foucault, is through the active transformation of self, the taking up of one’s freedom 
so that the experiences and expressions of one’s life might always be welcoming change, 
and so that the conditions and possibilities of one’s life, and the life of her community, 
might find moments of opening, of shifting towards new horizons.  In this way, though 
the conditions of freedom are still not equally available to all today, processes and aims 
of education – as growth, as agency – might be thought of as a part of working toward 
more opportunities for students, especially those marginalized by current networks of 
power and knowledge.  Incorporating insights gleaned from Foucault’s wok on care for 
the self and projects of self-transformation might be factors in accomplishing these 
results. 
 At this point, it might be helpful to pause and take stock of what we have gained 
from this perspective.  First, we can glean an account of agency from Foucault’s later 
work, one that is focused on seeing oneself as a project in the making, as a conduit of 
possible transformations.  In articulating a sense of agency in this way, I am departing 
from Foucault in a way, but not, I believe, in a way that departs from the spirit of what 
his work develops.  In seeing ourselves, on one hand, as individuals subject to a host of 
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social-cultural norms, we also have the potential of seeing ourselves as flexible nodes of 
those norms; places where those norms might be assessed, challenged, transformed.  And 
such transformations can take place because we can transform ourselves, transform the 
body-subjects that inhabit this particular socio-historical position.  I interpret this element 
of Foucault’s thought to lead us toward a sense of agency that resides in our potential – as 
embodied subjects – to develop our own responses to our cultural milieu.  Leading into 
the next point, these responses take place, one might expect, through embodied practices. 
 Part of what we gain from Foucault’s focus on akseses and self-transformation is 
the continued emphasis that transformation of self occurs through the concrete, lived 
practices we engage in.  What we might stress further from such practices, particularly 
those considered practices of freedom, is the way in which they enact and enrich our 
freedom by letting us feel free when we engage in them, allowing us to experience 
freedom as a condition that is particularly “alive” in such moments.  Without the 
cultivation of such a feeling of freedom or the felt sense of agency as a part of such 
practices, they are not likely to be very powerful or effective in having a transformative 
effect on our lives.  Rather, with a reminder from Johnson that all experience has a felt 
quality, what we can underscore from Foucault’s account is the way in which cultivating 
a relationship with oneself contains a felt quality as well.  One might experience 
frustration, anger, or inadequacy as felt elements of self-work, or they might experience 
joy, expansion, exhilaration, or openness as felt experiences of self-transformation.  As 
such, we might say that practices of freedom or projects of self-transformation may do 
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their “best work” when what they address is precisely this felt quality of self, and what 
they enrich is the feeling of agency in the conduct of one’s life.280  
 In this light, we might see practices of freedom as manners of taking up human 
freedom as a condition and enhancing it through engagement in certain kinds of activity.  
Such practices can take the shape of deliberately chosen undertakings, projects we design 
ourselves and take on as endeavors of enacting, and in many cases, increasing, the felt 
sense of freedom and possibility in our lives.  As such, I find it helpful to think about 
such practices as expressions of agency, and as we have seen through each of the primary 
thinkers of this project, such agency is a felt, experiential part of embodied life.  While 
such practices may be taken up in the context of a group or collective, they can be taken 
up as solo projects as well.  Moreover, while they may not always be consciously 
thematized as such in everyday experience, these practices can also be thought of as 
projects of self-transformation – they are akeses in that they are projects that aim, in some 
way, at changing a habit, incorporating a new practice, or following up a certain desire.  
At one point, Foucault claims that the “problem” he has been chasing throughout his 
intellectual life is his own transformation, noting that transforming oneself through one’s 
pursuits of knowledge is something like an aesthetic experience, asking, “Why should a 
painter work if he is not transformed by his own painting?”281  In this way, we see that 
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much of his intellectual motivation comes from pursuing such transformation, finding 
new ways of discovering how knowledge and engagement shape us, and how manners of 
relating to ourselves and our communities shift through such pursuits, through taking up 
new practices and disciplines.  Thus, thinking about Foucault’s perspective on 
transformation in this light, we can think about practices of freedom and projects of self-
transformation as continual modes of educating the self; and with each mode 
encountered, new potentials for transformation open up in increasing measure.  
 A few good examples of such projects appear in Ladelle McWhorter’s book, 
Bodies and Pleasures.  McWhorter describes several such practices that she took up upon 
moving to a new city and starting a new job.  She reports her first forays into gardening, 
country line dancing, and political activism, as each represents a new askesis in her life 
and each demonstrates different possibilities of expanding self-knowledge and embracing 
transformation.  With respect to gardening, McWhorter describes the washed-out, overly 
firm tomatoes she consistently found in her local grocery stores, thus inspiring her desire 
for fresh, ripe, good tomatoes.  Thus, cultivating this desire, she began planting seedlings 
in her yard, watching and waiting, patiently learning about what the plants “like” and 
“don’t like,” and over time, she learned a great deal about attending to the environment 
around her as well as about her own health.  An entirely new body of information opened 
up for her, as she knelt into the dirt every day, tilled up the soil with her hands, and began 
discussing her endeavors with others.  She describes the feeling of this transformation: “I 
could feel myself coalescing, becoming a part of a network of endeavor, spreading out, 
putting down roots.  A world was opening toward me, and I was starting to belong.”282  
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Her work – her bodily engagement with this project – thus lead to transformations not 
only in herself, but in her relation to her environment and community more broadly.   
 With respect to country line dancing, McWhorter was again urged on by a desire: 
meeting women after moving to a new city.  She began attending weekly dance classes at 
a local gay bar, then attending the bar’s country night regularly, slowly becoming more 
acclimated to the scene and more comfortable in her own body within it.  McWhorter 
describes the growing ease and joy she felt as she continued this project of dancing, 
discovering, again, a new bodily pleasure and a new type of satisfaction in engagement.  
This example also shows the way that this askesis, the taking up of a new bodily 
discipline, led her to participation in a new community as well as fostering the buoyant 
feeling of possibility in this aspect of her life.  Though she describes herself at the start of 
the practice as somewhat clumsy, she captures with revelry the evening when her 
persistence and practice paid off: “The dance just flowed through me.  I had it.  I knew it.  
And it wasn’t a matter of knowing how the dance was supposed to look.  I could feel the 
dance from the inside.  What I knew was what it felt like to be that dance.  It was 
absolutely exhilarating.”283  Again, we see her transformation as a particularly felt, 
thoroughly embodied experience, full of pleasure and possibility. 
 With respect to political activism, McWhorter describes her participation with a 
local group committed to challenging laws in her state that discriminate against gays and 
lesbians.  She describes this experience with pointed, visceral detail: the physical anxiety 
of meeting with legislators, the strength with which she and her group had to literally take 
a stand against inequality, and the significance it held that these politicians were forced 
                                                
283 Ibid., 171. 
 212 
to see them, face to face, body to body, in acts of political recognition.  While McWhorter 
describes this process as a kind of collective askesis, she marks the intense, bodily feeling 
of transformation as she and her co-activists pursue political change, developing a greater 
sense of agency in herself as a civic subject as well as fighting for transformation for her 
community.  She describes, 
 The act, the exercise, the practice of behaving as if I, a queer person, am a full and 
 equal citizen of this state and this country is the only way I will ever feel that I am 
 a full and equal citizen of this state and this country.  ...  I had to stand in close 
 proximity to a straight person in a position of authority and state my case before I 
 began to believe it, to truly live it, myself.  It’s not a piece of abstraction.  It’s a 
 bodily thing.284 
 
Again, she details not only the bodily participation, but the way in which such bodily 
participation transformed her felt experience of her own rights. 
 I spend this time with McWhorter’s projects of self-transformation because I 
think they show several important things about such undertakings: first, that each of the 
practices she takes up are markedly bodily activities.  Digging in the dirt and tending 
plants, dancing in a bar, and gathering with others and meeting with politicians all show 
examples of projects with particular ends other than bodily transformation, but which 
require bodily engagement in their enaction, and thus can entail significant 
transformations in bodily agency as a result.  Second, each of these projects involves a 
kind of continued education for McWhorter, especially insofar as education, on Dewey’s 
terms, is the kind of engaged and flourishing life of continual growth.  Gardening, 
dancing, and activism all provide sets of skills and sets of knowledge that allow her to 
expand her own experience of possibility, with respect to these endeavors and their 
results, but also, if it might be the case that one experience of “success” or flourishing 
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encourages her to take on others, then her sense of possibility may have been enlarged 
beyond her engagement in these projects alone.  Third, these practices are examples of 
askeses taken up both individually (gardening) and socially (dancing and activism), thus 
showing the breadth of what such projects might entail.  In each case, moreover, the 
projects are historically-culturally situated: growing one’s own tomatoes is a response to 
the imported, mass-produced agriculture that dominates the American food industry 
today; dancing is taken up with the intention of finding a community and, perhaps, 
romantic partners, and a bar with a local community is a predictable place for this to 
happen; activism is a collective response to the social-political climate that discriminates 
against gays and lesbians, and its forum is in a community-based group acting in concert 
to confront political actors.  Thus, the care with which she describes these practices, 
taking up Foucault’s rallying cry from History of Sexuality, vol. I of “bodies and 
pleasures” as the points of resistance and expansion of new political subjectivities, 
demonstrates how bodily askeses truly can prove transformative, both for one’s life and 
potentially for one’s community.  Furthermore, in describing these practices, McWhorter 
attends to the depth of feeling in each of these experiences, emphasizing the 
transformative potentials opened up through these practices and the feelings of possibility 
and power they impart.  She adds, “Caring for myself has led me almost always to risk 
myself, to explore, to attempt, to suffer, to expand, to grow.”285  McWhorter’s examples 
thus offer evidence of ways in which Foucault’s work can lead to a sense of agency, but 
that they often lead to a particularly robust sense of embodied agency, cashed out in its 
felt experiences. 
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Practices of Freedom, Self-Transformation, and Embodied Agency 
 At this point, it will be helpful to tie together the main ideas from the foregoing 
discussions.  If discipline is a part of the construction of embodied selves, and care for the 
self and askesis take us to practices of freedom and self-transformation, where do these 
ideas take us?  In short, I find the most significant upshot of incorporating this work on 
Foucault to be thinking about transformation as a corollary to Deweyan growth.  This is 
because Foucault’s emphasis on transformation, in my view, is about enacting agency in 
one’s life, as an orientation for taking up projects and articulating goals, and it 
acknowledges the disciplinary character of executing such projects.  That is to say, it 
recognizes that projects and aims of transformation take place within particular contexts – 
and all the social conditioning and historical influence these contexts may involve – and 
it highlights the use of disciplinary measures that one engages deliberately in order to 
achieve those goals.  It acknowledges the character of working, of engaging bodily with 
one’s tasks, in enacting changes in one’s life and in the life of one’s community.  
Moreover, Foucault’s characterization of transformation is about engaging one’s life such 
that possibilities are always expanding, such that transformations continually allow the 
enrichment of experiencing novelty and meaning in human life.  This runs parallel to 
Dewey’s idea of growth, insofar as growth is geared towards more growth, towards the 
expansion of possibility and the increasing potential of intelligence and freedom to direct 
one’s actions and pursuits.  What transformation adds to this picture is a way to see such 
growth as the deliberate taking up of practices that can enhance one’s agency, actualizing 
and enriching one’s freedom.  Such actualizations and enrichments, Foucault is always 
keen to stress, occur through the bodily practices people engage in.  But to flesh this out 
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more, I will address ways in which I see Foucualt’s work on discipline as helpful here, 
then turn to his work on askesis and self-transformation, articulating what I believe they 
add to Dewey’s concept of growth. 
 First, Foucault’s earlier work on discipline contributes a concrete sense in which 
subjectivity is an embodied and situated phenomenon, and shows that body subjects are 
largely products of their treatment by social and cultural life and the responses subjects 
have to such treatment.  Discipline is one of the primary ways that we engage in and 
participate with these cultural meanings and treatments, despite the fact that many 
disciplinary practices work “below the radar,” so to speak.  However, discipline, like 
habit, is a significant way in which we, as body-subjects, relate to the environing forces 
around us, and thus, is a significant way in which we relate to ourselves.  Emphasizing 
that this factor is a large part of our relation to self is one of the significant aspects that 
Foucault’s work highlights; it stresses not only that, like habit, such forces are large parts 
of our activity and direction of energy, but in addition, that such practices are very 
important for how we come to understand ourselves, insofar as we do so in the context of 
other institutions and powers making sense of our conduct.  Thus, when it comes to the 
concept of growth and the embodied reality of agency, I think that discipline is helpful 
insofar as it shows both the confining and constricting forces that act in our various 
domains of life, but also, in seeing the contingency of such forces, we might begin to 
develop new relationships with such disciplinary practices, and as such, develop 
disciplinary practices that better suit our purposes.  This is not to say that we can ever 
completely extricate ourselves from disciplinary powers, or from networks of power-
knowledge in general.  Insofar as these exist and have efficacy, we may not be able to 
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change them and often may not be aware of them.  But insofar as we can identify them 
and situate ourselves with respect to them, we might be able to change our relationships 
to them and our relationships to ourselves vis a vis those networks.  In this way, we can 
think about discipline as a potential mechanism for cultivating habits that promote 
freedom rather than oppression, and thus in turn can cultivate the feeling of agency 
within their practice.  McWhorter’s political activism is a good example of this: she was 
part of a movement that had to engage the disciplinary practices of the reigning policy 
structure in order to shift the very policies that structure implements.  Though this 
activism does not change the policies or the practices that surround them immediately, 
the confrontation with political forces as they operate is a first step in engaging social 
change.  Moreover, the fact that such changes are possible – and any landmark legislation 
regarding civil rights, women’s rights, and LGBT rights are evidence of how activist 
work can lead to change in social policy – shows how disciplinary practice can help us to 
enact such shifts in our lives, our subjectivities, and our communities.  This occurs in part 
due to individuals and groups acknowledging the social realities of their lives and 
developing askeses of transforming them, both enacting and enriching agential 
possibilities therein.  
 With respect to Foucault’s later work, we might think of carrying the positive, 
empowering elements of disciplinary practice into a reading of askesis, insofar as such 
practices are also disciplinary ones, of working on the self to achieve particular goals.  
However, insofar as askesis also has ties to care of the self and practices of freedom, we 
can use these ideas to show how such practices might have more leverage when it comes 
to positive, deliberate self-transformations.  Because these ideas refer to practices by 
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which one can come to know oneself better, care for oneself better, or change one’s being 
in some way, they represent some of the positive elements of discipline.  If we can take 
up deliberately chosen practices, in order to both express and enrich our freedom, it 
seems that these can be aligned with aims towards growth as the enrichment of a felt 
sense of agency.  What these ideas, in total, contribute, is a way of thinking about growth 
that always takes into account the social conditions in which people act and make 
meaning, as well as the ways in which responding to such conditions can be exercises of 
agency.  This is because taking them up as projects means, first, that we are agents in the 
midst of complex networks of power-knowledge, and second, that being agents in these 
networks means that we are bodily agents with the potential of transforming ourselves 
and our surroundings through the practices we take up.  Moreover, the practices we take 
up and the ways they can transform our embodied selves are distinctly felt, thoroughly 
embodied elements of agency; transformations of self are not solely cognitive 
experiences, but are experienced as shifts in the embodied possibilities and felt capacities 
of our existences.  They are not only practiced and actualized through embodied 
endeavors, but their results can be immensely influential with respect to the feeling we 
have of ourselves as embodied agents.  Recalling McWhorter’s words, learning to dance 
was not just knowing what to do in order to dance, it was feeling how to be the dance. 
 In taking up such practices of transformation, acknowledging that the aims of 
such practices might be sketchy or ambiguous at the outset, McWhorter writes,  
 The ‘goal’ is the expansion of behavioral options.  That means that the ‘goal’ we 
 aim at is simply that of being able to continue to change, to engage in new 
 behaviors, to try new things, to let new things happen without our sovereign 
 determination laid down in advance.  The ‘goal’ of such practices is just the 
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 continuation and proliferation of such practices.  The ‘goal’ is freedom, and 
 freedom only exists in and as events, practices, or exercises.286 
 
As such, the goal of transformation is the continuation of possibilities of transformation, 
the expansion of freedom’s potential, and we see an important link here with Dewey and 
his idea that the goal of growth is more growth.  I liken Foucault’s ideas to this concept, 
but I also think they add something valuable to it: not only the sense in which such 
growth always takes place in the midst of a complex social history, but also the sense in 
which such growth can be understood as the concrete development of agency in one’s 
life, the actual and felt sense of increased possibilities, the increased potential of 
actualizing possibilities.  Such agency develops, as McWhorter stresses, through events, 
practices, and exercises, which is also to say that such agency occurs through the body, 
what it does, and what it aims toward. 
 With this in mind, we might return to some of the bodily practices of schools 
which I mentioned in the introduction.  When it comes to the regular practice of sitting at 
a desk, raising one’s hand, and walking through hallways as signaled by bells, we can see 
that the typical range of movement comprising the majority of a school day (or at least, 
most in-class time and work) is rather limited.  This range of movement does not offer 
many novel possibilities for exploring one’s bodily potential or expanding one’s 
embodied sense of agency, and it may indeed instill feelings of one’s body and 
movement being restricted, hemmed in, or stifled.  Indeed, this is a part of the way our 
modern subjectivities operate via discipline – we learn that such feelings are part of the 
“greater good,” part of the process of learning, part of being in a monitored social space, 
and so on.  The counterweight to this mode of bodily being is often the (also restricted) 
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periods of time students have dedicated to physical activity: physical education classes, 
recess, and the in-class activities that might engage the body in some way.  What 
expanding on this range of bodily movements and options might entail, I argue, are more 
opportunities for students to experience themselves as embodied agents.  Moreover, in a 
Foucauldian line, these might bring opportunities in which students experience 
themselves more directly as embodied agents worth caring for, equipped with some 
mechanisms by which they can enact this care, and potentially expand their senses of 
freedom by exploring different practices of self-transformation. 
 For example, including practices such as yoga, meditation, dance, or martial arts 
into the options students have as part of their school day (as part of a physical education 
course, integrated into some class lessons, or perhaps as independent programs) might 
give students an opportunity to engage their bodies in a brand of meaningful, purposive 
activity that goes beyond performing work at a desk, also allowing them to engage their 
bodies in ways not (as heavily) prescribed by building structure or the temporality of they 
typical school day.  Not only do many of these practices focus on bodily strength and 
certain patterns of movement, but they also involve an engagement of the body that can 
teach students about themselves as embodied actors.   
 I will take yoga as a specific example, as this is a practice being implemented in 
some schools (and it is one I have more personal experience with).  Because yoga tends 
to focus on an integration of bodily movement and posture with a deep, mindful focus, 
students might develop ways of attending more carefully to their own patterns of 
concentration, ways of monitoring their own feelings and associated bodily reactions, and 
ways of finding calm in stressful situations.  They might discover a certain avenue 
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through which to feel empowered, in finding their strength, flexibility, and focus increase 
as they practice more frequently.  They might discover ways of challenging themselves, 
finding out where their personal boundaries lie and seeing how they might explore and 
experiment with them.  In short, they may find new ways of relating to and caring for 
themselves, which can further impact ways of engaging with others and approaching 
tasks to be accomplished.   
 This list of some potential benefits of this practice goes to demonstrate that such 
qualities – attending to, empowering, and challenging oneself – are things many 
educators would like to see their students exercise.  They are manifestations of growth, 
insofar as students’ abilities to encounter the world, others, and themselves are enriched 
with new and/or deeper connections.  Providing a means through which students can 
pursue these kinds of growth – and yoga, dance, etc. are just a few among many rich 
possibilities – can offer students resources in how they might continue such 
transformations on their own terms.  Recalling McWhorter’s description that efforts of 
caring for herself have nearly always lead her “to risk..., to explore, to attempt, to suffer, 
to expand, to grow,” it seems we might implement more avenues through which students 
have access to such practices of caring for themselves, giving them more opportunities to 
know themselves, to discover their possibilities, and to transform.  I believe there are rich 
resources for doing so in bodily practices, particularly insofar as such practices might 
highlight how agency works in and through one’s embodied life. 
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CHAPTER VI 
GROWTH, AGENCY, AND THE BODY:  
A “THREE DIMENSIONAL” PERSPECTIVE 
 
 At this point, we have covered a lot of ground, so it will be helpful to look back 
over the course of this project to see how we might synthesize these discussions.  The 
project began with an account of John Dewey’s educational philosophy, focusing 
particularly on his ideal of growth, acknowledging that this concept is a significant one 
for his approach to education and to a philosophical life, generally speaking.  However, 
in articulating this concept, I stipulated that my interpretation casts it as an ideal of 
agency, insofar as it signifies an increase in intelligence, reflective capacities, 
understanding of one’s self and the potentials of one’s actions, and thus, signals an 
enrichment in one’s sense of being able to act deliberately and in accordance with the 
goals of increasing one’s freedom and possibilities.  This articulation of growth then took 
us to an exploration of the body’s role in experiencing and cultivating this agency, as I 
argue that the experience of such agency is not a purely rational or intellectual one, but is 
a felt quality that is a vital part of one’s entire embodied experience.  Thus, we first 
looked at this character of embodied experience within Dewey’s work itself, then through 
the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michel Foucault.  So where have we gotten with 
all this?   
 Before outlining the contents of this final chapter, I wish to provide a brief, 
informal summary to answer these questions.  I take up embodied agency in this project 
because if we want to think about Deweyan growth, a central concept for his educational 
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philosophy, I think it is necessary to ask what this term means both conceptually as well 
as what it means in practice.  As I interpret this ideal to be a concept about practical 
intelligence and agency, about an intelligence that has teeth and accomplishes things in 
the world – as I believe Dewey would say also – this sense of intelligence can be most 
beneficially thought of according to the way humans exist and operate, and we exist and 
operate as bodies in the world.  Because we are bodies in the world and there are many 
ways of understanding what we are, the perspectives represented here are just a small 
slice of some of the most prominent ones available to Western academic philosophy.  
However, I believe each has something critical to offer a perspective of embodied agency 
as a way of interpreting Deweyan growth.  Insofar as growth aims toward more growth, 
or education aims toward the increase in possibilities for more, more interconnected, and 
more richly meaningful encounters with experience, I believe attending to the body’s role 
in achieving this growth is significant, insofar as it is always present within these 
encounters and sometimes is the explicit focus of such growth-oriented experiences.  The 
possibility of expanding one’s experience – the result of growth towards more growth – is 
one of the most valuable things I find in the practice of philosophy and the practice of 
education; enriching the possibility of seeing things anew, of experiencing the novel, of 
basking in a moment of wonder, or even catching it as a glimpse, as in Saito’s focus of a 
gleam of light.  To the extent that these experiences are possible, they are so within the 
body that I inhabit and which inhabits me, the body that makes my life possible, the body 
that holds all possibilities for my existence.  My hope is to continue enriching such 
possibilities for the course of my life, and as many educators would note, one of the most 
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powerful ways to do this is to help others along such a path also: to help them grow, to 
help them discover possibility, to help them realize their agency.   
 I offer this answer to provide something of an explanation for what has driven 
much of the work in this project, and to offer a less technical answer to the questions of 
what we might hope to gain from a multi-perspective account of Deweyan growth as 
embodied agency.  But at this point, a more technical answer is needed. 
 In this final chapter, I will return briefly to Dewey’s account of growth and his 
characterization of the body, to bring our attention back to these ideas.  In doing this, I 
will also raise the issue of why other perspectives are needed to flesh out the picture of 
embodied agency I am hoping to offer.  From here, I will briefly work through the most 
significant additions that Merleau-Ponty and Foucault add to this perspective: 
specifically, a phenomenological account of how the body’s agency is felt through its 
expressive potentials and its capacity of transcendence, and a social-political account of 
how disciplines, as well as the potential forms of transformation they can give rise to, are 
significant pieces of understanding how agency is concretely felt and experienced 
through bodily being.  Last, by synthesizing these perspectives on embodiment, I hope to 
show how a multidimensional conception of the body is helpful for fleshing out a 
conception of embodied agency, linking this back to growth as a significant educational 
goal.   
 
Deweyan Growth as an Educational Aim 
 To recall the main ideas covered in the first few chapters, I will begin with a few 
reminders from chapter two.  We began this chapter with Dewey’s definition of education 
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as a reconstruction of experience, taking up his definition of experience as a blend of 
activity-passivity, of doing-undergoing.  From there, we looked at Dewey’s description of 
growth as a primary aim of education, emphasizing education as occurring in the increase 
in and deepening of connections between experiences such that more meaning from them 
might be discerned, more meaningful interactions with future experience might be 
directed.  The active-passive character of experience is significant for Dewey’s concept 
of growth, in that understanding the connections between activity and how the 
consequences of activity are linked to it are important for the perception of connections, 
or markers of the achievement of growth.  After a brief inventory of some critiques of 
growth, I discussed the element of self-knowledge in education stressed by Cherilyn 
Keall and the element of agency in education stressed by Daniel Pekarsky.  Elaborating 
on these readings of Dewey, I argued similarly that growth might be understood as an 
idea regarding agency, emphasizing the way in which growth characterizes an element 
within educational experience that allows students to glean a greater understanding of 
themselves with respect to the situations in which they act, as well as an element which 
allows them a greater sense of intelligent, deliberate, and efficacious action within their 
worlds.  I also maintained that such agency is not just a cognitive or rational faculty, but 
represents an experiential, felt, and thoroughly embodied quality of one’s potential within 
experience.  
 From this point, chapter three took up more of Dewey’s ideas on experience, on 
habit and the human self, on embodiment, and on elements of experience that might be 
understood as growth or as agency.  We found that Dewey’s conceptions of human 
experience and the human being fall along naturalistic lines, viewing the human being as 
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an organism in an environment whose construction and character emerge out of habits, 
from the repeated ways we transact with others and with our environments, through the 
relationships of mutual influence we build with our surroundings and which sustain our 
existence.  I also outlined Dewey’s conception of the body-mind, an organic take on 
human life that views the self as emerging out of the habits an individual and a culture 
practice, paired with the qualities of experience that result from those habits and the ways 
these habits and qualities structure an individual’s future encounters.  In looking at 
Dewey’s conceptions of habit and experience, we also looked at his conception of the 
reconstruction of experience, seeing how habits and the connections between them might 
be transformed to alter the character of experience or our manners of responding to 
experience.  In outlining some characteristics of experience that might relate to a sense of 
Deweyan agency, we looked at his conceptions of will, intelligence, freedom, and the 
cumulative quality of having an experience.  This chapter concluded with a discussion of 
different facets of embodied life and different philosophical approaches to embodiment: 
ways of experiencing and conceiving of the body as mine and as not-mine, which pose 
alternatives to Dewey’s naturalistic conception of the body-mind as an organic being. 
 Thus, these chapters outline the foundations of the educational vantage point 
which I am exploring in this project as well as much of the grounding material for what, 
in Dewey’s educational work, constitutes a sense of growth.  I am compelled by Dewey’s 
assertion that growth is a touchstone of educational goals: that in the variety of subject 
matter and the range of possibilities offered by its methods, what education aims toward 
is the kind of reconstruction and expansion of experience that leads toward more 
reconstruction and expansion, offering the tools and proclivities to reach into experience 
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and discover what it has to reveal; and as Dewey claims, one of the most important habits 
imparted by education is the inclination and desire to continue such reaching and 
exploring.  This sense of possibility, of the endless potentials of learning more, of 
discovering more about oneself and one’s world, is one of the highest rewards that 
education can offer.  Indeed, Dewey closes Democracy and Education with the line, 
“Interest in learning from all the contacts of life is the essential moral interest.”287  As 
such, it stands to reason that one is best able to learn from all the contacts of life when 
one is able to make meaningful contact with the encounters of life, approaching such 
contacts with a sense of “what one is about,” and with a sense of purpose balanced with 
openness and generosity.  It seems to me that, recalling Keall’s insights about self-
knowledge and Pekarsky’s insights about agency, one might best encounter the various 
contacts of life when she has a sense of her place within her world, and thus, this entails 
having an embodied sense of trust in her self and her situation.  As such, I relate 
educational growth to embodied agency by linking the sense of expanding capacities and 
skills that genuine learning provides with the sense of expanding possibilities that 
genuine learning enables, stressing that such capacities and possibilities are both 
intellectual habits and skills as well as embodied, experiential qualities of existence.   
 However, while Dewey’s work gives us many rich resources for outlining what 
such an education calls for, I believe his work is somewhat wanting when it comes to 
articulating what such experiences can feel like “in the flesh,” as well as what conditions 
those very feelings and qualities of experience.  As such, I turn to the work of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty as well as Michel Foucault in fleshing out a picture of the experienced 
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and conditioned body, such that we might develop a thicker conception of embodied 
agency. 
 
Merleau-Ponty: Transcendence and the Body’s Expressive Agency 
 In articulating the feeling of the body as mine, I argued that a supplemental view 
might be a benefit to this project, in presenting a perspective that expresses a sense of 
what experience is like as a human body, how human life and agency are available to us 
because of our particular, embodied existences.  As such, chapter four takes up the work 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who examines and describes various qualities of human 
perception, human meaning-making, and human expression in their thoroughly fleshy, 
material characters.  In this chapter, I emphasized Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of 
embodied habit as a manner of increasing our potentials of meaning and activity in the 
world, as well as his claims that the body itself is an expressive capacity.  More 
importantly however, I stressed that his account of transcendence is significant for 
articulating a sense of embodied agency, insofar as the felt qualities of agency’s potential 
require a sense of moving beyond one’s own embodied subjectivity, of moving forward 
in time and outward into the world.  I believe that while Dewey’s accounts of 
intelligence, will, freedom, and having an experience all capture something significant 
about this facet of agency, Merleau-Ponty’s account presents a richer sense of the felt 
experience of (paradoxically) having one’s potentials rooted in one’s embodied life, 
while such rootedness is also the condition necessary for our agency and potential to 
extend beyond – transcend – the boundaries of our limited, bodily existences.  While 
indeed operating with a somewhat different conception of what the human self or the 
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human subject is than Dewey, I believe that Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the body and 
the extensive attention his analyses give to it provide a thicker sense of what the 
experience of agency is like, insofar as it is experienced as real and actual to the degree in 
which it is felt, not the degree to which it is rationally understood.   
  
Foucault: Social Conditions, Discipline, and Transformative Agency 
 Conversely, in articulating how the body is also, in a way, not-mine, I argued that 
another view on embodiment would further benefit this project, thus taking our attention 
to the work of Michel Foucault.  Because Foucault’s work emphasizes the ways in which 
the body is a social, historical structure, influenced through and through by the play of 
cultural forces upon and within it, I incorporated this view to articulate some of the ways 
in which we can experience and view the body as not-our-own, as influenced from 
“outside;” including the extent to which those “outside” forces structure much of our 
experience precisely by the ways in which pervasive cultural forces are experienced as 
interior, personal, and embodied qualities of existence.  While Foucault, like Dewey, 
operates with a constructivist conception of the human self or subject, his analyses go 
further than Dewey’s in detailing many of the historical trajectories that influence our 
contemporary environments.  I outline Foucault’s conception of discipline, specifically, 
to articulate a mechanism by which we internalize and embody meanings and patterns of 
our social culture, but also to articulate one of the primary ways we can then take up such 
meanings and transform them to suit our own purposes.  Foucault’s account of discipline, 
while in his earlier work stresses the character of social conditioning and the ways we 
modify our bodies and selves to work within cultural structures, also represents, in his 
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later work, some of the ways we can deliberately and responsively transform our 
activities, our bodies, and our selves.  Such transformations can represent huge boons, 
both for expanding our own experiences and enacting our potentials, increasing our 
capacities and senses of agency, as well as for our communities, insofar as 
transformations can take on social, cultural, and political norms and practices, addressing 
themselves to these spheres and aiming towards change in the climate of our historical 
present.  I argue that Foucault’s accounts of embodied subjectivity, discipline, and self-
transformation are helpful for characterizing some of the conditions of agency that 
pervade our embodied lives, thus enabling us to see them with more transparency and 
take them up with greater perspicacity, direction, pleasure, and possibility.  
 
All Together Now 
 Since this project has been focusing on educational growth, and my interpretation 
of this concept has focused on embodied agency, what might a picture of this agency look 
like, taking all these perspectives into account?  First, working from Dewey, we can say 
that agency involves intelligence, will, freedom, and it can involve the satisfaction he 
describes resulting from the completion of an experience.  It involves the operations of 
the body-mind, insofar as body-minds are organic beings that develop habitual manners 
of living, and through those habits, Dewey claims, we develop the kind of characters or 
selfhoods that can recognize and thus, alter those habits.  But further, I hope for this 
project to articulate more about the experience of embodied agency, about how the 
potentials and capacities for action require both the cognitive, conscious awareness of 
one’s abilities, but also the felt, experienced qualities of potential that entail the body’s 
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involvement.  Part of what this quality includes is, as Keall argues, the knowledge and 
felt capacities one builds up over time, knowing how past actions influenced past results 
and developing a sense of “what one is about” in given situations.  And I would further 
this: a solid sense of “what one is about” is not simply a kind of intellectual facility; it is a 
feeling of competence and capability, a sense of confidence that influences the way one 
approaches tasks, others, and the world.  As such, what Merleau-Ponty’s work 
contributes to this account of agency is the thoroughly embodied reality of human 
existence; the ways in which our manners of relating to the world and discovering 
ourselves are suffused with bodily intentionality, bodily feeling, bodily receptivity, 
bodily expression, and bodily transcendence – the “I can” of primary bodily 
consciousness.  This highlights the fact that my existence occurs as and through my 
body’s existence; but this is also not to limit human existence to a kind of “brute” 
materiality, claiming the complexities of human experience, intellect, and imagination are 
insignificant.  Rather, it is to acknowledge how complex, interdependent, and meaningful 
our human materiality is.  It is to underscore how our bodies are our pivots of existence, 
our openings to the world, and our sites of possibility; they are the locations of our 
agency, the sources of its existence and the means of its expression. 
 However, the fact that our bodies are our openings to the world and the sites of 
our possibility signals the fact that they are also sites of vulnerability, locations of 
influence and pivots for the operations of power.  The conditions that structure the 
possibilities of agency often work by means of the body, targeting it while working also 
on our social subjectivities.  Our possibilities are influenced and often limited by our 
concrete situations, and many of these situations revolve around issues of the body: age, 
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race, ability, gender, gender presentation, and sexual preference are among those 
enactments and engagements of the body that structure large portions of our lives, and 
those engagements are largely structured by cultural norms and practices as well as laws 
and institutional policies.  While the particular questions and controversies surroundings 
these issues change as knowledges and discourses change, as Foucault notes, the fact 
remains that bodies are a site of control, a site in which the operations of power find their 
points of contact, the places where they become effective.  However, as I discuss in 
chapter five, the fact that bodies are sites of power does not make them absolutely 
controlled, as if the reality that they are influenced by power means that their agency is 
nullified.  This, as I interpret Foucault, is far from the case.  The fact that bodies are sites 
of power means that they are also sites of resistance.  We can draw a kind of parallel here 
between Merleau-Ponty and Foucault: for Merleau-Ponty, bodies are sites of existence, 
meaning that they are also the sources or movements of transcendence; for Foucault, 
bodies are sites of incorporating power, meaning also that they are sites of resisting 
power and transforming experience.  Similarly, Dewey’s account of habit entails that 
because we are structured by individual and social habits, we can change our “selves” 
through modifying the very habits which constitute our character.  What these thinkers all 
stress is that because bodies are the locations where these habits take place, where 
existence finds transcendence, and power meets subjectivity, they are also the locations 
where subjectivity can reinterpret itself, where bodily practice can transform the power 
working within it, where expression and transcendence make the body more than 
existence, where habits coalesce to create a new “home.”  In McWhorter’s example of 
political activism, the behaviors and engagements of her body are precisely the targets of 
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discrimination, insofar as she is protesting the restrictions of gay rights, and the behaviors 
and engagements of her body are also what move against this discrimination, as she 
stands up and actively resists the policies regarding gays and lesbians in her state.  What 
this example shows, in articulating the point I wish to show in incorporating these 
perspectives together, is that while bodies are sites of influence, limitation, and inhibition, 
they are also sites of activity, potential, and agency. 
 Nonetheless, the fact that bodies contain this conglomeration of mixed meanings 
does not mean that they are uncontrollable, “brute” matter, or are beyond the bounds of 
approach; rather, it means they are the bearers of life in all its complications, injustices, 
and beauties: they are our existences, and as such, they are the homes for and the 
actualizations of our possibilities.  What we might hope for, along the lines of Foucault’s 
emphasis on transformation and Dewey’s emphasis on growth, is that we allow them – 
and they allow us – the possibility to keep experiencing possibility, the potential to keep 
increasing our potential, the reality of expansion and wonder in expanding our 
possibilities of experience.  It is in this light that I, interpreting Dewey’s idea of growth, 
believe that education might facilitate and encourage these possibilities.  As Dewey 
makes mention that attending to the obvious fact of the body in education would nearly 
revolutionize many of our educational practices, we might then think about some ways to 
enhance students’ possibilities of experiencing agency through their bodies in schools.  In 
engaging students’ entire embodied being in the practice of education, they might 
develop more and more effective resources for continuing to direct their own educations, 
to continue transforming their lives and their world.  Such practices encourage them to 
experience themselves as agents, and more specifically, as embodied agents with the 
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potential to continue growing, continue expanding the possible experiences their lives 
might encounter.  This is my interpretation of what Dewey means, at heart, when he 
emphasizes that the aim of education is growth, and the aim of growth is more growth: 
the embodied experience of agency, experienced as possibility. 
 As Marjorie O’Loughlin notes in Embodiment and Education, students, teachers, 
and others involved in schooling learn to carry their embodied selves in certain ways, and 
the ways they learn to carry themselves then works in creating a certain set of 
possibilities.  She explains that certain bodily behaviors – “walking, being seated, moving 
around and lingering in certain spots before taking up another cycle of activity” – shape 
“the perceptual tools of the individual ... creating patterns that will be repeated as certain 
kinds of relations and as layers of identity throughout life.”288  She elaborates further that 
these patterns of bodily movement and comportment, along with the values and 
categorizations of experience they impart, end up being much more than just corporeal 
habits, but become “ingrained as basic orientations towards the world.”289  Let us take 
this general example and see what kind of analysis the body thinkers of this project might 
perform, with respect to its potentials for cultivating embodied agency. 
 While there are certainly exceptions, the typical school day for American middle-
school students consists largely of being seated in one room for a period of time, working 
on a particular task or subject, moving through hallways or corridors to another room at a 
prescribed time (often signaled by a bell or alarm), and sitting in this room for a period of 
time, working on another task or subject.  Including breaks for eating and for recreation, 
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this structure tends to form the bulk of the school day’s patterns.  Physical education and 
art classes are, of course, another break in this routine; but as they often constitute a 
categorical split between intellectual work and physical work, they also move within a 
paradigm that designates mind/body engagements as relatively distinct and hierarchically 
organized.290  But let us focus for a moment on the long periods of seated work and 
walking through hallways as transitions in the spaces where such work occurs. 
 As we have seen Dewey note previously, the pupil “brings his body to school 
with him,” despite the fact that this model can make it appear that the body is simply 
what carries the student’s mind from place to place.  But if we think about Dewey’s 
emphasis on habit and the ways in which organism-environment transactions are the 
processes that shape the body-mind or the self, then this model creates a quite limited set 
of variations in the kind of body-environment transactions possible.  The spaces students 
occupy tend to be rather limited – hallways, desks, chairs, lockers – and moreover, they 
tend to be highly monitored.  As such, students tend not to have a very broad range of 
possible movements or possibilities for varying their environment within this scheme.  
And due to the ways they are monitored, aberrations from the proscribed kinds of 
movements or variations of environments tend to be met with reprimand.  The main 
thrust, however, is that greatly limiting the kinds of engagements and explorations 
students have with their environments – both natural and constructed – will in turn limit 
                                                
290 It is well-documented that such programs are also under serious threat by drastic 
budget cuts in current educational systems (see National Education Association, NEA 
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limitation or entire elimination of these programs are huge drawbacks for students, for 
more reasons than I have the space to delineate here, but especially when it comes to 
developing bodily confidence and agency in a wide variety of tasks.   
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the kinds of possibilities they discover and the ways in which they might understand 
“what they are about” within them.  If the felt sense of one’s place and potential within a 
situation is hesitant, lacking in self-confidence, or is simply suffused with impediment 
and inhibition, then one is less likely to develop manners of expressing and expanding 
one’s embodied agency within them; her options for engaging in this aspect of growth are 
likely to be limited. 
 Merleau-Ponty’s work on the body’s incorporation of habits continues this 
analysis, insofar as he characterizes the body’s acquisition and modification of habits as 
the “dilation” of one’s embodied dialogue with her environment.  If the conditions 
requiring modification are limited – students traversing and occupying the same types of 
spaces, performing similar bodily engagements even while taking on more challenging 
intellectual material as they progress through school – then we might look at how 
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis offers a phenomenological reading of how those limitations and 
repetitions might be felt.  Specifically, some of them might be felt as the intensification 
of one skill set at the expense of others; some might be experienced as actual 
impingements on one’s bodily flexibility and dynamism; some might be felt as anxiety or 
tension if bodily energies do not have the same degree of outlet as strictly “academic” 
energies.  To remain true to a thoroughgoing phenomenological account, the content of 
what each student feels as their embodied experience is likely to be somewhat different, 
and particular experiences are likely to have different effects on how students understand 
and feel the potentials of their agency.   
 However, working with the model outlined, Merleau-Ponty’s approach might 
diagnose a limitation in the ways students incorporate new types of bodily habits, it might 
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also be telling for describing limitations in how they manifest their body’s expressive 
capacities.  Because he emphasizes that the body is expression itself, restrictions on one’s 
space and on the potentials for how she can occupy, move through, and utilize that space 
– even if unconsciously felt – can have the effect, in turn, of making her experience her 
body’s expressive capacities as not equal to her intentions, or that her felt capacity for 
executing her purposes or taking on new bodily engagements is somewhat constrained.291  
Moreover, when it comes to the feeling of embodied agency in relation to a kind of 
transcendence, insofar as intentions, purposes, and actions carry one beyond oneself and 
past one’s bodily limits, the feeling of restriction in one’s capacities or potentials may 
have the further effect of curtailing the feeling of one’s agency in moving beyond 
oneself, as carrying out purposes into the future and into one’s world.292 
 When looking at Foucault and how his approach might treat this situation, we 
might think about the question he raises in Discipline and Punish: “Is it surprising that 
prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?”293  
This might guide us in a Foucauldian analysis of the model described above.  This is not 
to say that the form or function of schools, prisons, factories, etc. are all the same, but 
what it calls out is that they share an approach to modulating the space and time of 
individuals such that they experience themselves as subject to the codes and knowledges 
operative in those structures, effectively shaping their subjectivities with respect to those 
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mechanisms.  When it comes to the model of sitting, bell, coursing through hallways, 
sitting again, etc. we might see how Foucault’s approach would characterize these 
movements and practices as subject-forming, insofar as they provide the disciplinary 
mechanisms by which students come to understand their tasks, roles, successes, failures, 
and basically, their identities.  Again, we see that the habits developed in these 
transactions or the disciplines incorporated through these routines are ones that offer a 
relatively limited set of bodily possibilities, when it comes to the body’s proscribed role 
within the activities of the school day.  As such, we see from another angle ways in 
which the structure of spatial and temporal arrangement in schools, and the mechanisms 
for accomplishing the objectives therein, can be read as limiting the possibilities for 
cultivating the embodied agency of individuals.   
 However, when we think about Foucault’s emphasis on care of the self, askesis, 
and self-transformation, we might think about how bodily discipline can be engaged in a 
wider variety of ways and how this might offer potentials for students learning to 
empower themselves.  While disciplinary practice is at the heart of many forms of self-
transformation, the key to making such practices empowering is ways in which they 
might open up more possibilities for the individuals practicing them.  Thus, while not all 
school-centered disciplinary practices must be entirely self-directed, thinking about how 
to expand the range of possible disciplines students might engage in schools might open 
up new ways for them to envision their own bodily practices and embodied agencies, 
particularly in terms of new experiences of feeling bodily possibility.   
 Following up this more positive note, I would also like to look at a briefly noted 
example from the introduction to see how it might compare against these analyses.  The 
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EATS program of Downtown High School in San Francisco is a project-based curriculum 
designed for students who have been through the juvenile detention system or who have 
been unable to succeed in traditional high schools, for a variety of reasons.  The program 
consists of a year-long course broken into four components, focusing on (1) the basics of 
nutrition and the current condition of agribusiness in the U.S. market, (2) ecological 
sustainability, (3) local botany and horticulture, and (4) the social and philosophical 
implications of food accessibility and community health.  All the while, the class 
constructs an urban garden on the school’s campus, including the preparation and 
organization of space and construction of components within it (such as tilling soil, 
preparing composts, building raised bed frames, etc.), the planting and regular tending of 
the garden, and finally, the harvesting of crops and the celebration of its yield.  Not only 
did this program carry many students through to graduation who otherwise did not 
believe themselves likely to complete high school, but they also learned a variety of 
academic and life skills through the marriage of intellectual engagement and embodied 
action toward a collective goal.294  They developed skills and cultivated their felt 
possibilities of agency through this collaboration. 
 We might think about Dewey’s response to this scenario: in many ways, it enacts 
much of what his vision of education outlines.  It takes on local issues of importance to 
the individuals involved, while tackling the intellectual, investigative elements necessary 
to understand multiple sides of an issue, including its broader social impacts.  It engages 
                                                
294 Personal communication with Lauren Hoernig, a former Downtown High School 
teacher instrumental in designing and executing this program.  She reports that many 
students confided in her that they did not think they would finish high school, and this 
program was one of the few things that kept them engaged and invested enough to 
complete it. 
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the students in a variety of ways: from “book learning” to individual and collective 
inquiry to communal design and participation in a practice that benefits them all.  All 
facets of the academic content relate to the physical work and the tangible results of the 
students’ endeavor.  They get to literally reap the fruits of their labor, all while deepening 
their understandings of history, geography, agriculture, food science, economic and 
political issues, and conditions within their own communities.  Most importantly, they 
expand and enrich their felt, experienced potentials in approaching and changing socio-
cultural structures that have an impact on their lives and the well-being of their 
communities. 
 From Merleau-Ponty’s perspective, we might see how individual students develop 
bodily habits and expressions that may not have been available to them before; for some, 
perhaps answering part of the riddle for why traditional school systems had failed them.  
Many students may have experienced embodied possibilities in ways that schools had not 
presented to them prior, and this program allowed them to experience their expressive 
and transcendent embodiments by engaging new tasks and by collaborating with others in 
innovative ways.   
 From Foucault’s perspective, we might see how these students move from one 
predominant form of embodied subjectivity toward a different range of disciplinary 
emphases, which may contain more possibilities for transformation within it.  Because 
this program aims to develop disciplines and practices not taken up by most traditional 
schools, it is possible that students working in this program experienced new potentials 
and new benefits of disciplinary practice, thus opening up possibilities for self-
transformation by opening up new avenues of bodily engagement and social meaning. 
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 What these provisional analyses show is the extent to which meaningful bodily 
engagement can be a significant part of changing a student’s perspective toward and 
participation in learning.  If an important part of growth is the development of embodied 
agency as I have been arguing throughout this project, then exploring different models of 
educational participation could have tremendously beneficial results.  In addition to the 
EATS project and some experiments noted in the introduction (practices such as yoga, qi 
gong, and meditation), O’Loughlin suggests strategies such as educational drama, 
creative incorporations of dance in a variety of subjects (such as geometry), using music 
in math classes, explorations of architecture and built environments and the bodily 
relations they construct, incorporation of craft-knowledge with an emphasis on the body’s 
productive characters, and an emphasis on studying place in connection with politics and 
citizenship.295  Each of these practices could open up new potentials for the living 
meaning of what students learn in schools, not just seeing their relevance but feeling their 
significance through embodied practice.  While I am not advocating the complete 
elimination of the traditional classroom or school – this would offer a hardly tenable 
suggestion in practice – I do believe that exploring with more possibilities for engaging 
the body in the everyday structures and practices of learning would provide many 
benefits, particularly with regard to students’ experiences of embodied agency.  The 
EATS project demonstrates one particular model that employed variety in its approach to 
the curriculum and the practices of the school day; moving forward from their successes 
might be a place to start when it comes to modifying the conventional school structure.  
However, part of what the EATS model employs is a sensitivity to local circumstances 
                                                
295 O’Loughlin, Embodiment and Education, 52, 69, 111, 165, respectively. 
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and community needs; as such, any school working to adopt a similar approach would 
have to respond in kind with their own community’s situations.  However, as O’Loughlin 
suggests also, there are myriad ways in which students could engage bodily movement 
and action within the school day, without overhauling curriculum or structure.  In brief, 
what I believe these possibilities might enhance are the ways in which students might 
experience themselves as embodied agents, as capable and efficacious actors within 
situations, acknowledging that a significant content of situations are the felt qualities 
present within each one.   Whether addressing large scale modifications to educational 
approach, such as the EATS project, or smaller scale modifications like those O’Loughlin 
proposes and some of those I mention in the introduction, I believe that if students are 
equipped with a wider variety of tools for reading, understanding, and feeling the 
characters of situations, then they are more likely, I believe, to develop their capacities 
for feeling their own embodied agencies as actors within them.  Moreover, this might be 
understood as an important component for increasing one’s feeling of agency and ability 
to intelligently engage possibilities as she goes through life, which is a central part of 
what Dewey advocates for when he claims that growth is an aim of education.   
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